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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines how family background, measured as parents education, 
and household access to amenities affects children’s school enrolment, and how 
parents education affects earnings. I also examine how education and family 
background affects performance of unregistered urban businesses.  
In the first empirical study, rural educated parents’ effects on biological 
children’s enrolment were stronger, with educated fathers’ effects positive for boys 
and girls. Educated mothers helped boys, perhaps indicating more “traditional” values 
among women. Urban educated parents’ effects were weaker, which is plausible, given 
the weaker influence of “traditional” values. For non-biological urban children, 
educated mothers effect were adverse, suggesting that children fulfil a servant-type 
role to facilitate the educated mother’s market work. Poor access to amenities reduces 
enrolment.  
In the second empirical study, while family background was important for 
education, there were also direct effects of family background on earnings given 
education for urban individuals, implying that “connections” and nepotism may be 
important.  
The final study shows that education is important for performance of 
unregistered businesses without workers. Among firms with workers, education is 
insignificant, a result admittedly difficult to explain. Parental business ownership 
assists performance, an implication that parental business owners can effectively train 
children to business ownership.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
“Education is a human right with immense power to transform. On its foundation 
rest the cornerstones of freedom, democracy and sustainable human development”. 
(Kofi Annan, 1999) 
 
This chapter introduces the background and aims of the research. Section 1.1 
presents the motivation and background. Section 1.2 gives a by a brief introduction to 
education and employment options for individuals in the Ghana labour market in. 
Section 1.2 also highlights some key challenges to education in Ghana. The nature and 
composition of the labour market is presented in section 1.3, followed by the aims and 
objectives of the research in section 1.4. The organisation of the thesis is outlined in 
section 1.5.  
 
1.1 Motivation and background  
For many years, the goal of governments in most developing countries has been 
the need to ensure equal access to education and increased enrolment for children of 
school going-age. Human capital acquired through formal education is seen as an 
essential determinant of economic progress. It is pivotal in preparing individuals to 
enter the labour market by equipping them with the right skills and knowledge 
(Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001). In Ghana, education and 
more importantly, family background, play a major role in human development and 
labour market success, not only because of its direct influence on individual lifetime 
earnings, but also because it indirectly facilitates entry into high paid jobs (Kingdon 
and Söderbom, 2008). Family background also acts as an initial determinant of 
children’s educational attainment and future economic success. However, the 
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schooling decisions made by parents for their children could be determined by both 
the financial and human capital (formal education) of parents, in addition to the 
endowment of the child (Checchi, 2006). Family background, measured by parents 
education could proxy for parental tastes (Hannum et al., 2009), for parental ability 
(Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002), and also for the extent to which credit constraints 
(Brown and Park, 2002) bear on the household. Admittedly, children from wealthy 
families are more likely to be confronted with lower interest rates, an implication that 
wealthy parents will be able to invest more in their children’s education. Family 
background could also be an indicator of labour market knowledge and social 
networks. Educated parents often in good and well-paid jobs are able to provide their 
children with information about the labour market, and sometimes serve as role models 
for their children.  
In Ghana, however, even if parents are rational investors who care about 
themselves as much as their own children, they may sometimes be confronted with 
different economic needs that includes access to basic amenities that affect their 
decision to invest in children’s education.  As the views of many Ghanaian households 
are sometimes influenced by the views of rural and traditional societies, there is also a 
general perception of pro-son bias, even on the part of mothers (Lloyd and Gage-
Brandon, 1994). These bias may be rational to some extent, if it reflects the 
expectations of higher returns from male children (Song et al., 2006; Song, 2000) who 
are expected to stay with the family (whereas girls move out), and therefore parents 
invest in their male children with the hope of maximising their future utility. The rural-
urban locality distinction and household’s lack of access to basic amenities, as well as 
parental education, may affect the schooling enrolment decisions made by parents for 
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their children and could have lasting effects on children’s employment outcomes and 
labour market success. 
 
1.2 Education and labour market options in Ghana  
The importance of education for employment in Ghana is that, a higher level 
of educational attainment may enhance chances of finding well-paid jobs mainly in the 
formal sector. Those with post-basic education (senior secondary education and 
tertiary education) may also prefer to allocate into the more heterogeneous self-
employment category (both formal and informal). For those with lower levels of 
educational attainment (primary, and no education at all), the preferred sector is 
usually agriculture. Figure 1.1 shows the “path” to various employment options in 
Ghana. The arrows indicate the various pathways. It takes an average of 16 years to 
complete formal education (including tertiary education). At each level of education, 
an individual can opt out and enter the labour market. For the study on individual 
earnings in chapter 3 and business performance in chapter 4, only formal “wage” work 
and informal urban work are considered. 
Figure 1. 1 Education and employment in Ghana 
 
4 
 
There are however some challenges to educational attainment in Ghana that 
might have implications for the study. Especially for rural, poorer, and non-biological 
children, access to education may be restricted. These may have further implications 
on their labour market success. 
1.2.1 Challenges to education in Ghana 
Despite the importance of education for labour market success, education in 
Ghana is faced with major challenges in both access and participation. Apart from 
supply-side challenges, there are also demand-side challenges (which is what my thesis 
will address) which are of equal importance when addressing some of the challenges 
facing school enrolment and education in developing countries. Due for instance to 
household financial constraints and sociocultural norms, children’s education 
investment decisions made by their parents tend to be affected. Children from poorer 
households may therefore have less access to education. For this thesis, what this 
means it that, in households where children face financial constraints such as poor 
access to basic amenities, and where parents are less educated, children’s schooling 
enrolment chances will be low. An implication, especially for the Ghana labour market 
is that, individuals with fewer years of education and from poorer families will have 
limited access to higher paid jobs.  
1.2.1.1 Financial constraints 
Financial constraints on education are important in a poor developing country 
such as Ghana, as my research on family background and school enrolment in chapter 
2 will show. As reported by UN (2013), sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) alone accounts for 
more than half of the world’s out-of-school children and the key factor for the low 
schooling enrolment is poverty. Children from poorer families suffer because they 
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engage in income-generating activities to support the family. This means that poorer 
children will have to divide their time between educational activities and non-
educational activities, such as collecting firewood and fetching water. According to 
the UNDP/WHO (2009), approximately 74 percent of people in SSA had no access to 
electricity. In Ghana, 46 per cent of the entire population had no access to electricity, 
with the worst areas being those in rural areas. This thesis will show that, in households 
with limited access to basic amenities (light and water), children’s schooling enrolment 
probability reduces. This may have further consequences on labour market outcomes. 
Particularly for girls, this means that fewer women will have higher educational 
qualifications, which may contribute to the disadvantages women have in the labour 
market. In consequence, there will be a reduced number of women in high paid jobs.  
Financial constraints also mean that non-biological children compared with 
biological children may be disadvantaged. With the considerable degree of child 
fostering in Ghana, poorer parents send their children to join other relatives and non-
relatives in order to benefit from, for instance, educational opportunities. However, 
these may sometimes not always yield the intended outcomes. Non-biological children 
may instead be used as additional household support, and their school enrolment 
chances may be affected. The study will examine this possibility by looking at how 
educated parents and household wealth, measured as access to basic amenities, affects 
the schooling enrolment of non-biological children. 
1.2.1.2 Socio-cultural beliefs 
Socio-cultural beliefs may also have an effect on human capital investment 
decisions by parents. In traditional Ghanaian societies where males are regarded as 
household heads and breadwinners, the practice of entrusting family wealth and assets 
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into the care of sons encourages parents to favour sons over daughters when making 
education investment decisions. In making education investment decisions, parents 
will generally value that part of investment in education which benefits them directly, 
since the returns to female education are mostly enjoyed by the in-laws (Kingdon, 
2002). Parents therefore consider boys as an effective source of future financial help 
(‘pensions’) in older age. 
Particularly for girls, cultural and traditional beliefs have serious implications 
for enrolment chances. In rural and traditional communities, girls are used in 
household support and income-generation activities which reduces their chances of 
participating in school, and ‘forces’ parents to remove them from school. Girls are 
generally preferred to boys for carrying out household chores such as fetching water, 
collecting firewood, cooking, taking care of the elderly and sick, and caring for 
younger siblings. For this thesis, an attempt will be made to identify whether in rural 
areas where parents are generally more traditional, the schooling enrolment of children 
particularly girls will suffer. The study will further examine whether in urban areas 
where parents are more educated and have lesser traditional beliefs, school enrolment 
of girls improves.  
These challenges show how important family background is for children’s 
schooling, and later labour market outcomes. Not only does family background affect 
enrolment of children into schools, family background also alters the preferences and 
expectations in relation to children’s future economic success. The study will show 
that, in households with limited access to basic amenities (due in part to financial 
constraints), education of children especially girls’ falls. For the labour market, the 
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implications of these are that access to wage jobs will be limited to individuals with 
higher levels of education and those with highly educated parents. 
 
1.3 Labour market and employment composition in Ghana 
The Ghana labour market consists mainly of workers in agriculture, paid 
employment, and self-employment.1 Agriculture constitutes about 54.18% of the 
labour market. In rural areas alone, 74.79% of workers were in agriculture compared 
with only 15.45% in urban areas.  
Non-agricultural self-employment accounts for 26.33% of the working force. 
Unlike rural areas that are dominated by agricultural activities, most non-agriculture 
self-employment activities take place in urban areas (44.52%). In rural areas, this 
accounted for only 16.64% in 2006. Wage employment constitute only 16.96% of the 
total labour force. In urban areas, 35.62% of the total labour force in 2006 were in paid 
employment, compared with only 7.04% in rural areas. The remaining 2.53% of the 
labour force were domestic workers, apprentices and in other unclassified economic 
activities.  
This thesis will show that in wage employment where workers are generally 
paid higher, education and family background tend to be important for individual 
earnings. For the informal economy that is made up of unregistered businesses, 
education may be less relevant for business success. Due to circumstances of poverty, 
family business experience may be a more relevant factor for business success. 
                                                   
1 The analysis was carried using data from Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) 2006 for 
individuals aged 16 to 60 years. All figures are based on author’s calculations.  
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1.4 Research aims and objectives 
Education and family background could be important for future economic 
success. At early stages of an individual’s life, the level of parents’ education, in 
addition to household wealth could determine the schooling enrolment and educational 
attainment of children. The level of education an individual receives could also 
potentially enhance their chances of finding good jobs. In addition to education, family 
background is important for labour market success in Ghana. Family background 
effect on earnings works directly through either educated parents’ “connections” and 
knowledge of the labour market, or indirectly through the positive effects it may have 
on the individual’s education. Even for those unable to find wage jobs, family 
background through experience from parental business ownership and formal 
education could potentially enhance business performance. These possibilities are 
investigated in the three empirical chapters of the thesis. The three parallel objectives 
of the thesis are highlighted below.  
The first empirical chapter (chapter 2) builds on the observation that children’s 
education (schooling enrolment) in rural areas fall behind their counterparts in urban 
areas. The chapter investigates whether poorer, more traditional families (rural) are 
more boy-centred than richer and more urbanised families. The study examines in 
particular, how educated parents affect schooling enrolment of children aged 6 to 19 
years using household data from the 2006 Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS). 
Since parents are assumed to be more altruistic (Case et al., 2000) towards their own-
birth children, the preferences of parents may differ between biological and non-
biological children (e.g. fostered, adopted, and other children). With child fostering 
being very common in parental behaviour in Ghanaian households, there is little 
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research on how parents’ education investment decisions are affected by their 
relationship with the child. This chapter will therefore consider the situation for non-
biological children, who generally receive different treatment because biological 
parents tend to be more altruistic towards their own children. The study further 
examines how the lack of access to basic amenities in the form of water and light 
affects children’s schooling enrolment in both rural and urban areas. This 
consideration is important because children in households without good access to basic 
amenities are usually expected to devote a substantial amount of their time to 
collecting firewood and fetching water, which could mean that parents remove them 
from schools. 
The second empirical chapter builds on the previous empirical chapter by 
examining the importance of education in mediating (where education influences the 
effects of family background on earnings) the association between family background, 
measured as parents’ education, and labour market success for individuals aged 25 to 
60 years in wage employment. This study is based on individual data from the 2006 
GLSS. Considering the nature of the labour market in Ghana, education alone may not 
be sufficient for economic success. For instance, Pellizzari (2010) note that in labour 
markets with intermediaries, the effects of personal contacts on finding well-paid jobs 
tend to be higher. Individuals from wealthy families (educated parents) may be able to 
benefit from their parents’ knowledge of the labour market and “connections” (Hudson 
and Sessions, 2011). These advantages could enhance their chances of earning higher 
wages in the labour market. As for those with relatively poorer parents (often the less 
educated ones), the effects of family background may be less important for labour 
market success. Such individuals may therefore allocate into lower paid jobs. The 
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empirical analysis for this chapter will focus on the extent to which family background 
is correlated with the individual’s education, and given the individual’s education, the 
impact family background may have on labour market success, measured as earnings. 
The estimations are carried out using a simultaneous equation model that allows me to 
test the direct and indirect effects (via education) of family background. 
The last piece of empirical analysis (chapter 4) considers the role of education 
and family background in determining business success. The analysis here is based on 
a World Bank Survey of Informal firms (unregistered firms) in five urban areas in 
Ghana. Given the limited access to wage jobs, the informal sector is a sector of great 
interest for government policies, particularly because unregistered businesses in 
general constitute an undervalued contribution to national production levels. A 
heterogeneous group of people normally engage in informal economic activities in 
Ghana. These include both educated and uneducated people, and, for instance those 
struggling to find wage jobs. In the literature from developed countries, there is 
evidence indicating that education of firm owners and managers is important for firm 
performance (Parker and Praag, 2006; Bosma et al., 2004), and productivity (Aggrey 
et al., 2010). Highly educated managers in manufacturing firms are also associated 
with higher productivity (Goedhuys et al., 2008). However, most of these studies are 
on entrepreneurs that operate in the formal sector. Given the nature of the labour 
market and unfavourable government regulations on businesses, the positive effect of 
education may not always hold for a less developed country such as Ghana. At the 
same time, the literature also find that the likelihood of good business performance is 
higher among children of business owners than among children of non-business 
owners (Fairlie and Robb, 2007; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Hout and Rosen, 2000; 
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Chlosta et al., 2012; Colombier and Masclet, 2008). Explanations for the 
intergenerational transmission are that the human capital acquired through informal 
learning and apprenticeship-type training provides an opportunity correlated with 
business success (Colombier and Masclet, 2008; Lentz and Laband, 1990). 
Based on these considerations, the third empirical chapter will examine the effects of 
firm owners’ education and family background, measured as parents’ education and 
parents’ business ownership) on business performance among unregistered urban 
firms in Ghana. Addressing these issues are of great importance in Ghana for the 
simple reason that unregistered businesses are the main source of employment and 
incomes for most urban households. Informal economic activities and unregistered 
businesses in Ghana are also an entry point for the less advantaged to integrate into the 
more challenging urban labour market environment.  
 
1.5 The organisation of the study 
In the following chapters of this thesis, the three empirical studies outlined 
above will be presented and concluding comments provided. Chapter 2 focuses on 
schooling enrolment of biological and non-biological children, and the impact that 
educated parents and household’s lack of access to basic amenities may have on school 
enrolment using the 2006 Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS). Chapter 3 also uses 
individual level data from the 2006 GLSS to examine the linkages between education, 
family background and labour market success for individuals aged 25 to 60 years. In 
the final empirical study (chapter 4), data from the 2013 World Bank Informal Firms 
Survey (IFS) for Ghana is used to investigate the role of firm owners’ education and 
family background on performance of unregistered businesses in five urban cities. 
12 
 
Chapter 5 provides conclusions from the three empirical studies, and directions for 
future research.   
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CHAPTER TWO: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN EDUCATION AMONG 
BIOLOGICAL AND NON-BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN: EDUCATED 
PARENTS AND HOUSEHOLD POVERTY 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Children’s education can depend on the education and circumstances of their 
parents, and the education of a child’s mother and father is routinely included in 
empirical work as a determinant of education. Parental education could proxy for 
parental tastes (Hannum et al., 2009), for parental ability (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 
2002), and also for the extent to which credit constraints bear on the household (Brown 
and Park, 2002). In Ghana, education plays a major role in labour market success not 
only because it directly increases earnings, but partly because it indirectly facilitates 
entry into paid employment and formal employment jobs (Kingdon and Soderbom, 
2008).  
In this study, an examination of how educated parents and other variables such 
as household access to basic amenities affect both boys’ and girls’ schooling enrolment 
in rural and urban areas is considered. The literature tends to show starting with 
Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) and more recently Qian (2008) and Zhao and 
Glewwe (2010), that improvements in the mother’s position help daughter’s education, 
with improvements in the father’s position helping sons, perhaps for cultural reasons 
since fathers may be more aware that sons help support the family in adulthood 
(whereas daughters marry out). For instance, Hannum (1998) demonstrate that in 
households where parents face financial difficulties, the chances of boys’ enrolment 
into school is higher than the chances of girls’ enrolment. Interestingly, Li and Lavely 
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(2003) also show that mothers with a culture of traditional belief are more likely to 
have pro-son attitude.  
Using matched data on children2 and parents from the 2006 Ghana Living 
Standards Survey (GLSS), the study investigate why some children do not enrol in 
school. This is done by examining, in addition to household’s lack of access to basic 
amenities, how educated parents enhance children’s school enrolment. The study 
investigates whether the poorer, more traditional educated rural parents are more boy-
centred than the richer and more urbanised parents. The study further considers the 
situation for non-biological children. This consideration is important because although 
child fostering is common in most urban sub-Saharan African (SSA) households, very 
few studies have investigated the influence of parents’ education3 and household 
access to basic amenities on non-biological children’s education chances. Many 
studies on education investment instead treat the household as consisting of only own-
birth children. However, the considerable degree of child fostering (from the 2006 
Ghana Living Standards Survey, about 10% of children of school-going age were in 
households with a non-biological parent) taking place in Ghana means it is important 
to consider the role of non-biological parents in human capital development. To 
address this gap, the study examines how educated parents and household resources 
affects schooling enrolment of non-biological children within households in Ghana.4  
                                                   
2 Children refer to biological and non-biological (adopted, house helps, other relatives, and 
non-relatives) children of household heads. 
3 A related study is Siaens et al. (2006) who examine the probability of school enrolment for 
orphans as part of a study on assessing the welfare of orphans in Rwanda. Also, Shapiro and 
Tambashe (2001) control for the relationship of the child to the household head on children’s 
educational attainment in Congo. 
4 Throughout this study, non-biological children are treated synonymous with foster children. 
Foster children in this study refer to children other than the household head’s own child. 
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2.1.1 Background  
The relatively lower rate of enrolment of children into schools across 
developing countries is partly due to financial constraints faced by parents. Children, 
in Ghana, especially girls, suffer the consequences of poverty by helping parents with 
household income generation activities such as farming and petty trading. The lack of 
financial resources implies also that parents will invest more in the education of 
children who they believe will cater for their long-term financial security. If parents 
are more altruistic and especially so towards sons because sons generally provide for 
parents’ long-term financial needs, then educational investment in sons will be higher 
than daughters. In addition, the views of many Ghanaian households are often 
influenced by the views of rural and traditional societies of pro-son bias. Boys 
compared with girls are given higher education partly because boys in effect provide 
more financial benefits ‘pensions’ particularly for rural parents in their old age. Girls, 
on the other hand are given fewer years of schooling for the simple reason that they 
are expected to relocate to their in-laws. Therefore, girls’ in-laws receive a greater 
share of the returns to education compared with own parents (Levine and Kevane, 
2003). While such behaviour would be consistent with parents being rational investors, 
in Ghana, parents are confronted with other needs and imperatives that influence their 
decision to invest in children. These inter-temporal decisions may generate differential 
investments in children’s human capital that might be unrelated to preference or bias 
particular to a given society (Yueh, 2006).  
Parents’ education investment decision in Ghana may also be influenced by the 
relationship with the child. As parents generally tend to be more altruistic towards their 
own-birth children (Becker, 1991; Case et al., 2000), investment in non-biological 
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children can be affected negatively. For instance, foster children can provide support 
in the form of labour and household chores in exchange for food, shelter, and 
importantly, education. The involvement of children in household support activities is 
therefore likely to reduce their level of participation in education activities, for 
example, when parents remove them from school.  
Based on these considerations, the study examines whether in urban areas, 
educated parents advance children’s schooling enrolment, in particular girls’. Since 
improvements in a mother’s position reduces the education gender gap (Zhao and 
Glewwe, 2010; Qian, 2008), a further investigation of whether educated mothers 
increase the chances of daughters’ schooling enrolment in urban households. In rural 
areas, the study accesses whether educated parents invest more in sons’ education, 
possibly as a way of maximising their future financial benefits through the provision 
of financial security as a kind of family sourced ‘pension’. The study also investigates 
this for the case of non-biological children. If non-biological children are 
disadvantaged because they make more significant contributions to household 
activities, then a possible negative or insignificant effects of parents’ education is 
expected, especially maternal schooling, on foster children’s enrolment probability. 
Lastly, the study examines how the lack of access to basic amenities (an indicator of 
household wealth) in the form of water and light affects children’s schooling enrolment 
in both rural and urban areas. This consideration is important because children in 
households without good access to basic amenities will be expected to devote a 
substantial amount of their time to collecting firewood and fetching water, which could 
mean that parents remove them from schools. 
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2.1.2 Organisation of the chapter 
The remainder of the chapter discusses relevant propositions and hypothesis 
relating to parents’ education investment decision, followed by a review of the 
literature in section 2.2. The theoretical framework for the empirical model of 
educational investment is discussed in section 2.3. Section 2.4 provides a description 
of the data and the variables used for the empirical analysis, followed by the model 
specification in section 2.5. Sections 2.6 and 2.7 presents a discussion of the results 
and conclusions of the study respectively. 
 
2.2 Theoretical underpinnings of investment in children’s education 
Many propositions have been put forward as influential in parents’ investment 
in children’s education. Economic and social motives are plausible reasons when 
parents are making education investment decisions for their children. One of such 
arguments hypothesises that, parents are more altruistic towards their own-birth 
children and care about their welfare (Becker, 1991). As such, investment in own-birth 
children’s education is likely to be higher compared with investment in non-biological 
children’s education.  
Parents, by devoting most of their resources to their own-birth children implies 
that, children who are raised in families with non-biological parents will be 
disadvantaged and may receive different treatment (Becker and Tomes, 1986), and 
there are some reasons for this (Case et al., 2000). Some parents treat non-biological 
children differently because of possible ability differences. In addition, if parents have 
higher expectations of financial support from their own-birth children in their old age 
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(Plug and Vijverberg, 2003), then the investment in biological children’s education 
will be higher.  
Lillard and Willis (1994), however, believe that the investment in children’s 
education does not necessarily depend on parental altruism. Instead, the differential 
returns to education is a major reason why parents may sometimes invest differently 
in boys and girls. The authors argue that the pattern of labour demand could influence 
the preferences of parental education investment decisions. A shift away from 
agricultural occupations such as farming and domestic services to a more industrial or 
service-based activities during periods of economic development can significantly 
alter the preferences of parents. If the claims of Lillard and Willis (1994) are valid, 
then the traditional pro-son argument I propose could be weakened, as parents might 
want to invest more in high ability children rather than solely on the grounds of 
traditional beliefs. 
Gertler and Glewwe (1992) also suggest that irrespective of the financial 
benefits from education (i.e. benefits that may accrue directly to the child, and benefits 
that may accrue to the parents through future financial support), parents may still prefer 
educated children. By investing in children’s education, parents are able to enhance 
their children’s welfare. Educating children can also bring financial returns to the 
parents in the long term. This is important particularly for developing countries where 
there is a poor welfare support system and therefore parents rely more on children for 
financial support in their old age.  
However, according to Alderman and King (1998), the expected transfers from 
children to parents in their old age may differ by gender, and therefore parents would 
prefer to invest in educating children who are likely to remit more in the future, usually 
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boys. Given that sons retain loyalty to their family than daughters, parents often see 
the investment in girls to be risky, especially when daughters relocate to join their in-
laws (“virilocality”) after marriage (Adam, 1947; Levine and Kevane, 2003). Parish 
and Willis (1993), also argue that, in the presence of financial constraints, parents are 
forced to favour sons’ education over daughters’, because sons generally provide long-
term financial security for parents compared with daughters. Michelson and Parish 
(2000) also share this view and speculate that since women, compared with men make 
enormous contributions to family income, parents may therefore not be compelled to 
invest heavily in girls’ education in the same way as they would for boys. 
If daughters are allowed to leave their parents’ home to join their in-laws, then 
the private return to the parent from girls’ education investment will be lower than 
their private return in their sons’ education. There are, however, short-term benefits of 
investment in daughters, mainly through monetary and non-monetary transfers to the 
girls’ family during the process of marriage “bride-price”. For instance, Mahmud and 
Amin (2006), argue that since the preferred outcome of investing in girls’ education is 
marriage, parents are more willing to educate girls in the same way they invest in boys’ 
education. Short-term benefits could therefore incentivise parents to invest in 
daughters’ education. Garg and Morduch (1998), suggests, however that, the marriage 
market in Ghana is imperfect and unable to compensate parents for any investment in 
their daughters’ education. Due to this, the return to investment in boys’ rather than 
girls’ will be more beneficial to parents in the long term. In rural China, for instance, 
due to traditional beliefs, parents tend to prefer a good marriage to a good job for their 
daughters. Parents therefore focus more on securing a good husband for daughters than 
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investing in girls’ long-term career which remains uncertain should girls relocate to 
their in-laws’ house (Li and Tsang, 2003). 
Affecting parents education investment decision is also the resource dilution 
hypothesis (Blake, 1981). In households with more children, investing in the education 
of each child by parents’ is more expensive, compared with parents with fewer 
children. This implies that, for credit-constrained families, investing in all children’s 
education becomes complicated. 
Regardless of how the educational investment decisions are modelled, these 
conflicting and yet interesting propositions suggest that parents’ education investment 
decisions in children could be complicated. The study contributes to the literature by 
examining the effects of parents’ education on the schooling enrolment of both 
biological and non-biological children in Ghana. 
2.2.1 Previous empirical findings 
The remainder of this section discusses empirical findings from the literature 
on determinants of children’s education. Findings related to the effects of parental 
education are first discussed followed by other possible determinants, such as those 
relating to the resource dilution hypothesis, time-use, and those relating to differences 
because of parent-child relationship.  
2.2.1.1 Education of parents and effects on children’s education 
Parents’ level of education are a major determinant of the schooling of 
children, and could possibly explain some of the difference in parental preferences 
regarding children’s education. Educated parents are able to assist their children at 
home, especially when it comes to completing school assignments. Parental education 
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level also determines the extent to which children may stay in school (Behrman and 
Rosenzweig, 2002).  
A number of studies find positive relationships between the education of 
parents and education of children (Alderman et al., 1996; Drèze and Kingdon, 2001). 
Although the education of both mothers and fathers are known to positively affect 
enrolment chances and educational attainment of children, Lillard and Willis (1994) 
find that despite educated mothers having a more positive effect on girls’ education 
than on boys’ education, these positive effects may also be indicating the quality of 
mother’s time in childbearing. A related argument is that, mothers that are more 
educated usually have smaller families, and are therefore able to devote time towards 
the upbringing of children. This is similar to Summers (1994), who argues that 
educated mothers are more able to control their fertility. Lillard and Willis (1994) find 
also that, the education of father’s have a stronger positive effect on their sons’ 
educational attainment, a possible suggestion of same-sex intergenerational effect. 
Tansel (2002), find that in Turkey, schooling achievements of children 
increases with the level of parents’ education. The author notes that the impact of both 
parents’ level of education is larger for girls’ schooling achievement than boys’ 
schooling, except for the effect of the mother’s primary education, which the author 
found not to have any effect on schooling. Glick and Sahn (2000), find evidence in 
Guinea to show that a higher level of the father’s education raises the likelihood of 
children’s school enrolment, but more importantly for sons. In addition, the authors 
found that mother’s education only increases the chances of girl’s schooling 
enrolment. In China, Song et al. (2006) find evidence that educated mothers have a 
stronger impact on enrolment at primary school level for both boys and girls compared 
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with fathers’, but a weaker effect on post-primary enrolment on girls. Similarly, Zhao 
and Glewwe (2010) find that improvement in the mother’s position (due to level of 
education) helps reduce the education gender gap, whereas an improvement in the 
father’s position only increases the gap, possibly because fathers tend to favour sons 
in education investment decision. In addition, Connelly and Zheng (2003) find that the 
level of parents education has different effects for both boys and girls.  
This evidence shows that empirical studies on the effects of parents’ education 
on children’s education is inconclusive. For Ghana, especially in rural and traditional 
areas where fathers generally make most of the household decisions, including 
children’s education, the effect of educated parents especially mother’s on children’s 
school enrolment may be different. This study contributes to the literature by 
examining this for rural and urban children (both biological and non-biological) in 
Ghana.  
2.2.1.2 Parents’ employment effects on children’s education  
Related to the effects of parental education on children’s education is the effect 
of parent’s employment. Parental employment or occupation sometimes determines 
how rich or poor a family is, and could affect the long-term outcomes of children. 
However, studies examining how the employment status of parents affects the 
educational attainment of children is inconclusive. Ermisch and Francesconi (2000) 
suggests that there are short-term and long-term effects of parental employment on 
children’s welfare. In the short-term, maternal employment negatively affects 
children’s socioeconomic adjustment, whereas in the long term, maternal employment 
lowers educational attainments. Ermisch and Francesconi (2000), also suggest that 
these have a long lasting impact on labour market performance of children. 
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Interestingly, the authors find that the effects are less severe for children of mother’s 
in better jobs. Similarly, they find that children’s outcomes are positively related to 
father’s employment. Unsurprisingly however, Lillard and Willis (1994) find that the 
chances of a child to enrol or continue schooling is reduced if the child’s father is a 
farmer, with a larger effect for girls. Evidence from some developed countries show 
that children’s educational attainments are enhanced by the employment/occupational 
status of their parents. (Schildberg-Hoerisch, 2011).  
For this study, only father’s employment status is included as an additional 
determinant of children’s schooling enrolment chances. In Ghana and other traditional 
societies, mostly developing countries, father’s employment or occupation is seen as 
the main determinant of wealth or socioeconomic status of the family. Mother’s 
employment is not commonly used because of historically lower levels of women’s 
participation in the labour market (Marks, 2011). For instance, only 4.7 percent of 
mothers are in professional jobs, compared with 21 percent of fathers. In rural areas, 
this represents only 1.43 percent for mothers compared with 9 percent for fathers. In 
urban areas, this is 14 percent and 52 percent for mothers and fathers respectively.   
2.2.1.3 Resource dilution and its effects on education 
Another determinant of children’s education in developing countries follows 
from the resource dilution hypothesis (Blake, 1981). This hypothesis suggests that as 
the number of children available to parents’ increases, the amount of material 
resources and parental attention available to each child decreases. This is predominant 
in rural and small areas where childbirth and family sizes are large. The opportunity 
costs and benefits of children’s education are therefore likely to vary by the number of 
siblings in the house and the order of birth.  
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2.2.1.3.1 Sibship size and birth order effect  
Despite the importance of children in, for instance, contributing to household 
activities, the total number of children available to parents can partly determine how 
education investment decisions are made. Sibship size, or family size effect on 
children’s schooling enrolment and education has been well documented in the 
literature for developing countries. However, the evidence in support of a negative 
effect of family size on enrolment is not universal. These effects may be due to for 
instance, socioeconomic, political and cultural influences (Buchmann and Hannum, 
2001; Steelman et al., 2002). Lu (2009) and Lu and Treiman (2008) argue that the 
availability and distribution of family resources may be affected by some of these 
influences. For South Africa, Cornwell et al., (2005) find that having more children of 
school-going age in the household increases school enrolment of other siblings. The 
authors relate this effect to economies of scale in schooling, and schooling culture. The 
economies of scale of schooling arises because as the number of children increases, 
the extra cost associated with enrolling one more child may be considerably lower than 
the cost associated with educating the first child. This is typical in African societies, 
where because of financial constraints and parents’ resourcefulness, older siblings pass 
on their books, uniforms, and even accompany younger siblings to school. Older 
siblings also serve as ‘home teachers’ to the younger ones, which help reduce other 
associated costs of education, such as private tuition fees. 
In Congo, there is evidence that girls’ rather than boys’ schooling enrolment 
suffers in households with more children (Shapiro and Tambashe, 2001). This makes 
sense, especially in an African country context where girls are generally disadvantaged 
due to cultural norms, and often burdened with household chores. As regards the larger 
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effect for girls, the authors associate this to resource constraints, and the ‘chain of 
educational assistance’ as the reason for boys. That is, older male siblings are able to 
offer educational support to younger siblings.  
On the other hand, Buchmann (2000) makes no finding of a negative effect of 
the number of children on the probability of school enrolment in Kenya. This finding 
is also plausible because, in rural communities where family size is relatively large, 
children may have to contribute to household income generation by participating in 
unpaid activities. In contrast to the evidence of no or little effect of family size on 
children’s education, Parish and Willis (1993) find family size to be negatively related 
to children’s education in Malaysia.  
As regards birth order effects, evidence suggests that the costs of having more 
children may be borne by older siblings who usually assist parents with household 
management duties. Advocates of the resource dilution hypothesis argue that birth 
order matters extensively in parents’ educational decision. Some predict that earlier-
born children are more advantaged because they tend to get greater levels of attention 
and engagement from parents compared with later-born children (Behrman et al., 
1994; Jæger, 2009). Children born at later years of parents’ life are more likely to 
receive greater financial support, mainly because, parents may have accumulated more 
wealth (Jæger, 2009; Powell and Steelman, 1995). Enrolment into schools are higher 
for younger siblings because they may not be required by parents to contribute to 
family income and household support activities in the presence of older siblings 
(Buchmann and Hannum, 2001). As for the gender effect, females having younger 
siblings and male siblings have a lower likelihood of enrolment. This arises partly 
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because, girls in general compared with male and younger siblings provide more 
household support services (Glick and Sahn, 2000; Levison and Moe, 1998).  
The evidence from the literature indicates that parents’ education investment 
decision can be a complicated one. In a country where sociocultural norms are 
prevalent and one where education investment decisions made by parents are 
influenced by economic reasons, it is expected that the effects of educated parents on 
school enrolment will differ between gender, location, and even relationship of child 
to parent. This study consider these possibilities, and while focussing on how educated 
parents and household resources, measured as access to basic amenities, impacts on 
biological and non-biological children’s school enrolment in rural and urban areas, the 
study also accounts for any possible evidence of resource dilution by controlling for 
the number of children in the household. 
2.2.1.4 Time-use effect and children’s education 
Apart from the effects of parents’ education on school enrolment, time-use on 
other non-educational activities can play a role in school enrolment of children, and 
even on their labour market outcomes. For instance, Greenwood et al. (2005) show 
that in households with no access to electricity, labour market participation, especially 
among women tend to be low. Similar arguments apply to children that engage in non-
educational household work. In fact, the literature on child labour and schooling tend 
to show a negative correlation between schooling and time spent on non-educational 
activities. Amin et al. (2006) examine how market work and household work affects 
children’s education in Bangladesh. The authors find that household work significantly 
reduces girls’ education, with no significant effect on boys’ although negative. As 
regards the effects of market work, the authors find instead that boys rather than girls’ 
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education reduces, with an insignificant effect on girls’ education. Khanam and Ross 
(2011) also find that children involved in work, that is, both household work and 
market work, are associated with reduced schooling enrolment.  
In this thesis, the possibility of household wealth having an effect on schooling 
enrolment using household’s access to basic amenities, measured as access to light and 
water is considered. The lack of access to water and light can bear significantly on 
children’s education, in the sense that children will be required by parents to collect 
firewood and fetch water for use at home. In rural areas where most households do not 
have easy access to good drinking water (indoor plumbing) and electricity supply, 
children’s schooling enrolment especially girls’ will suffer. 
2.2.1.5 Parental characteristics and non-biological children’s education 
Separation from biological parents may have an impact on children’s outcomes 
later in life. Children raised in families without the presence of both parents or 
biological parents are often disadvantaged, compared with children raised by 
biological parents (Case et al., 2000). Non-biological children could benefit from 
positive spillover effects of parents’ education, and family environment. This is 
because, adoptive parents generally tend to be better at parenting (Plug and Vijverberg, 
2005), possibly because of their level of education5. The effects of both parents’ 
characteristics may not always have a positive impact on children’s outcomes. For 
instance, Björklund et al. (2006) estimate the effects of parental education on 
children’s education using data on adopted children and their biological and adoptive 
parents. They find largely that for both adopted and biological children, the effects of 
                                                   
5 From the 2005/06 GLSS data used for this study, non-biological fathers and mothers have an 
average of 11.1 and 9.3 years of schooling respectively, compared with 10.1 and 8.1 years of 
schooling for biological fathers and mothers respectively. 
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father’s education are significant and of equal magnitude. For mother’s education, 
however, the authors find although positive for both children, that the effect is much 
larger for biological children. Plug (2004) also find similar effects. This possibly 
suggest that mothers, unlike fathers, may be more altruistic towards their own birth 
children and may care more about maintaining family genes.  
In terms of how family income can affect the education of children, Sacerdote 
(2002) examines this effect for adopted children, as well as for biological children. 
Sacerdote (2002) find that income of the family significantly increases the education 
of adopted children, and biological children. Sacerdote (2002) interprets the result to 
mean that the significant effect of family income on non-biological children’s 
education could be driven by family environment rather than along genetic lines. Plug 
and Vijverberg (2003) also found positive effects of family income on the education 
of adopted and biological children’s education.  
The evidence on non-biological children’s education chances so far indicate 
mixed effects of parental characteristics. Non-biological rather than biological 
children are generally disadvantaged and benefit mainly from family environment 
rather than family genes, as biological parents tend to protect their genetic material. 
Due to financial constraints, non-biological children may join relatively wealthier 
families in order to benefit from family environment, and contribute to household 
activities in exchange for shelter, food, and most importantly education. This study 
adds to the existing literature by examining the effects of educated parents and 
household’s lack of basic amenities on the schooling enrolment of non-biological 
children in rural and urban areas.  
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2.3 Modelling educational investment: Theoretical framework 
Parents decision to invest in education of children is modelled through an 
adaptation of the models in Alderman and King (1998), and Brown and Park (2002). 
The model assumes that parents live for only two periods; they work in the first period 
and then retire in the second period. Household consumption in period one is parents’ 
income less costs of educating children.  
Parents have a lifetime income,𝑌 an indicator of family wealth and is based on 
parents’ level of education, 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶. That is, parents’ income, 𝑌 = 𝑓(𝑃𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶) . 
Parents choose a certain amount to invest in the education of the child,𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶. The 
condition for educating children is based on parental preferences which are often 
influenced by their level of education and gender of the child, 𝑆. Parents in urban areas 
will provide their children with the level of education necessary to maximise their 
future wealth. Urban educated parents may therefore be less reliant on their children 
for future financial support. Rural parents, however, may not be able to provide the 
wealth-maximising level of education because of financial constraints. Rural parents 
may therefore choose to invest more in boys because of the associated future economic 
benefits, in the form of pensions for parents in old age. Daughters on the other hand 
may receive lower investment because of virilocality6 in traditional Ghanaian societies 
(hence, investment in girls’ education by parents especially fathers’ may only be for 
short-term benefits). Inherent in the virilocality argument is the assumption that the 
                                                   
6 Implicit in this hypothesis according to Levine and Kevane (2003) is the idea that parents 
who invest in daughters’ education create a positive externality, but this externality is not 
expected to reduce investment in daughters if the in-laws or groom can make a payment 
necessary to internalize the externality (bride price). Also, Garg and Murdoch (1998) suggest 
that in Ghana women are more likely to move out, and since the marriage markets does not 
work perfectly to compensate for daughters’ investment, the full returns to sons is often higher 
than the returns to daughters’. 
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girl’s parents are not compensated by the boy’s family for any investments in the girl’s 
education (Levine and Kevane, 2003). Parents may therefore provide daughters with 
the level of education necessary to improve their chances of finding a wealthy suitor.  
The education of the child, 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶 has both direct and indirect costs,  𝑃𝑒 . The direct 
costs of education may include tuition fees, Parent Teacher Association (PTA) levies, 
costs of books, transportation and other stationaries. The indirect costs are the 
opportunity costs associated with schooling. The price of education is expected to be 
high for children in households with poor access to basic amenities (indicator of 
wealth). This is because parents consider the opportunity cost of sending children to 
school as the loss of children’s labour activities, such as, collecting firewood and 
fetching water when households do not have access to basic amenities.  
In period two, consumption by parents is largely dependent on the wealth or 
earnings of children, 𝑊. This is determined by an ‘earnings production function’ that 
relates earnings to the child’s human capital investment, 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶. Hence wealth of the 
child, 𝑊 = 𝑓(𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶). The lack of a strong welfare support system in Ghana implies 
that parents receive a share, 𝑤 in the child’s future earnings, 𝑊. Parents share, 𝑤, is 
dependent on the gender of the child, 𝑆; and also the relationship to the child (whether 
biological or non-biological). This will be greater in rural areas if the child is male and 
less if the child is female because of virilocality; and depends on the amount of 
education invested, i.e. 𝑤 = 𝑓(𝑆, 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶). The share of the child’s returns to education 
now becomes(1 − 𝑊)𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶. Assuming parents do well by their sons because sons 
provide alternative future source of finance, then, the share of the returns accruing to 
sons will be less than the shares accruing to daughters i.e. (1 − 𝑊𝑏) < (1 − 𝑊𝑔). 𝑏 
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and 𝑔 represent boys and girls respectively. Parents’ consumption in the second period, 
𝐶2 becomes: 
𝐶2 = 𝛽1𝑊𝑏 +  𝛽2𝑊𝑔,      (1) 
where 𝛽 is the rate of transfers per unit of wealth of the child.  
The model also assumes that parents are altruistic,𝐴, but only towards their 
own-birth children and so care about them as much as they care about themselves. 
Altruism is reflected by a linear combination of parental preferences over the education 
of their children. Educated parents can and may wish to invest more in the education 
of their children than less educated parents. The degree of altruism is also assumed to 
depend on the gender of the child. Thus, 𝐴 = 𝐴(𝑆, 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶). Since the degree of 
altruism depends on whether or not children are biological or fostered, the education 
of non-biological children could suffer relative to the education of own-birth children 
if parents are altruistic. With these assumptions, parents’ utility function (maximised 
over both periods) becomes: 
𝑈 = 𝑌 − ( 𝑃𝑒)𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶 + 𝑤(𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶) + 𝐴(1 − 𝑤)𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶   (2) 
Parents will maximise their utility based on their income constraint,𝑌, cost of 
educating the child, 𝑃𝑒 , their level of altruism,  𝐴  and consumption from transfers from 
children in period two, 𝐶2.  For non-biological children and where parents are less 
altruistic, 𝐴 = 0.  
The reduced-form equations for boys’ and girls’ schooling enrolment estimated 
are a function of; 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑃𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶, 𝑋)      (3) 
where 𝑖 represents whether the individual is boy or girl. X is a vector of individual and 
household characteristics such as age, region, religion, access to household amenities, 
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and occupation of father. For children in urban areas we expect little or no gender 
penalty in education. In rural areas, girls’ education relative to boys’ education is 
expected to suffer because of virilocality and the benefits sons may have as a result of 
contribution to parents’ future finances.  
Priori expectations are that educated parents will invest in their children’s 
education in both rural and urban areas. Particularly for children in rural areas, since 
parents have limited access to financial facilities, investment in children’s schooling 
can serve as a means of providing financial security in old age through increased 
transfer payments (Lillard and Willis, 1997). Hence, educated rural parents may invest 
in their children’s education if they expect future financial support from children. In 
urban areas, parents may face less financial constraints because of access to credit 
facilities (Becker, 1991), savings, and pensions. Hence, educated urban parents may 
therefore be less reliant on children as a source of future financial support compared 
with rural parents. The effects of educated parents on children’s schooling enrolment 
may therefore be more important for children in rural areas compared with children in 
urban areas. 
The effect of parental education, and rural/urban location on the schooling 
enrolment of non-biological children could go either way. For financial constrained 
parents, educating non-biological children could provide additional future financial 
benefits. On the other hand, non-biological children’s education could also be 
negatively affected if parents prefer that these children simply provide additional 
household support. Figure 2.1 shows parents’ education investment decisions in rural 
and urban areas. 
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Figure 2. 1 Differences in schooling decision in rural and urban areas 
 
In figure 2.1, because rural parents face higher interest rates compared with 
urban parents, children in rural areas receive less years of education. In addition, due 
to rural parents being more traditional with a pro-son belief, boys’ rather than girls’ 
receive higher levels of educational investment. This is shown by 𝐷𝑏 and 𝐷𝑔 where the 
demand for boys’ education is higher than the demand for girls’ education, 
corresponding to increased years of schooling, 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑏(𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙) for boys. On the 
contrary, in urban areas where parents are wealthy (more educated) and consequently 
less traditional, they are faced with lower interest rates, and are therefore able to 
provide their children with more years of schooling, 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑏(𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛)and 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑔(𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛), 
which is greater than the years of schooling received by rural boys and girls. 
 
2.4 Data  
The main data used is the 2006 Ghana Living Standards Survey. The survey is 
part of the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS). Data were 
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collected on core topics including education, health, and employment. For the first part 
of the analysis, matched data for biological children aged 6 to 19 years and their 
parents are used. The second part of the empirical analysis focuses on non-biological 
children. A household is defined as a person or group of persons who live together in 
the same dwelling, share the same housekeeping arrangements and are catered for as 
one unit.  
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present summary statistics of the main variables for both 
biological and non-biological children used in the analysis. Notably, school enrolment 
for biological children averages about 74% for both boys and girls, although between 
urban and rural areas, enrolment is higher for children in urban areas than in rural 
areas. For instance, 86% of urban girls compared with 69% of rural girls were enrolled 
in school. This is similar among boys, where 88% and 70% were enrolled in school in 
urban and rural areas respectively.  
The total sample is 7,723 and 1,074 for biological and non-biological children 
respectively. In terms of parental education, table 2.1 shows that urban parents are 
more educated than rural parents, with the proportion of rural educated fathers higher 
than the proportion of rural educated mothers. For both boys and girls, table 2.1 shows 
a higher proportion of educated fathers compared with mothers. Table A2.1 in the 
appendix shows summary of variables used in the analysis. 
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Table 2. 1 Summary statistics of main variables 
  Panel a. Biological children 
 Rural Urban 
Variable Boys Girls Boys Girls 
  N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Currently in school 3041 0.70 2510 0.69 1108 0.88 1064 0.86 
Age (years) 3041 11.62 2510 11.27 1108 12.23 1064 11.92 
Father: Educated 3019 0.26 2496 0.27 1095 0.67 1055 0.71 
Mother: Educated 3011 0.08 2493 0.09 1093 0.4 1047 0.42 
Father: Professional 2766 0.09 2273 0.09 987 0.52 966 0.53 
Father: Self-
employment 
2766 0.06 2273 0.06 987 0.26 966 0.28 
Father: Agriculture 
occupation 
2766 0.85 2273 0.85 987 0.22 966 0.19 
 Panel b. Non-biological children 
 Rural Urban 
 Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Currently in school 350 0.59 325 0.60 153 0.82 246 0.68 
Age (years) 350 12.89 325 12.18 153 13.28 246 13.64 
Father: Educated 349 0.31 323 0.35 150 0.71 244 0.75 
Mother: Educated 343 0.12 321 0.13 149 0.50 240 0.54 
Father: Professional 315 0.12 295 0.13 134 0.42 226 0.53 
Father: Self-
employment 
315 0.12 295 0.12 134 0.27 226 0.27 
Father: Agriculture 
occupation 
315 0.76 295 0.75 134 0.31 226 0.2 
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In panel b of table 2.1, it can be seen that compared with biological children, 
non-biological children have lower rates of school enrolment, with urban non-
biological children having a higher school enrolment rate than their rural counterparts. 
Again, in terms of parental education, non-biological fathers are more educated 
compared with non-biological. For instance, for non-biological boys in rural areas, 
only 31% of foster fathers are educated, compared with 71% for non-biological boys 
in urban areas. This is similar for girls, where 35% of foster fathers are educated in 
rural areas, compared with 75% in urban areas. This seems to agree with Plug and 
Vijverberg (2005) that non-biological parents generally tend to be more educated. 
Table A2.2 in the appendix shows the distribution of biological and non-biological 
children. 
For children to be able to participate in school, access to basic amenities can 
play a significant role. Table 2.2 shows summary statistics for the key household 
amenities variables used in this study. Most households, particularly those in rural 
areas rely on boreholes and wells as their main source of drinking water. Children from 
these households will be required to spend time making water available for use at 
home, implying reduced time for educational activities such as homework, and even 
enrolment. In urban areas however, most households have access to indoor plumbing 
and standpipe, implying that less time is needed for fetching water, and hence fewer 
constraints on school enrolment.  
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Table 2. 2 Summary statistics of household basic amenities 
Panel a. Biological children 
  All Rural Urban 
Source of drinking water N % N % N % 
Standpipe/indoor 
plumbing 
2043 26.45 368 6.62 1675 77.12 
Borehole/Well 4167 53.96 3745 67.47 422 19.43 
River/rain/other 1513 19.59 1438 25.91 75 3.45 
 7723  5551  2172  
Source of light      
Electricity(mains) 2726 35.3 1018 18.34 1708 78.64 
Other 4997 64.7 4533 81.66 464 21.36 
 7723  5551  2172  
Panel b. Non-biological children 
Source of drinking water     
Standpipe/indoor 
plumbing 
379 35.29 53 7.85 326 81.7 
Borehole/Well 511 47.58 447 66.22 64 16.04 
River/rain/other 184 17.13 175 25.93 9 2.26 
 1074  675  399  
Source of light      
Electricity(mains) 473 44.04 137 20.3 336 84.21 
Others 601 55.96 538 79.7 63 15.79 
  1074   675   399   
According to the UNDP/WHO (2009), approximately 74 per cent of people in 
sub-Saharan Africa had no access to electricity, and about 42 per cent of the population 
in developing countries used wood as their primary source of fuel for cooking and as 
source of light. The figures in table 2.2 shows that in relation to household access to 
electricity, both biological and non-biological children in urban areas tend to be more 
advantaged than children in rural areas. The use of electricity and good access to other 
basic amenities can have particularly positive impacts on female labour-force 
participation. For instance, Greenwood et al. (2005) find that the use of labour-saving 
technologies in the household accounted for more than half of the rise in female labour-
force participation. Access to basic amenities, and adoption of labour-saving 
technologies could reduce the amount of time devoted to household chores. This tend 
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to disproportionately benefit females, leading to a likely increase in school enrolment 
rates.   
2.4.1 Variables 
The dependent variable is current school enrolment status. This variable takes 
the value of 1 if the individual is enrolled in school and 0 if otherwise. Parents’ 
education, the key independent variable is measured using father’s education and 
mother’s education. This is defined by whether the father or mother have formal 
education. Another independent variable of interest is household wealth, measured as 
household’s access to basic amenities, i.e. drinking water, and sources of light. These 
are categorised into good access, poor access and average access. Poor access are 
households that do not have access to both light and water. Households with good 
access to amenities are those that have light and a good source of drinking water, 
mainly indoor plumbing. Average households are households that have either good 
access to light and poor access to water, or poor access to light and good access to 
water. While not controlling for parental income, the use of access to amenities in this 
study proxies for household wealth. As Mazumdar (2005) notes, due to transitory 
fluctuations in earnings, using a single period of parental earnings may lead to bias 
estimates. To overcome this issue, earnings over a longer period were used. However, 
due to the unavailability of equivalent data in the GLSS, the proxy of household 
amenities is used. Households with good access to amenities are generally more 
wealthy than households with poor access to basic amenities. 
In addition, the study controls for a number of demographic factors. Age 
dummies are used to represent the various ages of children. This is to allow for the 
rising opportunity costs of school with age. Household composition is included to 
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account for potential resource dilution. This is measured by the number of brothers 
and sisters of school-going age, and the number of children under 6 years. Father’s 
occupation is also controlled for, and is measured by whether the father is in a 
professional job (reference group), self-employed, or in agriculture. Lastly, religion, 
and regional dummies are included to account for possible unobserved regional 
policies or conditions. Table 2.3 shows summary definitions of the main variables used 
in the regressions. 
Table 2. 3 Summary definitions of variables 
Variable Description     
Currently Enrolled 
1 if child is currently enrolled in school, 0 
otherwise 
Father Educated 1 if father is educated, 0 otherwise 
Mother Educated 1 if mother is educated, 0 otherwise 
Father Self-Employed 1 if father is self-employed, 0 if professional  
Father Agriculture 1 if father is in agriculture, 0 if professional 
Muslim 1 if child's religion is Islam, 0 other 
Christian 1 if child's religion is Christianity, 0 other 
Household Amenities: 
Average 
1 if household has either good source of light 
and poor access to drinking water, or good 
source of drinking water and poor access to 
light, 0 if both good access 
Household Amenities: 
Poor 
1 if household has poor access to drinking 
water and light, 0 if good access 
Number of Brothers (6 To 
19 Years) 
Number of brothers in the household aged 6 to 
19 years 
Number of Sisters (6 To 
19 Years) 
Number of sisters in the household aged 6 to 19 
years 
Number of Children (Less 
Than 6 Years) 
Number of siblings in the household less than 6 
years 
Age Age dummies (6 to 19 years) 
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2.5 Empirical specification 
A discrete choice logit model based on maximum-likelihood methods are used 
to estimate the determinants of school enrolment. The equation describing the school 
enrolment status of the child is given by; 
Pr (𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖 = 1) = β1𝑃𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖 + β2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖   (4) 
where current school enrolment, 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖 is 0 if the individual is not currently enrolled 
in school, and 1 if enrolled in school. The probability of the child being enrolled in 
school is assumed to be linearly dependent on parents level of education, 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖. 
𝑋𝑖 is a vector of household and individual characteristics including the indicator of 
household access to basic amenities, age dummies, and family size.  
Unlike studies such as Glick and Sahn (2000), that control for household 
income using earnings of both parents or income of the household head, this study 
does not directly control for parents’ income because parental and individual income 
varies along the life-cycle compared with education which remains fairly unchanged. 
The focus on parent’s education also captures credit constraints and borrowing limits 
of parents. Separate regressions were estimated for boys and girls to allow for the 
impact of parental education to vary between boys and girls. It is also plausible to 
allow for the effects of educated parents and household’s lack of access to basic 
amenities to vary by location since, for instance, lack of access to basic amenities is 
likely to impact differently on schooling between rural and urban areas. Sibling 
composition may also have different impacts on parents’ education investment 
decisions (Connelly and Zheng 2003), and so it is necessary to control for these.  
In estimating the schooling enrolment of children in rural and urban areas, there 
might be concerns of endogenous selection to rural and urban areas by parents. Certain 
44 
 
characteristics that determine the household’s location may also determine the 
likelihood of children’s schooling enrolment. Similarly, the characteristics that 
determine the choice of having non-biological children may also be linked to 
enrolment. This is recognised, however, given the information within the dataset it was 
impossible to find appropriate exclusion restrictions. That is,  variables that determine 
either location or a non-biological child in the family but do not affect the schooling 
enrolment probability of children. With this limitation in mind, the study proceeds to 
estimate all regressions without controlling for selectivity into rural and urban areas.   
All regressions are run separately for rural and urban areas, unless otherwise 
stated. 
 
2.6 Results and interpretation 
2.6.1 Results: Biological children 
The initial results for boys and girls in rural and urban areas are presented in 
table 2.4. All regression results presented are average marginal effects. Parental 
education and occupational variables are first discussed, followed by a discussion of 
the results relating to access to amenities. Full table of results showing all variables 
can be seen in the appendix. 
2.6.1.1 Parental effects on school enrolment 
While educated fathers appear to have no effect for boys’ schooling enrolment 
in urban areas, columns (1) and (2) of table 2.4 show that for children in rural areas, 
having an educated father increases boys’ enrolment probability by 5.2 percentage 
points but raises girls’ enrolment by 12.4 percentage points. In rural areas, educated 
fathers’ may invest more in daughters’ education anticipating that girls need more 
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education in order to earn as much as men (Carter and Wojtkiewicz, 2000). May 
(1983), also notes that an educated girl attracts more money (bride-price) as 
compensation for the money invested in her education, and to increase her value to her 
husband. In line with the virilocality argument (Levine and Kevane, 2003; and see 
section 2.2, and page 32) since girls mostly relocate to their in-laws’ house, educated 
fathers are encouraged to enrol them in schools in order to secure a wealthy suitor, and 
also to secure a high bride price, as suggested by May (1983). Thus, the interpretation 
of the higher impact of rural educated fathers on girls’ enrolment chances can be seen 
as a way of fathers trying to maximise both their short-term utility (bride-price) and 
long-term altruistic utility (due to increased earnings equating to that of boys’). In 
contrast, the wealth maximising level of education for boys may depend on future 
financial expectations in parents’ retirement i.e. sons effectively pay for their parents’ 
pensions.  
As regards the effect of educated mothers in rural areas, educated mothers are 
associated with a higher likelihood of school enrolment by boys but not girls’ 
enrolment (columns (1) and (2) in table 2.4). This is the opposite of the expectation 
that mother’s education would be of greater importance to girls in line with evidence 
that improvements in the mother’s position reduce the education gender gap (Zhao and 
Glewwe, 2010; Qian, 2008). The significance of educated mothers for boys’ enrolment 
but not girls’ schooling enrolment could possibly reflect pro-son attitudes of traditional 
women related to an expectation that boys provide for the family’s long-term financial 
security of the parents.  
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Table 2. 4 Effects of educated parents and household access to basic amenities on 
school enrolment: biological children 
DV: 1 if currently enrolled, 
0 if otherwise 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Rural Urban 
     
Father Educated 0.0515** 0.124*** 0.0150 0.0648*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0224) (0.0254) (0.0233) 
Mother Educated 0.0882** 0.0320 0.0210 0.0485** 
 (0.0372) (0.0374) (0.0224) (0.0224) 
Father Self-Employed -0.0675 0.0361 0.0191 -0.0427* 
 (0.0487) (0.0558) (0.0233) (0.0249) 
Father Agriculture -0.0320 0.0394 -0.0704** -0.146*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0428) (0.0314) (0.0341) 
Household Amenities: 
Average -0.0844*** -0.144*** -0.0178 0.0135 
 (0.0258) (0.0255) (0.0244) (0.0266) 
Household Amenities: Poor -0.133*** -0.180*** -0.0801* -0.0858** 
 (0.0283) (0.0289) (0.0434) (0.0389) 
Number of brothers (6 To 
19 Years) 0.00134 0.00581 -0.00929 0.0214** 
 (0.00545) (0.00605) (0.00833) (0.00989) 
Number of sisters (6 To 19 
Years) 0.00447 -0.0152** 0.00999 0.00867 
 (0.00623) (0.00685) (0.00963) (0.0105) 
Number of children Less 
Than 6 Years 0.00376 0.000291 0.0224* -0.0137 
 (0.00660) (0.00726) (0.0131) (0.0125) 
     
Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.33 
Log pseudolikelihood -1299.54 -1084.07 -256.18 -240.78 
Observations 2,725 2,249 965 888 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
All regressions include age, region, and religion dummies 
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In the richer urban households where parents are generally less traditional and 
more educated, the results in columns (3) and (4) show that, educated parents only 
raise the probability of schooling enrolment for girls. This supports Parish and Willis’ 
(1993) assertion that increasing prosperity may have led to a reduction in the tough 
choices parents faced when confronted with deciding between sons and daughters’ 
education. As for the significant effect of educated mothers on girls’ schooling 
enrolment, if level of parents education partly determines how resources are allocated 
in the household, then resources under the control of mothers could lead to a potential 
increase in girls educational investment (Levy, 2007; Levy and Rodriquez, 2004)7. 
Educated mothers will have higher bargaining power and can contribute in the 
household decision-making process. 
That the effects of educated parents on boys and girls’ enrolment chances 
differs in rural and urban areas is interesting. As suggested by Greenhalgh (1985), 
educated parents in urban areas may invest more in children of higher ability rather 
than simply on the basis of the traditional pro-son view. These differences may be 
related to changes in the pattern of labour demand in developing countries. Although 
Ghana is still predominantly an agrarian economy, economic activities in urban areas 
are shifting towards modern industry and services, hence requiring more educated and 
skilled labour.  
The statistical significance of the differences of the effects of educated fathers 
between rural and urban girls are compared. The results indicate a significant 
difference between rural and urban girls. For rural areas, although the effects of 
                                                   
7 This evidence is based on the Mexican antipoverty and human resource investment 
programme, PROGRESSA/Oportunidades. 
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educated fathers is larger for girls compared with boys, the difference is not 
statistically significant. Table A2.4 in the appendix shows the statistical significance 
between estimated coefficients.  
In terms of the effects of father’s occupation, having a father in agricultural 
occupation compared with having a father in a skilled/professional occupation 
(reference group) reduces school enrolment of children in urban areas, and especially 
for girls (by 7 and 14.6 percentage points for boys and girls respectively). Having a 
father in self-employment has a weak negative effect for girls but no significant effect 
for boys. There are no significant effects of father’s occupation for school enrolment 
in rural areas.  
2.6.1.2 Effects of differential access to basic amenities on school enrolment 
In table 2.4, household wealth indicators measured as access to water and light, 
shows that poor access to basic amenities strongly reduce enrolment probability of 
both boys and girls in rural areas, although the effects are stronger for girls. Children 
in urban areas with poor access to basic amenities are also less likely to enrol in school, 
with girls’ education suffering the most in relatively poorer urban households. The 
negative impact of a lack of access to basic amenities is consistent with light and water 
being essentials of life and limited access potentially affecting educational 
development. Children need light in order to carry out educational activities such as 
homework and assignments in the evenings. There are also health implications of the 
lack of water on schooling enrolment, particularly for girls. For instance, Maimaiti and 
Siebert (2009) show that provision of tap water leads to a rise in school enrolment for 
girls after menarche. Also, Drakopoulos et al. (2011) find that individuals that grew 
up in unfavourable socioeconomic conditions as children were associated with frail 
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health in adulthood. Girls spend more time on household activities compared with boys 
in households with lack of good access to basic amenities8, meaning that girls have 
less time for educational activities, and parents may be more likely to remove them 
from school. Although the effects of access to household amenities on enrolment 
probability are generally larger for girls in rural areas compared with boys, the 
differences between the estimated coefficients are not significant.  
To further examine the gender differences in the effect of wealth on schooling 
in rural areas, the time (in hours) it takes for children to fetch water and collect 
firewood per week is used in place of the household wealth indicators. This is 
important because, children in households where there is the lack of access to basic 
amenities may be required to spend time collecting firewood and fetching water. This 
also captures the opportunity costs associated with schooling, and considered by 
parents as a loss of children’s labour activities. Thus, time-use may compensate for 
lack of amenities. 
The results in table 2.5 confirm that each additional hour spent by girls on 
collecting firewood and fetching water reduces their chances of enrolment by 1.4 
percentage points. This result is interesting because it is in line with Greenwood et al. 
(2005) and Hannum (1998) that lack of access to certain household amenities increases 
time-use activity and even reduces labour market participation, particularly for 
women. It is also consistent with Lloyd et al. (2008) who find that school enrolment is 
negatively and strongly related with hours spent on non-educational activities. For 
boys, the results show that the effect is negative but insignificant. Amin et al. (2006) 
                                                   
8 The data on the amount of time spent by children in collecting firewood shows that rural girls 
spend on average 159 minutes (2.6 hours) per week on fetching water and collecting firewood, 
compared with 44.3 minutes (0.74 hours) for girls in urban areas. For boys this is 80 (1.33 
hours) and 37 minutes (0.62 hours) in rural and urban areas respectively. 
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find similar results for Bangladesh that an increase in household work significantly 
reduces rural girls’ education, whereas for boys the effect is negative but insignificant. 
Table 2. 5 Effects of time use on school enrolment in rural areas: Biological 
children 
DV: 1 if currently enrolled, 0 
if otherwise 
(1) (2) 
Boys Girls 
   
Father Educated 0.0622*** 0.128*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0230) 
Mother Educated 0.110*** 0.000634 
 (0.0389) (0.0403) 
Father Self-Employed -0.0612 0.00283 
 (0.0463) -0.0542 
Father Agriculture -0.0482 0.00810 
 (0.0340) (0.0400) 
Time-Use: Firewood And 
Water -0.00263 -0.0138*** 
 (0.00403) (0.00323) 
Number of brothers (6 To 19 
Years) -0.00221 0.00733 
 (0.00587) (0.00652) 
Number of sisters (6 To 19 
Years) 0.00520 -0.0178** 
 (0.00657) (0.00720) 
Number of children Less Than 
6 Years 0.000141 -0.00163 
 (0.00687) (0.00795) 
   
Pseudo R-squared 0.22 0.22 
Log pseudolikelihood -1119.94 -914.08 
Observations 2,410 1,931 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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2.6.1.3 Effects of household access to basic amenities on school enrolment: 
Educated parents vs uneducated parents 
In many rural households, parents tend to have fewer or no years of education. 
If educated parents are more altruistic towards their children than uneducated parents 
are, then based on parental level of education, children in households that lack 
improved access to basic amenities will be disadvantaged. This is mainly because poor 
parents (uneducated) cannot afford altruism. To extend this analysis further, an 
examination of the effects of lack of access to basic amenities separately for children 
in households with an educated parent, and children in households with uneducated 
parents is considered. The analysis is conducted separately for rural and urban areas. 
Table 2.6 shows that lack of access to basic amenities impacts negatively on the 
schooling of both boys and girls in rural areas with the effect marginally higher for 
boys (column (2)). However, children that have uneducated parents are more 
disadvantaged, which is plausible. The stronger impact for children in households with 
uneducated parents indicates that the impact on schooling of poverty (which is 
captured by reduced access to basic amenities) is moderated by parental education. 
Among households with an educated parent, there is evidence of less pro-son bias as 
the effects of access to basic amenities have a more equal impact on both boys’ and 
girls’ enrolment. 
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Table 2. 6 Effects of household access to basic amenities on school enrolment: 
rural children 
DV: 1 if currently enrolled, 0 
if otherwise 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Educated parents Uneducated parents 
     
Household Amenities: 
Average -0.055** -0.079*** -0.158*** -0.186*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0249) (0.0383) (0.0358) 
Household Amenities: Poor -0.0714** -0.0651** -0.218*** -0.232*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0316) (0.0415) (0.0400) 
Number of Brothers (6 To 19 
Years) 0.0142 0.00764 -0.00288 -0.00497 
 (0.00907) (0.00871) (0.00668) (0.00746) 
Number of Sisters (6 To 19 
Years) -0.00699 -0.00699 0.00138 -0.0161* 
 (0.0102) (0.0125) (0.00763) (0.00844) 
Number of Children Less 
Than 6 Years 0.00480 -0.0256 0.00757 0.00617 
 (0.0133) (0.0156) (0.00782) (0.00850) 
     
Pseudo R-squared 0.19 0.26 0.16 0.15 
Log pseudolikelihood -275.50 -206.35 -1192.50 -1000.20 
Observations 900 697 2,141 1,761 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Table 2.7 shows that evidence of a differential effect of poverty in households 
with educated parents and households with uneducated parents is less clear in urban 
areas. In households with an educated parent, poor access to basic amenities only 
reduces enrolment for girls. In contrast, in households with uneducated parents, the 
lack of access to basic amenities only affects the enrolment of boys (by almost the 
same magnitude).  
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Table 2. 7 Effects of household access to basic amenities on school enrolment: 
urban children 
DV: 1 if currently enrolled, 0 
if otherwise 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Educated parent Uneducated parents 
     
Household Amenities: 
Average -0.0388 -0.0004 -0.0321 -0.0431 
 (0.0371) (0.0365) (0.0445) (0.0647) 
Household Amenities: Poor 0.0703 -0.147** -0.155*** -0.110 
 (0.0489) (0.0662) (0.0568) (0.0674) 
Number of Brothers (6 To 19 
Years) 0.0149 0.0229 -0.0289 0.0361** 
 (0.0138) (0.0147) (0.0186) (0.0173) 
Number of Sisters (6 To 19 
Years) 0.0261 0.0188 0.0133 -0.0286 
 (0.0167) (0.0148) (0.0178) (0.0234) 
Number of Children Less 
Than 6 Years 0.0226 -0.0179 0.0395* -0.00656 
 (0.0249) (0.0230) (0.0219) (0.0220) 
     
Pseudo R-squared 0.27 0.30 0.25 0.30 
Log pseudolikelihood -163.82 -169.25 -113.74 -101.85 
Observations 545 558 317 274 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
2.6.1.4 Other control variables  
Full results of the regressions from table 2.4 can be seen in appendix A2.3. The 
age coefficients largely show that schooling enrolment probability declines with age 
especially at the post-basic education level (15 years and above) for both boys and 
girls in rural and urban areas. At basic education level (6 to 14 years) however, the 
results in most specifications show that there are positive insignificant effects of age 
on enrolment for boys and girls in urban areas. In rural areas, boys’ enrolment 
increases more with age at the basic education level than girls’ enrolment. At the post-
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basic level, enrolment of both boys and girls in rural and urban areas is negative with 
a larger impact on girls. The decrease in school enrolment for girls notably after 
completion of basic education could be due to the high costs associated with investing 
in girls schooling at the secondary school level, and the need for girls to provide 
support in household income-generation.  
The number of sisters reduces enrolment probability of girls by 1.5 percentage 
points in rural areas. The negative effect of having sisters on school enrolment shows 
that girls appear to be rivals in investment of household resources from parents. This 
is interesting, as one would expect the schooling of girls to be affected by the presence 
of boys of school-going age. An implication of the negative effect of having sisters 
could suggest that, rural parents may be forced to educate only one girl (possibly 
because of credit constraints), in which case girls of high ability, and more preferred 
by parents receive a greater investment in education. There is also a positive effect of 
number of brothers of school-going age on the enrolment probability of girls.  
Muslims are generally less likely to enrol in school compared with Christians 
in rural areas9. The effect is even more pronounced for boys than girls in rural areas. 
This goes in favour of the common but hard notion that Muslim culture is inimical to 
schooling. I however expected this to have a more deleterious effect on girls than boys 
because of the issue of early marriage in many traditional Muslim 
communities/societies. The fact that enrolment is lower among Muslim boys and girls 
seems to have more to do with disadvantages such as poverty and lower levels of 
parental education, as noted by Drèze and Kingdon (2001). Girls of other or no religion 
                                                   
9 There is a positive correlation of 0.48 and 0.19 between being Muslim and having uneducated 
parents in both urban and rural areas respectively. 
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in particular are also less likely to enrol in school compared with Christians. This may 
be due to the large number of religious-based schools common in many rural areas, 
thereby alienating children especially girls from enrolling in school. Parents may also 
be less likely to enrol their children in religious-based schools for fear of their children 
being converted to other religions. Such issues abound partly because of the state’s 
inability to provide non-religious schools in many of these rural areas. In urban areas 
however, there are no significant effects of being Muslim on children’s schooling 
enrolment, although for children (especially girls) of other religion there is a negative 
effect on schooling enrolment.  
Lastly, most of the regional controls show that children in the three main 
northern regions (Upper east, Upper west, and Northern) have less chance of school 
enrolment, with the effect mostly larger for girls in rural areas. This is however not 
surprising given that these regions are predominantly poor compared with other 
regions. In addition, because education levels are generally lower in these three 
northern regions, parents tend to place little value on enrolling their children into 
schools. 
  
2.6.2 Results: Non-biological children 
Table 2.8 columns (1) and (2) shows results separately for school enrolment of 
non-biological boys and girls in rural areas. Due to the small sample size for urban 
areas, the study does not estimate separate regressions for boys and girls. A pooled 
regression that controls for gender (column (3)) is estimated. Full results of the 
regressions is in the appendix. 
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Table 2. 8 Effects of educated parents and household access to basic amenities on 
school enrolment: non-biological children 
DV: 1 if currently 
enrolled, 0 otherwise 
(1) (2) (3) 
Boys Girls All 
Rural Urban 
        
Father Educated 0.143** 0.229*** 0.151** 
 (0.0694) (0.0561) (0.0634) 
Mother Educated 0.0768 0.0170 -0.115** 
 (0.0931) (0.0825) (0.0480) 
Father Self-Employed -0.00200 -0.0803 -0.0137 
 (0.126) (0.105) (0.0520) 
Father Agriculture -0.147 -0.106 0.0253 
 (0.0946) (0.0822) (0.0653) 
Household Amenities: 
Average -0.295*** -0.0360 -0.00448 
 (0.0705) (0.0719) (0.0708) 
Household Amenities: 
Poor -0.389*** -0.246*** -0.424** 
 (0.0894) (0.0899) (0.202) 
Number of brothers (6 
To 19 Years) 0.0652** -0.0349 0.0203 
 (0.0317) (0.0312) (0.0317) 
Number of sisters (6 
To 19 Years) -0.0187 -0.0232 0.0343 
 (0.0399) (0.0295) (0.0283) 
Number of children 
Less Than 6 Years 0.0381 -0.0395 -0.0211 
 (0.0342) (0.0340) (0.0715) 
Girls   -0.134** 
   (0.0577) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.20 0.29 0.32 
Log pseudolikelihood -154.81 -137.38 -128.68 
Observations 282 285 327 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
All regression include age, region, and religion dummies 
2.6.2.1 Parental effects on school enrolment 
Similar to the biological children’s regressions in table 2.4, the results from 
table 2.8 show that educated fathers are important for both boys’ and girls’ school 
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enrolment in rural households. Educated mothers have no significant effect on girls’ 
school enrolment in rural areas. However, in urban areas the effect of an educated 
mother is to reduce the probability of school enrolment, contrary to biological children, 
where the effects of educated mothers on girls schooling enrolment are found to be 
positive. This interesting result is explored further below. 
The result that educated mothers reduce the enrolment probability of urban 
non-biological children by 11.5 percentage points is interesting. Plug (2004) argues 
that the differences between non-biological mothers and biological mothers could be 
due to reasons that are unrelated to maternal schooling effects. Possibly, educated 
mothers spend relatively more time working than raising their children,10 since 
education usually raises labour market attachment. This may mean that non-biological 
children are not able to benefit from the household mother’s education. It is 
traditionally mothers and not fathers time that is the primary input in raising children, 
and if mothers spend more time outside the home, then children’s human capital 
development can suffer. To explore this further, the impacts of mother’s occupation 
and income on schooling enrolment of non-biological children are considered. Table 
2.9 below shows results of the effect of mother’s education, occupation, and income 
on schooling enrolment of urban non-biological children. Although insignificant, the 
results show that mother’s occupation and income have negative effects on non-
biological children’s school enrolment. 
                                                   
10 Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) find that maternal education does not have beneficial 
effects on the schooling of children (male and female twins). They find also that maternal 
schooling leads to reduced home time for mothers. Thus, the education of mothers may not 
always have the desired outcome of increasing children’s education. 
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Table 2. 9 Effects of mother’s education, occupation, and income on children’s 
school enrolment 
DV: 1 if currently enrolled, 0 
if otherwise 
(1) (2) (3) 
Urban households 
        
Father Educated 0.122* 0.184** 1.029** 
 (0.0623) (0.0716) (0.482) 
Father Self-Employed 0.0359 0.00304 0.269 
 (0.0545) (0.0589) (0.380) 
Father Agriculture 0.134** 0.136** 0.988** 
 (0.0519) (0.0546) (0.476) 
Mother Self-Employed -0.0367  0.415 
 (0.0540)  (0.950) 
Mother Agriculture 0.0555  -0.0537 
 (0.0739)  (1.143) 
Mother's Income  -0.00948  
  (0.0163)  
Mother's Emp X Mother's 
Education   -0.245 
   (0.554) 
Age -0.0419*** -0.0440*** -0.289*** 
 (0.00781) (0.00807) (0.0709) 
Girls -0.129*** -0.162*** -0.981*** 
 (0.0448) (0.0475) (0.343) 
 -0.00948   
 (0.0163)   
Constant   5.018** 
   (2.155) 
    
Pseudo R-squared 0.19 0.22 0.19 
Log pseudolikelihood -120.25 -102.23 -119.69 
Observations 278 239 274 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: (3) is in log-odds unit 
Regarding household access to resources in rural areas in table 2.8, lack of 
access to basic amenities (average and poor access to basic amenities relative to good 
access to basic amenities) hurts boys’ schooling enrolment more than girls. This is in 
contrast to the findings from the regressions for biological children in table 2.4 where 
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girls’ rather than boys’ schooling enrolment are significantly and negatively affected 
by the lack of access to basic amenities. In households with poor access to basic 
amenities (relative to households with good access to basic amenities), non-biological 
boys’ school enrolment chances are lower by almost 39 percentage points whereas for 
girls with the same level of access to basic amenities, enrolment is lower by only 25 
percentage points. Even in households with average access to basic amenities, boys 
are less likely to enrol in school. This could be because poorer parents’ belief that they 
will not receive financial support from these boys in the future because they remit 
instead to their own biological parents, invest less in their education. Although lack of 
access to basic amenities hurts girls’ schooling enrolment, they may stay longer with 
non-biological parents and will therefore contribute for longer to the family, not only 
financially but also through household support services. In urban areas where access 
to basic amenities is less of a problem compared with rural areas, the results show 
instead that, children’s schooling enrolment probability decreases when households 
have poor access to water and light. This reduces school enrolment probability by 42.4 
percentage points. There are no significant effects of father’s occupation and 
household composition on school enrolment among non-biological children in both 
urban and rural areas. 
In column (3) of table 2.8, girls’ enrolment chances are lower by 13.4 
percentage points relative to boys’. Children are important for labour work in Ghana 
and non-biological female children are often used as additional household support in 
the absence of parents who are active in other labour market activities. Using children, 
and in this case girls, as additional labour, children are rewarded in the form of meals, 
cash (Gupta, 2000), and most importantly shelter. But Basu and Van (1998) associate 
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the use of children as additional labour by parents as not necessarily due to differences 
in parents’ attitude, but mainly because of poverty.  
2.6.2.2 Effects of differential access to basic amenities on school enrolment 
Table 2.10 shows the effects of households’ lack of access to basic amenities 
conditioned on parents’ education level for foster children. Columns (1) and (2) show 
that for non-biological children in households with an educated parent, having poor 
access to basic amenities reduces schooling enrolment probability of boys’ by almost 
33 percentage points with no significant effect of this on the enrolment probability of 
girls. This could mean that foster parents are reluctant to educate boys because they 
perceive a risk of losing any future financial support to the child’s biological parents. 
Since boys usually enter the labour market earlier compared with girls, because of the 
greater opportunities available including apprenticeships, and other menial jobs, they 
are more likely to move out of the home and start a new life. Thus, parents may be 
risk-averse when it comes to educating male children who are not their own-birth sons. 
In households where parents are uneducated, the results in table 2.10 indicate that both 
boys’ and girls’ enrolment are negatively affected with the effects of poor access to 
water and light having a higher impact. 
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Table 2. 10 Effects of household access to basic amenities on school enrolment: 
non-biological children 
DV: 1 if currently enrolled, 
0 if otherwise 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Educated parent Uneducated parent 
          
Household Amenities: 
Average -0.0736 0.111 -0.219** -0.222*** 
 (0.0586) (0.0675) (0.0882) (0.0743) 
Household Amenities: 
Poor -0.327*** -0.0291 -0.269** -0.512*** 
 (0.0993) (0.117) (0.109) (0.0917) 
Number of brothers (6 To 
19 Years) 0.0165 -0.00750 0.0612* -0.00706 
 (0.0340) (0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0373) 
Number of sisters (6 To 19 
Years) 0.00677 -0.000277 0.0217 0.0448 
 (0.0352) (0.0350) (0.0451) (0.0316) 
Number of children Less 
Than 6 Years -0.107* 0.000025 0.0279 -0.0241 
 (0.0573) (0.0671) (0.0369) (0.0320) 
Rural 0.0352 -0.131** -0.172* -0.0190 
 (0.0567) (0.0608) (0.101) (0.0900) 
     
Pseudo R squared 0.28 0.25 0.18 0.33 
Log pseudolikelihood -87.17 -141.42 -143.46 -111.16 
Observations 231 307 252 239 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
2.7 Summary of main findings: Educated parents and lack of access to basic 
amenities 
Table 2.11 shows a summary of the effects of the main variables on school 
enrolment probability analysed in this study. While some of the results are difficult to 
interpret, others are interesting and require further interpretation. The results largely 
indicate that the effects of educated parents and the lack of access to water and light 
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are moderated by urban and rural location, and by the relationship of the child to the 
household head (whether biological or non-biological).  
Table 2. 11 Summary of main findings 
  Biological children Foster children 
 Rural  Rural 
 Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Father Educated Positive Positive* Positive Positive* 
Mother Educated Positive - - - 
Lack of Access to Basic 
Amenities 
Negative Negative* Negative* Negative 
 Urban Urban 
 Boys Girls All 
Father Educated - Positive* Positive - 
Mother Educated - Positive Negative - 
Lack of Access to Basic 
Amenities 
Negative Negative*  -  - 
Note:” –“indicates no significant effect.  
* indicates a larger effect 
 
Biological children: Effects of educated parents 
What the results indicate for biological children is that rural educated parents 
may still have preference for boys’ schooling enrolment simply because boys’ 
compared with girls are more likely to provide future financial support to parents in 
old age (Li and Lavely, 2002; Hannum, 1998; Parish and Willis, 1993; Brown and 
Park, 2002). Therefore, rural educated parents’ investment in boys’ education may 
actually be for its long-term benefits. Urban educated parents on the other hand, are 
less traditional and may have access to, for instance, pensions and savings. They 
therefore do not expect financial support from children especially boys, in old age, 
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making girls education important in urban areas. Due also to labour markets 
disadvantages faced by females, urban parents may invest in girls’ schooling as a 
possible way of ensuring that girls similar to boys, are able to enter into well-paid jobs 
and receive higher returns from their education.  
Another interesting result is the effect of educated fathers on girls’ schooling 
enrolment in rural areas. Rural educated fathers’ investment in girls’ education unlike 
sons’ may be for short-term benefits. Since children’s education decisions are made 
by fathers’ because fathers have higher bargaining power compared with mothers’ 
(Song et al., 2006), educated fathers may educate girls in order to receive a high bride-
price as a return on his investment which are largely enjoyed by her in-laws. This 
supports the argument by Li and Tsang (2003) in rural China that parents invest in 
girls’ education to enhance the chances of finding a wealthy suitor, because daughters 
generally marry out.  
Non-biological children: Effects of educated parents  
Rural educated fathers may have similar effects on the schooling enrolment of 
both non-biological boys and girls. Educating foster children may provide extra 
financial support for rural fathers in both the short-term (bride price) and long-term 
(financial support in old age from boys). In urban areas however, the effect of educated 
mothers are unclear, although initial attempts to identify the cause suggest a labour 
market effect where educated working mothers may be using non-biological children 
for household support activities, which in effect reduces their chances of enrolling in 
school.   
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Biological and non-biological children: Access to water and light 
 The results on the effects of access to light and water are in line with 
Greenwood et al. (2005) argument that the amount of time spent on household work 
decreases as households switch to the use of labour-saving technologies. In both rural 
and urban areas, the lack of access to light and water reduces education chances of 
biological and non-biological children (insignificant effect on urban non-biological 
children) with larger negative effects for girls. The larger effect on girls is mainly to 
do with the fact that girls rather than boys spend more time collecting firewood and 
fetching water. The results support Hannum (1998) that, the enrolment gap between 
boys and girls is exacerbated when households face financial constraints. This finding 
is also in line with Lloyd et al. (2008) and Khanam and Ross (2011). 
 
2.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined how educated parents and households’ differential 
access to basic amenities affects school enrolment probability of biological and foster 
children in rural and urban areas in Ghana. The results indicate that the effects of 
biological educated mothers and fathers differs, and that these effects are moderated 
by urban and rural locality, and whether or not children are the natural offspring of the 
parents. The main effects of educated parents and access to basic amenities on school 
enrolment probability of biological and non-biological children are summarised in 
table 2.11. For example, the results show positive effects of biological educated 
mothers on sons’ enrolment in rural areas (but not daughters’). One possible 
interpretation of this result is that educated mothers in rural areas maintain traditional 
values associated with generations of poverty and a “pro-son culture” that views sons 
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to be of higher economic benefits than daughters. As such, parents and especially 
mothers put greater emphasis on sons’ education. A positive but insignificant effect of 
educated mothers was found for non-biological boys’ schooling enrolment in rural 
areas. 
Among urban educated parents who are likely to hold less traditional values, 
the effects of educated parents were equal for biological sons and daughters, and 
having educated parents’ significantly enhanced schooling enrolment of girls. One 
possible explanation is that living in a more dynamic labour market, urban educated 
parents foresee higher returns from educating their own-birth daughters. Educated 
parents’ knowledge of the labour market, and the associated earnings benefits from 
educating girls may therefore contribute to the positive impact on the schooling 
enrolment of girls in urban areas. Educated mothers may also have stronger bargaining 
power (Song et al., 2006) which means they are more able to control their fertility 
(Summers 1994), resulting in a smaller, better educated family. In addition, in urban 
areas where the standard of living is generally higher, parents may rely less on their 
sons in older-age for financial support. For all these reasons, educated urban parents 
may invest more in the education of girls by enrolling them into schools, anticipating 
that girls need higher educational attainment in order to earn as much as men.  
For foster children, only educated fathers have a strong positive effect on both 
boys’ and girls’ enrolment. Perhaps, educated fathers simply do not differentiate 
between biological and foster children in relation to access to education. The relevant 
factor may therefore be family environment rather than by direct family genes. The 
results are however less clear in relation to the influence of maternal education among 
foster children in urban families. While in rural families there is a positive but 
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insignificant effect of educated mothers, in urban households, educated mothers have 
a negative effect on the schooling of non-biological children. The effect of having a 
mother in a relatively better occupation is also negatively (although insignificantly) 
related to the schooling of urban non-biological children. This suggests that in urban 
areas, mothers, but not fathers, may differentiate in significant ways between 
biological and foster children.  
The negative effect of educated mothers on enrolment of non-biological 
children in urban families may arise because of an upbringing effect (Plug, 2004), 
often referred to as the ‘Cinderella effect’ (Case et al., 2000; Case et al., 2001), such 
that non-biological parents, here educated mothers, favour their own children in line 
with standard arguments on altruism. This could result in foster children having to 
perform some of the household chores if educated mothers are working. There is also 
the issue of heterogeneity with respect to the age foster children joined their non-
biological parents (Plug, 2004), and this may be a factor. It is possible that children 
that moved to non-biological families late, for instance, after the start of their basic 
education are likely to receive fewer maternal benefits if mother’s education is more 
influential at the pre-school stage.  
The results in relation to the wealth indicators confirm that poor access to water 
and light (which is much more likely in rural areas) strongly reduces both biological 
boys’ and girls’ enrolment chances, although the effects are generally stronger for 
biological girls. This is consistent with priori expectations; that poor access to light 
and water reduce the time children may have for educational activities, in part because 
they may be required to spend time fetching water and collecting firewood. The figures 
also indicate that biological girls tend to spend more of their time in collecting 
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firewood and fetching water, particularly in rural areas. Among non-biological 
children the effects are generally stronger for boys in rural households. 
One policy implication following from these results is that the availability of 
flexible work schedules, particularly for educated working mothers in professional 
jobs could help to increase the schooling participation of non-biological children. 
Currently in Ghana, there are limited opportunities for part-time professional work, 
which means that for educated women who want to work may need more help from 
their children in order to manage their homes. However, an increase in household 
labour by children is likely to lead to lower rates of schooling enrolment.  
For households facing financial constraints, intervention policies such as cash 
transfer programmes could also be implemented with appropriate monitoring and 
evaluation. This has been shown to be effective in Mexico, in the case of PROGRESA 
(Levy, 2007). Improving the lives of the poor through initial provision of financial 
resources could potentially lead to increased school attendance and reduced time spent 
on non-educational activities. In addition, to address parents possible reliance on 
children for support in old-age which potentially influences their decision to favour 
the schooling of sons, particularly in rural areas, pension reforms such as a non-
voluntary pensions systems can be introduced so that the poorest could have access to 
financial support. In South Africa and Brazil, non-voluntary pensions have been found 
to have significant impact on poverty reduction (HelpAge International, 2003).  
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Appendix 
Table A2.1: Summary statistics of variables 
  Biological children 
Non-biological 
children 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Variable Mean Mean 
Currently enrolled 0.87 0.69 0.73 0.60 
Father educated 0.69 0.27 0.74 0.33 
Mother educated 0.41 0.09 0.53 0.13 
Father: Professional 0.52 0.09 0.49 0.13 
Father: self-employment 0.27 0.06 0.27 0.12 
Father: Agriculture occupation 0.21 0.85 0.24 0.75 
Household amenities: Good 0.65 0.16 0.71 0.18 
Household amenities: Average 0.25 0.61 0.25 0.59 
Household amenities: Poor 0.10 0.23 0.05 0.24 
Christian 0.71 0.56 0.75 0.61 
Muslim 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.23 
Other religion 0.05 0.24 0.05 0.16 
Age (in years) 12.08 11.46 13.50 12.55 
Western region 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.12 
Central region 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.03 
Greater Accra region 0.27 0.02 0.26 0.03 
Volta region 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.07 
Eastern region 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 
Ashanti region 0.20 0.14 0.17 0.12 
Brong Ahafo region 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Northern region 0.09 0.18 0.07 0.12 
Upper east region 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.07 
Upper west region 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.25 
Number of brothers (6 to 19 
years) 1.56 2.05 0.79 1.16 
Number of sisters (6 to 19 years) 1.45 1.69 1.15 1.09 
Number of children (less than 6 
years) 0.68 1.15 0.10 0.30 
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Table A2.2 Composition of non-biological children 
  All Boys Girls 
Relationship to 
Household Head N % N % N % 
Other relative 762 70.95 360 71.57 402 70.4 
Adopted  230 21.42 121 24.06 109 19.09 
House help 30 2.79 4 0.8 26 4.55 
Non-relative 52 4.84 18 3.58 34 5.95 
 
Table A2.3. Determinants of school enrolment for biological children 
DV: 1 if currently 
enrolled, 0 if 
otherwise 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Urban  Rural  
     
Father Educated 0.0150 0.0648*** 0.0515** 0.124*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0233) (0.0220) (0.0224) 
Mother Educated 0.0210 0.0485** 0.0882** 0.0320 
 (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0372) (0.0374) 
Father Self-
Employed 0.0191 -0.0427* -0.0675 0.0361 
 (0.0233) (0.0249) (0.0487) (0.0558) 
Father Agriculture -0.0704** -0.146*** -0.0320 0.0394 
 (0.0314) (0.0341) (0.0354) (0.0428) 
Christian 0.000680 -0.00258 0.00838 0.0452** 
 (0.0305) (0.0280) (0.0198) (0.0219) 
Muslim -0.0853** -0.0953* -0.149*** -0.177*** 
 (0.0415) (0.0500) (0.0218) (0.0244) 
Household 
Amenities: Average -0.0178 0.0135 -0.0844*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0266) (0.0258) (0.0255) 
Household 
Amenities: Poor -0.0801* -0.0858** -0.133*** -0.180*** 
 (0.0434) (0.0389) (0.0283) (0.0289) 
7 Years -0.0222 -0.0339 0.0793** 0.0663* 
 (0.0419) (0.0260) (0.0369) (0.0341) 
8 Years 0.0161 0.0174 0.128*** 0.0897*** 
 (0.0365) (0.0190) (0.0355) (0.0347) 
9 Years 0.0326 0.000345 0.118*** 0.0556 
 (0.0345) (0.0210) (0.0355) (0.0369) 
10 Years 0.0191 0.0000002 0.150*** 0.115*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0241) (0.0347) (0.0337) 
11 Years 0.0463  0.161*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0298)  (0.0358) (0.0366) 
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12 Years 0.0438 -0.0240 0.123*** 0.0649* 
 (0.0319) (0.0281) (0.0350) (0.0368) 
13 Years 0.0357 -0.0461 0.143*** 0.108*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0302) (0.0368) (0.0378) 
14 Years -0.0221 -0.113** 0.0661* 0.0339 
 (0.0409) (0.0548) (0.0388) (0.0402) 
15 Years -0.0585 -0.168*** 0.0732* -0.0435 
 (0.0465) (0.0543) (0.0390) (0.0450) 
16 Years -0.0722 -0.216*** -0.0419 -0.105** 
 (0.0519) (0.0527) (0.0443) (0.0448) 
17 Years -0.229*** -0.241*** -0.0559 -0.118* 
 (0.0684) (0.0636) (0.0503) (0.0610) 
18 Years -0.279*** -0.449*** -0.197*** -0.227*** 
 (0.0654) (0.0685) (0.0478) (0.0555) 
19 Years -0.437*** -0.686*** -0.215*** -0.318*** 
 (0.0812) (0.0559) (0.0578) (0.0686) 
Central Region -0.0156 -0.0617 0.0280 0.0345 
 (0.0571) (0.0535) (0.0347) (0.0372) 
Greater Accra -0.0472 -0.0765* 0.0106 -0.0308 
 (0.0337) (0.0412) (0.0550) (0.0817) 
Volta Region -0.000589 -0.0687 -0.0707** -0.0931*** 
 (0.0489) (0.0476) (0.0350) (0.0356) 
Eastern Region 0.0401 0.0127 -0.0415 -0.0290 
 (0.0401) (0.0354) (0.0358) (0.0390) 
Ashanti Region 0.00227 -0.0476 -0.0152 -0.0269 
 (0.0330) (0.0371) (0.0309) (0.0349) 
Brong Ahafo -0.0118 0.0129 -0.0392 -0.0951** 
 (0.0394) (0.0358) (0.0343) (0.0393) 
Northern Region -0.00332 -0.0724 -0.312*** -0.318*** 
 (0.0484) (0.0482) (0.0346) (0.0367) 
Upper East Region -0.00612 -0.00906 -0.217*** -0.183*** 
 (0.0522) (0.0504) (0.0376) (0.0392) 
Upper West Region -0.0177 -0.00513 -0.283*** -0.165*** 
 (0.0939) (0.0655) (0.0390) (0.0403) 
Number of Brothers 
(6 To 19 Years) -0.00929 0.0214** 0.00134 0.00581 
 (0.00833) (0.00989) (0.00545) (0.00605) 
Number of Sisters (6 
To 19 Years) 0.00999 0.00867 0.00447 -0.0152** 
 (0.00963) (0.0105) (0.00623) (0.00685) 
Number of Children 
(Less Than 6 Years) 0.0224* -0.0137 0.00376 0.000291 
 (0.0131) (0.0125) (0.00660) (0.00726) 
     
Pseudo R-squared 0.27 0.33 0.21 0.21 
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Log pseudolikelihood -256.18 -240.78 -1299.54 -1084.07 
Observations 965 888 2,725 2,249 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Table A2.4: Comparing effects of educated fathers, educated mothers, and 
household access to amenities (based on logit regressions) 
  Rural Urban 
Variable 
Difference 
in 
coefficients P-value 
Difference 
in 
coefficients P-value 
Father educated -0.48 0.02 -0.57 0.17 
Mother educated 0.40 0.28 -0.34 0.42 
Household 
amenities: Average 0.44 0.12 -0.41 0.39 
Household 
amenities: Poor 0.36 0.23 0.01 0.98 
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Table A2.5. Effects of poverty on enrolment based on parents’ education level: Rural and urban biological children 
DV: 1 if currently 
enrolled, 0 if otherwise 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Rural Urban 
Educated Parent Uneducated parents Educated Parent Uneducated parents 
         
Christian 0.0149 0.0592* -0.00260 0.0289 -0.0479 0.0779** 0.0284 -0.0668 
 (0.0345) (0.0338) (0.0246) (0.0276) (0.0534) (0.0392) (0.0591) (0.0547) 
Muslim -0.0536 -0.135** -0.187*** -0.196*** -0.0708 0.0520 -0.116 -0.326*** 
 (0.0416) (0.0533) (0.0245) (0.0268) (0.0644) (0.0501) (0.0928) (0.119) 
Household Amenities: 
Average -0.0555** -0.0799*** -0.158*** -0.186*** -0.0388 -0.000423 -0.0321 -0.0431 
 (0.0227) (0.0249) (0.0383) (0.0358) (0.0371) (0.0365) (0.0445) (0.0647) 
Household Amenities: 
Poor -0.0714** -0.0651** -0.218*** -0.232*** 0.0703 -0.147** -0.155*** -0.110 
 (0.0294) (0.0316) (0.0415) (0.0400) (0.0489) (0.0662) (0.0568) (0.0674) 
7 Years 0.122** 0.0928*** 0.0968** 0.0635 -0.0162 0.0132 -0.0169 -0.0418 
 (0.0500) (0.0338) (0.0456) (0.0434) (0.0305) (0.0234) (0.117) (0.0767) 
8 Years 0.164*** 0.0465 0.113** 0.0813*   0.0913 0.0583 
 (0.0474) (0.0402) (0.0449) (0.0453)   (0.0971) (0.0759) 
9 Years 0.182*** 0.0523 0.105** 0.0776* 0.000395  0.0933 0.0537 
 (0.0461) (0.0399) (0.0438) (0.0466) (0.0240)  (0.0981) (0.0702) 
10 Years 0.206*** 0.0895** 0.152*** 0.134***   0.0821 0.0267 
 (0.0436) (0.0366) (0.0437) (0.0429)   (0.0975) (0.0872) 
11 Years 0.163*** 0.0601 0.163*** 0.132***   0.148* -0.0102 
 (0.0491) (0.0400) (0.0455) (0.0478)   (0.0866) (0.144) 
12 Years 0.190***  0.0976** 0.0348  0.00967 0.134 0.00967 
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 (0.0450)  (0.0437) (0.0471)  (0.0256) (0.101) (0.0256) 
13 Years 0.167*** 0.0186 0.177*** 0.142*** 0.00356 0.0131 0.0921 -0.119 
 (0.0503) (0.0494) (0.0450) (0.0483) (0.0228) (0.0232) (0.113) (0.102) 
14 Years 0.104* 0.0610 0.0744 0.00867 -0.0697 -0.0712 0.112 -0.0357 
 (0.0569) (0.0451) (0.0483) (0.0529) (0.0434) (0.0479) (0.0947) (0.113) 
15 Years 0.113** -0.0824 0.0708 -0.0312 -0.0846** -0.159*** 0.0633 -0.171 
 (0.0554) (0.0701) (0.0473) (0.0523) (0.0409) (0.0550) (0.122) (0.109) 
16 Years -0.0572 -0.174** -0.0218 -0.0953* -0.136** -0.178*** -0.000391 -0.313*** 
 (0.0705) (0.0823) (0.0512) (0.0521) (0.0614) (0.0559) (0.122) (0.117) 
17 Years -0.0627 -0.305*** -0.00964 0.00508 -0.251*** -0.251*** -0.00819 -0.181 
 (0.0790) (0.0813) (0.0590) (0.0674) (0.0645) (0.0697) (0.135) (0.122) 
18 Years -0.110 -0.329*** -0.182*** -0.247*** -0.378*** -0.357*** -0.139 -0.571*** 
 (0.0916) (0.0833) (0.0531) (0.0619) (0.0699) (0.0699) (0.114) (0.140) 
19 Years -0.0945 -0.507*** -0.216*** -0.112 -0.547*** -0.597*** -0.488*** -0.787*** 
 (0.101) (0.0956) (0.0607) (0.0868) (0.0862) (0.0789) (0.140) (0.111) 
Central Region 0.0441 0.0695 -0.0230 -0.0302 -0.102 -0.0279  0.0245 
 (0.0321) (0.0461) (0.0567) (0.0534) (0.0809) (0.0649)  (0.0593) 
Greater Accra 0.0571 -0.0178 -0.0181 -0.00859 -0.0540 0.0107 -0.106 -0.104 
 (0.0427) (0.0780) (0.0801) (0.109) (0.0432) (0.0469) (0.0973) (0.0951) 
Volta Region -0.0305 0.0359 -0.104** -0.211*** -0.124 0.0783 0.0679 -0.245*** 
 (0.0383) (0.0474) (0.0506) (0.0488) (0.0849) (0.0641) (0.107) (0.0943) 
Eastern Region -0.102** 0.0216 -0.0153 -0.0923* -0.0478 0.0313 0.149** -0.0272 
 (0.0413) (0.0451) (0.0524) (0.0556) (0.0617) (0.0558) (0.0727) (0.0685) 
Ashanti Region -0.0170 0.0453 -0.0275 -0.108** -0.0306 -0.0155 0.122* -0.101 
 (0.0332) (0.0421) (0.0462) (0.0492) (0.0445) (0.0537) (0.0710) (0.0768) 
Brong Ahafo 0.00300 -0.0380 -0.108** -0.131** -0.00941 0.112** -0.0278 -0.138* 
 (0.0384) (0.0483) (0.0508) (0.0518) (0.0518) (0.0488) (0.0806) (0.0730) 
Northern Region -0.159* 0.0554 -0.356*** -0.410***  0.0839 -0.0543 -0.269*** 
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 (0.0860) (0.0699) (0.0447) (0.0434)  (0.0726) (0.0922) (0.0872) 
Upper East Region -0.138* 0.0454 -0.309*** -0.324*** -0.0675 -0.0881 0.0229 -0.0705 
 (0.0806) (0.0772) (0.0470) (0.0454) (0.108) (0.144) (0.0945) (0.106) 
Upper West Region -0.136* -0.0726 -0.309*** -0.249***  -0.0967 -0.0180 0.000496 
 (0.0758) (0.0881) (0.0471) (0.0463)  (0.144) (0.141) (0.0700) 
Number of Brothers (6 
To 19 Years) 0.0142 0.00764 -0.00288 -0.00497 0.0149 0.0229 -0.0289 0.0361** 
 (0.00907) (0.00871) (0.00668) (0.00746) (0.0138) (0.0147) (0.0186) (0.0173) 
Number of Sisters (6 To 
19 Years) -0.00699 -0.00699 0.00138 -0.0161* 0.0261 0.0188 0.0133 -0.0286 
 (0.0102) (0.0125) (0.00763) (0.00844) (0.0167) (0.0148) (0.0178) (0.0234) 
Number of Children Less 
Than 6 Years 0.00480 -0.0256 0.00757 0.00617 0.0226 -0.0179 0.0395* -0.00656 
 (0.0133) (0.0156) (0.00782) (0.00850) (0.0249) (0.0230) (0.0219) (0.0220) 
         
Pseudo R-squared 0.19 0.26 0.16 0.15 0.27 0.30 0.25 0.30 
Log pseudolikelihood -275.50 -206.35 -1192.50 -1000.20 -163.82 -169.25 -113.74 -169.25 
Observations 900 697 2,141 1,761 545 558 317 558 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A2.6. Determinants of school enrolment: Non-biological children 
DV: 1 If currently 
enrolled, 0 if otherwise 
(1) (2) (3) 
Rural  Urban 
Boys Girls All 
        
Father Educated 0.143** 0.229*** 0.151** 
 (0.0694) (0.0561) (0.0634) 
Mother Educated 0.0768 0.0170 -0.115** 
 (0.0931) (0.0825) (0.0480) 
Father Self-Employed -0.00200 -0.0803 -0.0137 
 (0.126) (0.105) (0.0520) 
Father Agriculture -0.147 -0.106 0.0253 
 (0.0946) (0.0822) (0.0653) 
Christian 0.116* 0.0855 -0.0993 
 (0.0659) (0.0652) (0.0754) 
Muslim 0.0385 -0.0523 0.0185 
 (0.0793) (0.0859) (0.0781) 
Household Amenities: 
Average -0.295*** -0.0360 -0.00448 
 (0.0705) (0.0719) (0.0708) 
Household Amenities: 
Poor -0.389*** -0.246*** -0.424** 
 (0.0894) (0.0899) (0.202) 
7 Years 0.205 0.101 -0.0302 
 (0.154) (0.134) (0.0987) 
8 Years 0.0465 0.212* -0.133 
 (0.138) (0.123) (0.127) 
9 Years 0.178 0.298** -0.172 
 (0.147) (0.140) (0.160) 
10 Years 0.205* 0.227*  
 (0.123) (0.127)  
11 Years 0.353** 0.136 0.0228 
 (0.142) (0.131) (0.0840) 
12 Years -0.00346 0.342*** -0.0571 
 (0.139) (0.118) (0.0964) 
13 Years 0.137 0.265** -0.0793 
 (0.146) (0.124) (0.0935) 
14 Years -0.0129 0.252* -0.202** 
 (0.126) (0.136) (0.102) 
15 Years 0.249** 0.162 -0.237** 
 (0.118) (0.123) (0.0934) 
16 Years 0.0210 -0.0647 -0.0733 
 (0.148) (0.128) (0.0901) 
17 Years -0.0646 -0.378*** -0.207** 
 (0.132) (0.126) (0.104) 
18 Years -0.120 -0.0656 -0.630*** 
82 
 
 (0.135) (0.160) (0.113) 
19 Years -0.279* -0.353*** -0.451*** 
 (0.158) (0.116) (0.123) 
Central Region   -0.0136 
   (0.0766) 
Greater Accra  0.228 -0.265*** 
  (0.161) (0.0781) 
Volta Region 0.168 0.293** 0.0292 
 (0.111) (0.127) (0.0853) 
Eastern Region 0.108 0.407*** -0.0415 
 (0.102) (0.116) (0.123) 
Ashanti Region 0.00705 0.0681 -0.210*** 
 (0.0930) (0.0937) (0.0793) 
Brong Ahafo -0.121 0.116 -0.0299 
 (0.123) (0.107) (0.0930) 
Northern Region -0.275** 0.0773 -0.362** 
 (0.114) (0.105) (0.145) 
Upper East Region -0.0615 0.488*** -0.199 
 (0.159) (0.0922) (0.134) 
Upper West Region -0.118 0.237** 0.0362 
 (0.102) (0.0985) (0.0896) 
Number of Brothers (6 To 
19 Years) 0.0652** -0.0349 0.0203 
 (0.0317) (0.0312) (0.0317) 
Number of Sisters (6 To 
19 Years) -0.0187 -0.0232 0.0343 
 (0.0399) (0.0295) (0.0283) 
Number of Children Less 
Than 6 Years 0.0381 -0.0395 -0.0211 
 (0.0342) (0.0340) (0.0715) 
Girls   -0.134** 
   (0.0577) 
    
Pseudo R-squared 0.29 0.20 0.32 
Log pseudolikelihood -137.38 -154.81 -128.68 
Observations 282 285 327 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A2.7: Comparing effects of educated fathers, educated mothers, and 
household access to amenities (based on logit regressions) 
  Rural 
Variable 
Difference 
in 
coefficients P-value 
Father educated -0.71 0.20 
Household 
amenities: Average -1.57 0.03 
Household 
amenities: Poor -0.82 0.33 
 
Table A2.8 Determinants of school enrolment: Non-biological children 
DV: 1 if currently 
enrolled, 0 if otherwise 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Educated parent Uneducated parent 
          
Christian -0.0714 -0.0783 0.0700 0.0335 
 (0.0988) (0.0938) (0.0674) (0.0643) 
Muslim -0.0509 -0.169 -0.00492 -0.0961 
 (0.0867) (0.150) (0.0824) (0.0746) 
Household Amenities: 
Average -0.0736 0.111 -0.219** -0.222*** 
 (0.0586) (0.0675) (0.0882) (0.0743) 
Household Amenities: 
Poor -0.327*** -0.0291 -0.269** -0.512*** 
 (0.0993) (0.117) (0.109) (0.0917) 
7 Years   0.182 0.137 
   (0.178) (0.153) 
8 Years -0.176 -0.00898 0.130 0.323** 
 (0.133) (0.173) (0.156) (0.138) 
9 Years 0.00250 0.0471 0.240 0.139 
 (0.0586) (0.199) (0.159) (0.164) 
10 Years -0.0179 0.246* 0.166 0.218 
 (0.0571) (0.130) (0.153) (0.146) 
11 Years  0.111 0.298* 0.250 
  (0.141) (0.163) (0.156) 
12 Years -0.0822 0.210 -0.0603 0.398*** 
 (0.0772) (0.134) (0.171) (0.142) 
13 Years 0.0274 0.225 0.0555 0.151 
 (0.0538) (0.137) (0.168) (0.168) 
14 Years -0.167** 0.0891 -0.0652 0.0150 
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 (0.0841) (0.147) (0.174) (0.181) 
15 Years -0.0114 -0.101 0.188 0.0413 
 (0.0686) (0.142) (0.148) (0.159) 
16 Years -0.132* 0.0125 0.0715 -0.155 
 (0.0770) (0.147) (0.180) (0.156) 
17 Years -0.384*** -0.255 -0.00379 -0.0532 
 (0.104) (0.166) (0.153) (0.163) 
18 Years -0.333*** -0.471*** -0.163 -0.0716 
 (0.123) (0.144) (0.162) (0.159) 
19 Years -0.701*** -0.327** -0.365** -0.289** 
 (0.131) (0.166) (0.166) (0.144) 
Central Region 0.0885 0.0579   
 (0.0989) (0.108)   
Greater Accra 0.0989 -0.204** 0.0387  
 (0.0768) (0.0915) (0.205)  
Volta Region -0.0475 0.171* 0.0962 -0.0364 
 (0.125) (0.0887) (0.156) (0.118) 
Eastern Region 0.0564 0.0630 0.0726 0.0911 
 (0.0870) (0.115) (0.120) (0.105) 
Ashanti Region -0.0101 -0.0714 -0.0730 -0.483*** 
 (0.0868) (0.0863) (0.121) (0.115) 
Brong Ahafo -0.232* 0.0724 -0.0877 -0.314*** 
 (0.129) (0.101) (0.139) (0.117) 
Northern Region -0.132 0.146 -0.293** -0.493*** 
 (0.152) (0.107) (0.115) (0.106) 
Upper East Region -0.0232 0.235** -0.0758 -0.160 
 (0.132) (0.0996) (0.130) (0.140) 
Upper West Region -0.0593 0.157 -0.110 -0.302*** 
 (0.124) (0.107) (0.112) (0.104) 
Number of Brothers (6 
To 19 Years) 0.0165 -0.00750 0.0612* -0.00706 
 (0.0340) (0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0373) 
Number of Sisters (6 To 
19 Years) 0.00677 -0.000277 0.0217 0.0448 
 (0.0352) (0.0350) (0.0451) (0.0316) 
Number of Children 
Less Than 6 Years -0.107* 0.000025 0.0279 -0.0241 
 (0.0573) (0.0671) (0.0369) (0.0320) 
Rural 0.0352 -0.131** -0.172* -0.0190 
 (0.0567) (0.0608) (0.101) (0.0900) 
     
Pseudo R-squared 0.28 0.25 0.18 0.33 
Log pseudolikelihood -87.17 -141.42 -143.46 -111.16 
Observations 231 307 252 239 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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CHAPTER THREE: DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF FAMILY 
BACKGROUND ON EARNINGS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
In Ghana, family background especially parents’ education is very important 
for child development for a number of reasons. Firstly, family background acts as an 
initial determinant of the child’s educational attainment (my findings from chapter two 
shows that educated parents increase children’s school enrolment probability). 
However, the schooling decisions made by parents for their children are determined 
by both their financial and human capital, as well as the endowment of the child 
(Checchi, 2006). Children from wealthy families face lower interest rates (Becker and 
Tomes, 1994), and parents are therefore able to invest more in children’s education 
which potentially translates into economic success. Secondly, education is clearly an 
important determinant of later labour market success, and high earnings. Thirdly, 
however, given education, family background may also influence earnings via family 
connections (or the lack thereof). In particular, a wealthy family (educated parents) 
may be able to use its labour market and professional connections to help its children 
(Brown and Park, 2002). The fundamental aim of this chapter is to examine these 
linkages, that is, the links between education, family background and earnings. 
In addition, the study will consider the role of gender and rural-urban location 
in determining earnings. Chapter 2 has shown that more educated parents (in particular 
fathers’), tend to favour their daughter’s education in urban areas. This factor could 
help women overcome possible discrimination in the labour market. Therefore, this 
study will provide separate analyses for males and females. As regards the rural-urban 
distinction, it needs to be recognised that in Ghana, the rural areas are much poorer 
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than the urban areas. Consequently, labour markets are thinner, and businesses are 
smaller. In such markets, education may be less important and family background and 
“connections”, more relevant. There is also the possibility that, due to the lower levels 
of parental education in rural areas, parents may not have enough knowledge of the 
labour market, in part, because they do not have “connections”. Family background 
may therefore be less important for labour market success in rural areas. These 
possibilities need to be considered, and so a separate analysis for rural and urban areas 
are provided. A further reason for separate analysis for rural and urban areas is that, a 
higher proportion of earnings is likely to be received in non-monetary forms (captured 
imperfectly in my data) in rural areas. 
Having said this, the fact that my study is limited to wage work needs to be 
recognised. In particular, the study excludes self-employed, and agriculture. Taking 
first the self-employed in Ghana are a heterogeneous group, consisting of, for example, 
the very poor hawker category, and the rich business and large farm owners. Many in 
the self-employed group have non-market or unreported earnings, which make them 
unsuitable for my inquiry. As for agriculture, this group has similar analytical 
problems, and is simpler to exclude. However, the study in chapter 4 considers 
education and family background in the context of small informal businesses, so this 
field is not completely left out. 
Data from the 2006 Ghana Living Standards Survey for this analysis. Labour 
market success is measured by the earnings of the individual. The study considers the 
extent to which family background measured by parents’ education is correlated with 
an individual’s education and the consequent impact of that individual’s education 
(and family background) on earnings. A system of equations that is able to identify the 
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size of the direct and indirect effects (via education) of family background 
independently is used in this study. Figure 3.1 shows the path diagram for a linear 
structural equation model describing the process of earning higher wages. 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶, and 
𝐹𝐵 reflect education of the individual and family background respectively. 𝑌 s the 
earnings of the individual, measured in Cedis. The straight arrows leading to each 
variable is an indication that the variable at the beginning is a cause of the variable at 
the end of that arrow. So for instance, the years of education acquired by an individual 
is because of the individual’s family background (level of parents’ education). Those 
whose parents have more years of education are likely to have higher levels of 
education themselves. Path c1 measures the direct effect of family background on 
earnings. That is, the earnings of an individual are determined by the level of education 
of his/her parents. Where the parents have higher years of education, it is expected that 
earnings of the individual will be higher. Path ab measures the indirect effect of family 
background on individual earnings. Path, c, captures the total effect of family 
background, which is the summation of the direct effect, c1 and the indirect effect, ab. 
That is, c= ab + c1 
Figure 3. 1 Path analysis: effects of family background on labour market 
outcomes 
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3.1.1 Organisation of the chapter 
The next section of the chapter provides a discussion on the allocation of 
individuals into wage jobs, followed by a review of the literature on education and 
family background on labour market success in section 3.3. Section 3.4 and 3.5 
provides a brief discussion on some methodological issues, and a description of the 
data and variables used in the analysis respectively. This is followed by the model 
specification in section 3.6. Lastly, a discussion on key findings from the results is 
done in sections 3.7 and 3.8. Section 3.9 concludes. 
 
3.2 Allocation into wage jobs in the Ghana labour market  
Similar to labour markets in many developing countries, Ghana’s labour 
market is highly informal, and is characterised by poor labour standards and working 
conditions, and low pay (Schneider et. al, 2010). The formal sector, on the other hand 
is smaller and difficult to access, but offers higher pay and relatively better working 
conditions. Most of these formal sector ‘good’ jobs are concentrated in urban areas, 
and are largely dominated by men, who generally tend to have higher educational 
attainments than women (HDR, 2015). In 2010, wage and salaried workers accounted 
for only 18.2% of the total labour force in Ghana (World Development Indicators, 
2010). Due for instance, to current economic reforms (such as the public sector job 
freeze), entry into wage jobs is highly restricted. Nonetheless, formal sector jobs in 
Ghana offers higher status and pay, and is usually the preferred option for most 
individuals, despite its limited access. This section provides a brief discussion on how 
job allocation is achieved in wage employment in Ghana.  
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Firstly, access to wage jobs is partly dependant on the level of education of the 
individual, and there is empirical evidence on education and labour market outcomes 
in Ghana (Kingdon and Söderbom, 2008) to support this. In particular, those with post-
basic education have a higher chance of finding jobs in the formal sector. This is due 
in part to the possibility that, given the poor labour standards, educated individuals 
tend to have a higher bargaining power, that can for example, allow them to have 
access to work-related benefits which are usually non-existent in non-wage jobs, and 
negotiate higher wages. Further to this, higher levels of education can facilitate 
progression and ensures that these individuals get higher wages. As such, an 
appreciable level of education can facilitate chances of finding a wage job in Ghana. 
Another issue that limits entry into wage jobs in Ghana is the poor access to 
vacancy information. This limitation however implies that individuals in urban areas 
stand a better chance of hearing about jobs, simply because urban compared with rural 
dwellers have better access to information. Unlike most developed countries where 
jobs are advertised (mainly on the internet and sometimes in print media), and 
applications open to all qualified persons, access to job vacancies tend to be very 
limited in the Ghana labour market. This means that “connections”, often referred to 
as “whom you know” in Ghana, could play an important part in obtaining information 
on vacancies and submitting applications for jobs. These constraints, often through 
family background effects could therefore play a part in allocation into wage 
employment, and subsequently earning higher wages. This further imply that children 
from wealthy families (educated parents) may have a higher chance of securing wage 
jobs because their parents may have “connections” and have a better knowledge of the 
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labour market, compared with children from less educated families who tend to 
struggle to match the advantages children from educated families have.   
It is plausible therefore, that in a thinner labour market with intermediaries, and 
in an economy dominated by weak institutions, education and family background can 
be crucial for individual economic success. Individuals with higher levels of education, 
and those from families that are more educated will be more advantaged in the search 
for wage jobs. Based on these shortcomings in the market for wage work in Ghana, 
the study examines the linkages between education, family background, and labour 
market success, measured here as earnings. 
 
3.3 Previous research: Education, family background and economic success 
Children from poorer families receive less human capital investment mainly 
because of financial constraints, and the fact that poorer families face a higher interest 
rate (Becker and Tomes, 1976; Becker and Tomes, 1994). Since education acts as a 
major determinant of labour market outcomes in Ghana, any positive effects that 
family background may have on children’s education may translate into labour market 
advantages. Poorer parents compared with richer parents may have relatively lower 
levels of education that potentially affects their level of success in the labour market 
(Mayer, 1997). Family background characteristics could also affect the motivation, 
access to career information, or the discount rate of the child (Card, 1999). In addition, 
educated parents tend to have better knowledge of the labour market and are able to 
put their children into high-paid jobs using their social and professional networks.  
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3.3.1 Intergenerational transmission of inequality 
Empirical studies show that economic status is persistent across generations, 
with children brought up in high-income families earning more (Solon, 1992, Piketty, 
2000; Zimmerman, 1992), and having higher educational attainment than children 
raised in low-income families. The general and most widely used approach when 
studying the relationship between family background and children’s economic success 
is to generate an index for intergenerational correlation using socioeconomic variables 
such as educational attainment, earnings, or occupational status of parents and children 
(Blanden, 2013; Marks, 2011; Corak, 2013). The major limitation of this approach is 
embedded in how these variables are measured. In many instances, mobility is 
measured based on the traits of one single family member or parent, mainly fathers’ 
traits (Björklund and Jäntti, 2012). However, parental background effect on children’s 
economic success cannot be attributed to only one single measure.  
Hertz et al. (2007), estimates intergenerational educational mobility and find 
that despite the impact of parent’s education on the schooling of children, 
intergenerational mobility has fallen substantially over the last few years. They find 
an intergenerational correlation in schooling of around 0.4 for most countries in their 
sample. The sample of four African countries11 have a parent-child schooling 
correlation of 0.36. Björklund and Jäntti (2012), also examine the importance of family 
background for labour-economic outcomes, such as long-run earnings of individuals 
and years of schooling. In estimating the sibling correlations, the authors find that 
factors shared by siblings, including family and environmental influences account for 
                                                   
11 The four African countries considered in the study were; Egypt (0.50), Ghana (0.39), South 
Africa-only KwaZulu-Natal (0.44), and Rural Ethiopia (0.10). Correlations in parentheses. 
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about 40-60% of the inequality in outcomes. They find, compared with the estimates 
of siblings’ correlation that use only father’s traits, that by including the education of 
mothers, the explanatory power of the intergenerational model increased, although 
only marginally. Björklund and Jäntti (2012) associate the reason for a small impact 
on the explanatory power to positive assortative mating, that is, where educated fathers 
marry mothers of similar education level.  
On the relationship between parent’s income and children’s income, there is 
evidence to show that economic status is persistent across generations. For instance, 
Solon (1992), Solon (2002), and Zimmerman (1992) find a positive correlation 
between fathers’ and sons’ permanent earnings. As regards the effect of parent’s 
income on children’s education, Shea (2000) finds a positive impact of parents income 
on children’s human capital.  
There have also been recent developments in the literature on the 
intergenerational correlation of wealth. Two possible pathways are associated with the 
underlying causes of these correlations across generations according to Black et al. 
(2015). The first views this correlation to be transmitted through biology, that is, 
through genetic inheritance of skills and attitudes. The other pathway is transmitted 
through the environment. In particular, because educated (wealthier) parents face 
lower interest rates they are able to invest more in children’s human capital. Educated 
parents are also able to provide information about the labour market to their children, 
and may assist children to help them find better jobs. Richer parents, compared with 
poorer parents, are able to support their children financially by providing them with 
additional financial support to start-up businesses in cases where capital markets are 
imperfect (Parker, 2004). For instance, Charles and Hurst (2003) estimate a regression 
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of the wealth of children on parental wealth and find intergenerational wealth 
elasticities of 0.37 for the US. In addition, Black et al. (2015) find stronger effects of 
environmental factors on wealth of adopted and biological children rather than genetic 
factors. The authors suggest that the transmission of wealth does not necessarily mean 
that children from richer backgrounds have higher abilities, or more talented, but 
instead the role played by biological factors in the intergenerational transmission of 
wealth may be much smaller compared with the role of environmental factors.  
In Ghana, this study will show that family background, measured as parents’ 
education, can exert its influence on labour market success (earnings) through two 
channels. Firstly, it can influence the earnings of individuals directly, especially for 
those in urban areas where access to wage jobs are difficult. Secondly, family 
background can influence earnings of adult children indirectly through the positive 
effect of parents’ education on education of adult children.  
3.3.1.1 Other evidence: Family background and occupational outcomes 
Di Pietro and Urwin (2003) use a household income and wealth survey for Italy 
to investigate intergenerational mobility and occupational status. The study used an 
ordered probit regression and find that the occupational status of the mother has less 
impact on children’s occupational attainment compared with father’s occupation. The 
authors also find that non-working mothers do not have any significant effect on the 
occupational status of both men and women, but instead having a non-working father 
positively affected the likelihood of women to be in manual work. The authors go 
further to investigate the occupation of offspring at current age in relation to paternal 
occupation at that same age. They find that individuals whose fathers are in skilled 
occupations (clerical, middle managers, and managers) are less likely to be in manual 
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work. Di Petro and Urwin (2003), also find that the probability of an individual being 
in a more skilled occupation is larger, the higher the occupational category of the 
father, although in most cases these effects are stronger for men than women.  
Carmichael (2000), investigates intergenerational occupational mobility in 
Britain using ordered probit regression. The author finds that sons and daughters 
whose fathers engaged in non-manual occupations had a higher likelihood of being in 
in similar occupations. For sons, Carmichael (2000) notes that mothers occupation is 
generally insignificant, whereas the author finds that daughters whose mothers were 
in unskilled manual and semi-skilled manual occupations were disadvantaged 
compared with daughters whose mothers were in skilled and professional occupations. 
The author argues that daughters compared with sons are less dependent on their 
father’s occupational status, but instead daughters are more dependent on mother’s 
occupational status. The findings from this study clearly indicates that children’s 
occupational attainment depends on the occupational attainment of parents. Children 
from well-off households are therefore more likely to enter into skilled occupations 
compared with those from poorer backgrounds whose parents are in unskilled and 
manual occupations. 
Erikson and Goldthorpe (2002), argue that the reason why individuals of 
wealthy parents do well in the labour market is that the priority of such individuals is 
to avoid downward mobility. However, this claim may not be valid in all cases 
especially for children from poorer backgrounds. Some less educated parents, even in 
the presence of financial constraints may be willing to provide the required level of 
education for their children in order to increase their chances of securing good jobs 
and earning higher wages. The findings from chapter 2 suggests that despite rural 
95 
 
parents being less educated compared with urban parents, rural parents may still be 
willing to invest in their children’s education. 
The ongoing discussion on the empirical estimates of intergenerational 
correlations is a clear indication of the importance of family background on the 
economic outcomes of children. Some studies have found that father’s traits tend to be 
more important in children’s economic outcomes although the evidence also shows 
that both parent’s traits are important. It is therefore plausible for Ghana, that family 
background could also be influential in children’s human capital development and 
labour market outcomes. For instance, educated parents can provide support to 
children in many forms including acting as role models and source of funding, and 
where access to jobs are limited, educated parents can also provide “connections” for 
their children to enter into good jobs. What is missing in the literature on the role of 
family background, however, is the channels through which family background work 
to determine the labour market outcomes of children in Ghana. This study contributes 
to the dearth of evidence by showing how the education of the individual mediate12 
the relationship between the effects of family background and earnings in Ghana. 
3.3.2 Education and labour market outcomes  
Many studies have estimated the effect of education on an individual’s 
economic success. The general findings are that education does not only enhance 
chances of being in a better job, but it also leads to higher earnings (Psacharopoulos 
and Patrinos, 2002).  
                                                   
12 This refers to how education influences or absorbs the effect of family background 
(independent variable) on labour market success, earnings (dependent variable).  
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In many developing countries, the segmented nature of labour markets (Fields, 
2011) makes it difficult for educated individuals to find high paid jobs. The evidence 
however, points to the fact that education enhances the chances of finding jobs in 
highly paid sectors. For instance, Glick and Sahn (1997) use multinomial logit models 
to estimate sectoral choice models for men and women aged 15 to 65 years in Guinea. 
In the study, the authors categorise wage employment into private wage work and 
public wage work. The authors found that having more years of education reduced the 
likelihood of men and women being in self-employment. This finding seems logical, 
because self-employment is usually considered as a ‘bad job’ in Ghana, partly because 
of the relatively lower wages, compared with wage jobs where wages are higher.13 As 
regards wage employment, the authors found education to increase the likelihood of 
being in public sector jobs. Glick and Sahn (1997), find however, that for women more 
education increases their chances of being in private wage employment, whereas for 
men education weakly reduces their chances of entering private wage sector. The 
authors, however, believe that women’s higher probability of entering into private 
wage employment is due to the types of occupations available and open to women, 
and also because education is not a requirement for men in most private wage jobs. If 
this assertion by Glick and Sahn (1997) holds, then this study expects to find a direct 
effect of family background on the earnings of men, and for women an indirect effect 
of family background on earnings. 
Similarly, Vijverberg (1993) estimates participation across four occupational 
groups for Cote d’Ivoire. The author finds evidence showing that for both men and 
                                                   
13 This is discussed further in chapter 4, when the study looks at performance of unregistered 
businesses in urban areas. 
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women, the chances of entering into wage employment is largely dependent on the 
level of education. Having any form of education is associated with a higher chance of 
non-employment (that is, not being in the labour market). The author also find that 
educated men and women have a lower probability of being in self-employment. 
Kingdon and Söderbom (2008), investigate participation across five different 
occupational choices, including being out of the labour force for Ghana. The authors 
find that education reduces chances of entering into agriculture and raises men and 
women’s likelihood of being in wage employment. In addition, Kingdon and 
Söderbom (2008) find that for women in particular, secondary education significantly 
reduces chances of being out of the labour market. Especially for women, what their 
findings seems to suggest is that given the difficulty associated with finding high-paid 
jobs because of the disadvantages women face in the labour market, higher educational 
attainment can ensure that women are able to find high-paid jobs.  
The above evidence shows the importance of education in finding high-paid 
jobs and earnings. In Ghana, the small size of the formal sector has made access to 
wage jobs difficult. Despite the difficulty in finding high-paid jobs, education, and 
labour market connections through the positive impact of family background can 
facilitate allocation into these jobs. This study will show whether family background, 
given education can facilitate higher earnings. In the next section, evidence from the 
literature on the direct and indirect effects (via education) of family background on 
earnings is discussed.   
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3.3.3 Direct and indirect effects of family background on labour market 
outcomes 
On the mediating effect of education, Kuha and Goldthorpe (2010) examine 
how educational attainment of an individual affects the effect of the relationship 
between parental social class (mainly father’s) and the individual’s social class, using 
British data for men and women. The authors classify social class into three groups, 
namely; salariat and employees, intermediate class, and working class. They find, 
firstly, a positive correlation between parental class and the individual’s class. For the 
direct and indirect effects estimated using multinomial logit, the authors found that the 
direct effect of parental class on women’s social class is considerably lower compared 
with men. As regards the indirect effect (via education) of parental class, this was 
generally larger for women than for men. Although an implication of their findings is 
that the mediating effect of education on the effect of class mobility could differ from 
one social class to another, their finding also suggest that parental background helps 
women more via parent’s investment in the education of women. Men’s 
socioeconomic status is found to be influenced more by the direct effects of their 
parent’s socioeconomic status. 
Other studies, notably Raitano and Vona (2015) on eight European countries14, 
find that the influence of parental background on the earnings of children in Nordic 
countries (Finland, Denmark) and Germany is largely indirect (via the effects of 
education). Although the authors find no direct parental background effect on the 
earnings of children, they argue that this may be due to the strong welfare system, 
                                                   
14 The eight countries considered in the study were: Germany, France, Spain, Italy, UK, 
Ireland, Denmark, and Finland 
99 
 
regulated wage setting, and an effective education system that offers equal chances to 
all in these countries. For the remaining countries, the authors find positive parental 
background effects, and they suggest that the positive effects may reflect the 
unobservable quality of the education system and family networks.  
Similarly, Mazzonna (2014) investigate the relationship between socio-
economic background and later outcomes such as health and income of adults in 
Europe. Their study shows considerable differences in the outcomes of adults who had 
different socio-economic backgrounds during childhood. They note that although 
education largely mediates how family background and later adulthood outcomes are 
related, differences in institutional and cultural environment may explain some of these 
differences across countries.  
In contrast to evidence of the indirect effects of family background on the 
socioeconomic outcomes of children, Hudson and Sessions (2011) find evidence of 
direct parental influence on children’s earnings. They argue that the direct effect of 
parental background is mainly because educated parents tend to have better 
connections and are therefore able to assist their children in finding good jobs. 
Pellizzari (2010) also note that in labour markets with intermediaries, the wage effects 
of finding jobs through personal contacts tend be higher. For Italy, Raitano and Vona 
(2015b), find evidence that parental background exerts a significant influence on sons’ 
earnings even after conditioning on observable and unobservable characteristics of 
sons. The authors also find a large effect of parental background on the earnings of 
children even after controlling for the education of sons after twenty years of work 
experience. This implies that in some areas, the effects of family background on labour 
market success is still important.  
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The above evidence show mixed results of the effects of family background on 
earnings. These differences may be due to the nature of the labour market, and the 
education system of these countries. In labour markets with frictions and 
intermediaries, it is possible that personal contacts and social networks will be a key 
factor in finding good jobs. This possibility is examined for the case of Ghana by 
looking at the links between education of the individual, family background, and 
labour market success (earnings).  
 
3.4 Methodological issues: estimating intergenerational correlations 
If the economic success of children transmits from the economic status of their 
parents, then the association between the incomes of parents, 𝑦𝑝 and the adult child’s 
income, 𝑦𝑐 is important in studies of intergenerational mobility. This relationship can 
be summarised as below; 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑐𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑝𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖     (5) 
where  𝛽 measures the elasticity of an individual’s income given the income of the 
individual’s parent. Should 𝛽 be zero, then this means the incomes of the adult child’s 
parents do not matter and there is complete mobility. In the case where 𝛽 is 1, then 
there is evidence that the earnings of the adult child are reflected by the earnings of 
his/her parent.  
A major concern of estimating intergenerational mobility using this approach, 
and more relevant for developing countries is that information on parent’s income are 
hardly available in most surveys. For developed countries where this is less of an issue, 
economic mobility is captured by the elasticity of the adult child’s (mostly sons’) 
earnings given the father’s earnings. Another issue associated with the use of earnings 
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is that, since most data covers only a very short period, earnings measures might be 
prone to error, which could lead to bias and inconsistent estimates of the 𝛽 parameter 
(Checchi, 2006). Attempts have however been made to overcome this caveat. For 
instance, Mazumder (2005), argues that even averaging the earnings of the father over 
a period will still not be adequate to fully address any potential measurement errors. 
The author associate this to the fact that the closeness of observations to each other is 
not representative of the father’s lifetime income. A possible reason as argued by 
Haider and Solon (2006) is how the differences in permanent income and current 
income are related in the course of one’s life. For instance, at younger ages, incomes 
are generally low for most individuals, but this increases at older ages. The authors 
argue further that the direction of bias due to measurement error is linked to the age at 
which earnings of the individual is observed. A proposed solution to this problem has 
been to use the method of instrumental variable. However, this technique has its own 
challenges since most variables correlated with parent’s income may have independent 
effect on the status of the child.  
Another common but more traditional approach of measuring mobility across 
generations is to use the occupational or employment status of parents and children 
(Blanden, 2013; Marks, 2011). Sociologists mostly adopt this approach and it works 
by generating a socio-economic index that ranks occupations of both parents and adult 
children. The index is then matched to the occupations of fathers and sons, and 
correlated across generations. Contrary to the approach that uses income of parents, 
the requirements for this intergenerational mobility approach are less demanding. Data 
on parents’ occupation is easy to come by and is readily available in most surveys. In 
addition, since occupation varies less over an individual’s life-cycle, age-related biases 
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associated with the use of income/earnings is less of a problem (Blanden, 2013). This 
makes the use of occupational status or social class a more desirable and reliable 
measure. The only difficulty that arises with this measure is the quality of information, 
although this seems more relevant for cross-country studies. 
The last measure of intergenerational mobility considers the correlation 
between the education of parents and children’s education, which is similar to the 
approach used in chapter 2. Intergenerational education mobility can then be estimated 
from a regression of the form; 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑝𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖    (6) 
where 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑖 is the education of the individual, and 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑝𝑖  is parent’s education. A 
major shortfall in using this approach, however, is that, only one parents’ characteristic 
(usually fathers’) is mostly used in estimating intergenerational educational mobility. 
However, family background effect on children’s education cannot be determined by 
only one single trait, usually fathers’ (Björklund and Jäntti, 2012). Though fathers 
generally tend to be household heads, and often have stronger bargaining power in the 
house, mother’s role in child development is equally important as it has benefits that 
go beyond just economic success of the individual (Chen and Li, 2009; Miller, 2008). 
In addition to using only one single variable as a measure of family background, there 
is also the problem of how education is measured. A common approach has been the 
use of years of schooling or educational attainment. This becomes a problem of major 
concern particularly for cross-country studies, because of the differences in education 
system and the differences across age cohorts. Nevertheless, an advantage of this 
approach similar to the approach that uses social class or occupations, and 
income/earnings is that, information on parental education and children’s education 
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are easy to acquire and available in most surveys. Similarly, educational attainment 
compared with occupation, and income, remain fairly unchanged over the lifecycle 
(Marks, 2011). To overcome this problem, this study considers the education of both 
parents, by using the average years of parents’ education, measured in schooling years 
completed. The study also generates an index as an alternative measure of family 
background based on parents’ education and occupation. 
The alternative measures of intergenerational correlation discussed so far 
suggests that regardless of how intergenerational correlation is measured, there is the 
tendency to be confronted with estimation and measurement issues. These issues are 
however aggravated depending on the nature of the study. Cross-country studies will 
be compounded with more difficulties because of the differences in measurement and 
definition (Corak, 2006; Blanden, 2013) of variables. As the data does not provide 
information on the earnings of the individual’s parents (it is not possible to match data 
on parents and children in the sample used for this study. These adults have completed 
schooling and are active in the labour market, and most not living at home with 
parents), parental earnings are not used as a measure of family background. Instead, 
the average years of parents’ education is used, since the data provides information on 
parents’ highest level of education completed. As an alternative measure of family 
background, the study generates an index for family background using parents’ 
education and occupation. The results from these regressions are comparable with my 
preferred family background measure, that is, average years of parents education. 
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3.5 Data  
The data used is the 2006 Ghana Living Standards Survey. The survey provides 
rich information on demographic characteristics such as place of birth, educational 
attainment and marital status. The survey has detailed information on labour market 
characteristics such as employment status, employment conditions, hours of work, 
earnings, and other characteristics. The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25 to 
60 years in rural and urban areas. Individuals in this age group will be in the prime of 
their working lives (OECD, 2016), and not likely to be participating in any schooling 
activities, making them suitable for this study which is focussed on people who are 
strongly engaged with the labour market. The age range is also limited to 60 years 
because the official retirement age in Ghana is 60 years.  
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics of the main variables used in my analysis. 
Men make up 75.35% of the total sample. As shown in table 3.1, there is not much 
difference in years of schooling between rural and urban individuals, although table 
3.2 shows that in urban areas individuals have higher post-basic educational attainment 
compared with rural individuals. This seems to suggest that in rural areas, individuals 
are not able to continue schooling after basic education level, possibly as a result of 
the high indirect costs of education such as boarding fees, transportation costs, and the 
time associated with participating in schooling activities.  
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Table 3. 1 Summary statistics of main variables 
  Urban Rural 
 Men Women Men Women 
Variable N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
          
Weekly earnings 
(in '0000 Cedis) 1054 125.56 400 102.00 410 82.92 79 58.41 
Years of 
schooling 997 12.9 639 13.5 367 11.6 67 12.3 
Parents years of 
schooling 996 8.8 357 10.3 376 5.5 73 5.1 
Father years of 
schooling 1015 11.1 380 13.0 389 7.3 76 7.8 
Mothers years 
of schooling 1007 6.7 360 8.0 379 3.7 73 2.7 
Father: no 
education 431 45.5 125 35.6 240 65.0 45 62.5 
Father: educated 517 54.5 226 64.4 139 35.0 27 37.5 
Mother: no 
education 646 66.5 209 59.9 307 81.7 63 86.3 
Mother: 
educated 326 33.5 140 40.1 69 18.4 10 13.7 
For instance, 21% and 24.1% of men and women have secondary educational 
attainment in urban areas compared with 12% and 14.9% for men and women 
respectively in rural areas. At post-secondary level, the figures also show a higher 
attainment for both men and women in urban areas than for men and women in rural 
areas. Overall, there is a higher rate of no educational attainment among rural men and 
women than among urban men and women. This could be explained by financial 
constraints faced by rural households, which then affects parents’ ability to invest in 
children’s education. The composition of educational attainment of men and women 
in rural and urban areas can be seen table 3.2.  
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Table 3. 2 Educational attainment of men and women in wage employment 
Educational 
attainment 
Urban Rural 
Men Women Men Women 
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
          
None 99 9.9 38 10.3 75 20.4 17 25.4 
Basic 406 40.7 114 30.9 157 42.8 22 23.8 
Secondary 209 21.0 89 24.1 44 12.0 10 14.9 
Post-
secondary 283 28.4 128 34.7 91 24.8 18 26.9 
In terms of earnings, table 3.1 shows that the average earnings of urban men 
and women are higher than the average earnings of their rural counterparts, which is 
expected because of the nature of the labour market in rural areas. For instance, among 
women, those in urban areas earn almost two times more than that of their rural 
counterparts (102 compared with 58.41 Cedis). Men in general earn more on average 
than women in both rural and urban areas. This could explain why parents (in 
particular urban parents as found in chapter 2) may prefer sons’ education since sons’ 
compared with daughters are more likely to provide financial support for parents in 
old age. Table A3.9 in the appendix shows correlation between the main variables. The 
correlation shows a positive relationship between the individual’s education and 
earnings, and between family background variables and individual earnings. 
As the educational attainment of adult children is often the result of parental 
education investment decisions, it is plausible to find a higher level of schooling for 
adult children with respect to parental education and occupation. In table 3.3, at lower 
levels of parental educational attainment, adult children tend to have fewer years of 
schooling, a partial indication that less educated parents are less able to provide their 
children with more years of schooling compared with parents with increased years of 
schooling. For instance, whereas individuals whose parents have no educational 
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attainment have almost 12 years of schooling (comparable with completion of 
secondary education), those whose parents have post-basic education have an average 
of 16 years of schooling (which is equivalent to completion of tertiary/university 
education). 
Table 3. 3 Family background and adult child’s years of schooling 
Father's 
educational 
attainment 
Individual’s 
years of 
schooling 
Mother's 
educational 
attainment 
Individual’s 
years of 
schooling 
No education 12.1 No education 12.1 
Basic education 12.7 Basic education 13.3 
Post-basic 
education 15.6 
Post-basic 
education 17.0 
Father's 
occupation   Mother's occupation 
Agriculture 11.9 Agriculture 12.0 
Production/Other 11.9 Production/Other 14.6 
Sales/Services 12.9 Sales/Services 12.6 
Professional 15.0 Professional 16.1 
If parents level of education serves as a measure of family wealth, then this 
partly suggests that individuals from wealthy families will be able to acquire more 
years of schooling. In terms of parental occupation, there is also evidence to suggest 
that adult children from families where parents are in relatively better occupations tend 
to be associated with increased educational investment. For instance, the average years 
of schooling for workers whose fathers are in professional occupations is 15, whereas 
this is only 11.9 years for those whose fathers are in agricultural occupations. For 
mothers, the findings are similar. Individuals whose mothers’ are in agricultural 
occupations have an average of 12 years of schooling compared with 16 years of 
schooling for those in professional occupations. Table 3.3 shows details of parents’ 
education, occupation, and completed years of schooling of adult children. 
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There is also evidence suggesting a relationship between earnings of adult 
children and parental education and occupation as seen in table 3.4. The table shows 
that individuals whose parents have higher educational attainment earn more on 
average compared with those whose parents are in, for instance, agricultural 
occupations. Specifically, individuals whose parents have no educational attainment 
earn less than 100 Cedis per week, compared with those whose parents have post-basic 
education that earn almost twice this amount. This is similar for parental occupation, 
where it is seen that adult children whose parents are in agricultural jobs earn 
considerably less than those whose parents are in professional occupations. 
Table 3. 4 Family background and adult child’s weekly earnings 
Father's 
educational 
attainment 
Individual’s 
weekly 
earnings (in 
'0000 
Cedis) 
Mother's 
educational 
attainment 
Individual’s 
weekly 
earnings (in 
'0000 
Cedis) 
No education 95.63 No education 98.68 
Basic education 114.88 Basic education 122.23 
Post-basic 
education 168.66 
Post-basic 
education 217.27 
Father's 
occupation   Mother's occupation 
Agriculture 96.86 Agriculture 104.04 
Production/Other 112.31 Production/Other 112.35 
Sales/Services 109.36 Sales/Services 109.92 
Professional 150.97 Professional 185.30 
The above descriptive statistics clearly shows that parental background and 
education could be important for success in the Ghana labour market. Coming from a 
family with educated parents could potentially enhance earnings, as well as the 
individuals own education. These possibilities are examined by gender, and rural-
urban location. 
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3.5.2 Variables  
The dependent variable used in this study is log of weekly earnings in Cedis. 
This is derived from the weekly earnings as reported by respondents. In contrast to 
developed countries where income is less precarious and there is a welfare state, in 
Ghana weekly earnings gives a better indication of earned income than the hourly 
wage. Other studies on earnings differentials have also used weekly earnings (Bargain 
et al, 2009; Devereux and Hart, 2010). There is also the possibility of reporting error 
in regard to the number of hours worked as individuals may be involved in more than 
one job, making the calculation of hourly wages subject to measurement errors. The 
use of reported weekly earnings for this study rather than hourly earnings was therefore 
preferred. The key independent variable is family background, measured as the 
average years of parents’ education. Individuals from educated families are more likely 
to benefit from the positive effect of parents’ labour market knowledge and 
“connections”. These individuals again benefit from information about the labour 
market from their parents, hence allowing them to find good jobs with high wages.  
An alternative variable for family background based on parents’ education and 
occupation is generated. As this constructed measure of family background is 
comprised from four different variables, namely; father’s education, mother’s 
education, father’s occupation, and mother’s occupation, a single index that is able to 
summarize the information provided by these proxies is constructed. This index is 
expected to generate an accurate measure of family background, rather than controlling 
for each individual family background variable separately. Due to the relatively fewer 
number of family background variables, only one factor is generated from the factor 
estimation. Post-estimation results confirm that this generated factor can be used as a 
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measure of family background. Full results from this estimation and post-estimation is 
in the appendix.  
As with regressions that use family background measured as parents’ 
education, family background based on the constructed index give similar effects on 
education and earnings, although the magnitudes tend to be larger for the index 
variable (this could be because the index variable also captures the influence of 
parental occupation). All regression results presented in section 3.6 uses family 
background that is measured by parents’ education.  
The other independent variable (which is also the mediating variable) is 
education of the individual, measured as the years of schooling. This is based on the 
highest grade completed by the individual. As already explained, individuals from 
wealthy families (mainly educated parents) are more likely to receive more years of 
schooling compared with those from poorer families.  
In addition to the two independent variables, a number of demographic factors 
including age of the individual are included as control variables. Marital status and 
location of the individual are added to the list of regressors. Location of the individual 
is based on whether the individual resides in the urban or rural area. Lastly, a gender 
dummy is included to capture evidence of gender differences in earnings, and 
education, in estimations that do not run separate regressions for men and women. In 
the presence of equal opportunity, and in the absence of possible labour market 
discrimination, there should be no significant gender difference in earnings especially 
among individuals in urban areas.  
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3.6 Empirical specification 
The main outcome investigated, earnings, 𝑌, indicates the log of weekly 
earnings of the individual. The estimation uses three separate regressions as proposed 
by Baron and Kenny (1986) when determining evidence of possible mediation, that is, 
whether the individual’s education absorbs some of the effects of family background 
on earnings (this is path ab in the path diagram in figure 3.1). The separate estimable 
equations are of the form;  
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖 = β1𝐹𝐵𝑖 + β2𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖    (7) 
𝑌𝑖 = α1𝐹𝐵𝑖 + α2𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖    (8) 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝜃1𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖 + 𝜃2𝐹𝐵𝑖 + θ3𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   (9) 
where all equations are estimated using OLS. Equation (7) is the schooling equation, 
similar to enrolment regressions estimated in chapter 2, and equations (8) and (9) are 
the equations for individual earnings. Earnings, 𝑌𝑖 , is assumed to be linearly dependent 
on the individual’s years of schooling, 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖, a measure also of individual 
productivity. 𝐹𝐵𝑖 measures the individual’s family background and is measured by the 
average years of education of both parents. This is included to capture the influence of 
family wealth on labour market success, measured by earnings. 𝑍𝑖 consists of control 
variables such as marital status, age, gender and location. The main specification of 
interest is equation (9) which controls for the individual’s own education as well as 
family background, 𝐹𝐵𝑖. Regressions are firstly estimated by gender, and then 
location. 
In performing the mediation analyses, and as proposed by Baron and Kenny 
(1986), four key steps must be followed in order to establish that education is a 
mediator variable. First, that family background, 𝐹𝐵 which is also the causal variable 
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is correlated with earnings, 𝑌𝑖. This is implied by the specification in equation (8) 
which is estimated to establish whether there is an effect of family background that 
could be mediated by the individual’s education. The effect of family background in 
this specification would have to be significant. Secondly, family background should 
be correlated with the individual’s education, 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶, the mediator variable as 
specified in equation (7). Thirdly, when controlling for the effect of family background 
on earnings (equation (9)), the effect of the individual’s education should be 
significant. Finally, while controlling for family background in the earnings equation 
(9), the effect of family background should be reduced to near zero (or zero for 
complete mediation), and insignificant. Once these steps are established, then it is 
enough to conclude that the individual’s education mediates the effect of family 
background on earnings (and has no direct effect). The only issue with Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) estimation approach is that it assumes equations (7) to (9) are 
independent. The study therefore uses a more appropriate estimation technique that 
estimates all equations simultaneously rather than assuming that the three equations 
are independent.  
The main interest is to establish the direct and indirect effects, as well as the 
total effects of family background on earnings. The study therefore uses the Sobel-
Goodman mediation command (sgmediation in Stata) to identify these effects. This 
estimation technique is similar to estimating a simultaneous equation model using the 
sem command in Stata. These test whether education transmit the influence of family 
background to individual labour market success, earnings. Considering both direct and 
indirect effects enables a better understanding of the causal process, mainly because 
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the direct and indirect effects work differently. Failure to identify these effects 
separately could lead to wrong interpretation (Sobel, 1987). 
 
3.7 Results and discussion 
3.7.1 Effects of family background and education for men and women  
Table 3.5 shows results of the estimates of family background and education 
on earnings. As parental preferences differ in the human capital investment decision 
of children, the effects of family background may have different effects on men and 
women separately. Columns (1) and (2), and columns (4) and (5) shows the impact of 
family background on earnings and education respectively for men and women in the 
sample. The results show that that family background measured as the average years 
of parents’ education increases both earnings and education of adult children, with the 
effects of family background on women’s earnings and education almost 2 percentage 
points higher than the effects for men. What this suggests is that family background is 
important for the individual’s economic success since it acts as a potential source of 
social network and labour market connections that then enables individuals to find 
better jobs and earn higher wages.  
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Table 3. 5 Effects of family background and education by gender 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Path c 
(TE): log 
of weekly 
earnings 
Path a: 
Education 
Part b and 
c1 
(DE):log 
of weekly 
earnings 
Path c 
(TE):log 
of weekly 
earnings 
Path a: 
Education 
Part b and 
c1 
(DE):log 
of weekly 
earnings 
  Men Women 
       
Family 
background 0.0184*** 
 
0.1169*** 0.0052 0.026*** 0.1359*** 0.0028 
 (0.004) (0.0167) (0.0039) (0.0086) (0.0324) (0.0067) 
Education   0.112***  0.1707*** 
   (0.0064)   (0.0104) 
Age 0.0255*** 0.120*** 0.0119*** 0.0304*** 0.0322 0.0249*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0145) (0.0034) (0.007) (0.0277) (0.006***) 
Married 0.3547*** 0.51061 0.2975*** 0.2338* 1.9456*** -0.098 
 (0.0849) (0.334) (0.0764) (0.1374) (0.5185) (0.1072) 
Urban 0.4323*** 0.9045*** 0.3308*** 0.6185*** 0.3312 0.5619*** 
 (0.0750) (0.2949) (0.0676) (0.1878) (0.7086) (0.14395) 
Constant 11.5815*** 5.6003***   10.953*** 11.047*** 9.0529*** 9.5017*** 
 (0. 1639) (0.6443) (0.1515) (0.356) (0.1343) (0.2885) 
       
Indirect effect 
(IE) of family 
background  0.0132*** 0.0232*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0057) 
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Direct effect 
(DE) of family 
background 0.0052 0.0028 
 (0.0039) (0.0067) 
Total effect (TE) 
of family 
background 0.0184*** 0.0260*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0086) 
       
R-Squared 0.10 0.09 0.27 0.10 0.08 0.47 
Observations 1283 1283 1283 389 389 389 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
TE “Total Effect”, DE “Direct Effect”, IE “Indirect Effect” 
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While the association between family background and earnings is informative, 
ideally the interest is to measure this association allowing for the individual’s human 
capital, measured here as education. In columns (3) and (6), while controlling for the 
individual’s education, the results show that although family background positively 
increases earnings for both men and women, this effect is substantially reduced to near 
zero and no longer significant. This suggests that education is mediating the 
relationship between family background and earnings. In other words, education is 
absorbing the influence of family background on earnings. The effect of education for 
women is larger compared with men. Specifically, education increases the earnings of 
women by 17 percentage points, whereas for men education increases earnings by 11 
percentage points.  
For the estimated indirect (ab in the path diagram) and direct effects (path c1), 
the differences between men and women are in the same direction, with stronger 
indirect effects for women. Particularly for women, the relatively larger indirect effect 
of family background originates from earlier parental investment in the education of 
girls, possibly because educating girls could enhance their later chances of succeeding 
in the labour market, that is, earning higher wages. This effect of family background 
is seen in column (5), where there is a larger effect of family background on women’s 
education compared with the effects for men.   
While family background transmits advantages directly to children, it appears 
that most of this transmission is indirect, arising from the fact that family background 
affects how much parents can invest in children’s education, which then determines 
the success of children later in the labour market. An indication of this finding is that 
despite the importance of family background in child development, the effects of 
117 
 
family background are stronger in the early years of the individual’s life where parents 
are expected to make significant investments in children’s human capital. This is seen 
by the significant effects of family background on the adult child’s education in 
columns (2) and (4), which I also find in chapter 2.  
On the effects of other variables on earnings, similar to the evidence of Zuo 
(2013), the results show that being in an urban area increases individual earnings. In 
Ghana, most high-paid jobs are in urban areas and big towns, which shows how 
disadvantaged individuals in rural areas and small towns might be in terms of finding 
high-paid jobs. The increase in earnings associated with urban dwellers could be 
related to the thinner labour markets in rural areas. Age also improves earnings of both 
men and women, which could of course be due to seniority wage. There are positive 
and significant earnings effects for being married, but only for men.  
Tables A3.10 to A3.12 in the appendix shows results that uses the index 
variable as a measure of family background, generated through factor analysis. The 
results for education and family background have similar effects to the ones discussed 
earlier in this section. The magnitudes are however larger for the effect of family 
background on education and earnings, a reason associated with how family 
background is measured. That is, this measure takes into account parental occupation. 
3.7.2 Location-specific effects of family background and education 
Since many of the high-paid wage jobs tend to be concentrated in urban areas, 
it is plausible to examine the effects of family background and education separately 
for individuals in urban and rural areas. In table 3.6, the results show that family 
background effects on education is positively significant for both urban and rural adult 
children, with a larger effect for urban individuals. As regards the effects on earnings, 
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family background only significantly increases earnings in urban areas. The effect on 
earnings is insignificant for individuals in rural areas. This can be explained by the fact 
that most high-paid jobs are in urban areas, making the influence of family background 
in urban areas more useful. Although rural dwellers could have educated parents in 
relatively good jobs, the lack of opportunities and job openings in rural areas makes 
them less important for adult children’s labour market success. In column (3), the 
results that family background and education are both significant for labour market 
success (earnings) could suggest that in a labour market with intermediaries, education 
alone may not be sufficient for labour market success. Improvement in parents’ 
economic status via their professional connections and labour market knowledge 
becomes important for adult children’s economic success.  
In terms of the gender differences, the results show that women are more 
disadvantaged in paid employment. In columns (3) and (6), it is seen that women are 
associated with lesser earnings. Rural women’s earnings reduce by 51.6 percent 
whereas their urban counterparts are associated with 23.1 percent decrease in earnings. 
This could be explained by the fact that women in rural areas tend to have less years 
of education than urban women, and are therefore unable to occupy higher-paid 
positions. In addition, since urban individuals face higher costs of living than 
individuals in rural areas, it is only reasonable to see the earnings of women in urban 
areas surpassing that of rural women. It could also be that rural labour markets for 
wage employment generally disadvantages women, which is plausible, given that rural 
women compared with urban women spend more time on non-labour market activities.  
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Table 3. 6 Effects of family background and education by location 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Path c 
(TE):  
Log of 
weekly 
earnings 
Path a: 
Education 
Part b and 
c1 (DE): 
 Log of 
weekly 
earnings 
Path c 
(TE):  
Log of 
weekly 
earnings 
Path a: 
Education 
Part b and 
c1 
(DE):log 
of weekly 
earnings 
  Urban Rural 
       
Family 
background 0.0229*** 0.1239*** 0.0075*** 0.0095 0.1057*** -0.004 
 (0.0041) (0.0165) (0.0036) (0.0097) (0.0346) (0.0088) 
Education   0.125***   0.1281*** 
   (0.006)   (0.0127) 
Age 0. 028*** 0. 090*** 0. 017*** 0.0241*** 0.1122*** 0.0097 
 (0.0036) (0.0147) (0.0032) (0.0074) (0.0263) (0.0068) 
Married 0. 287***  1.161*** 0.142*** 0.3836*** 0.827*** 0.2776* 
 (0.077) (0.313) (0.067) (0.1736) (0.6792) (0.1553) 
Females -0.165*** 0.527* -0.231*** -0.384*** 1.031 -0.516*** 
 (0.0302) (0.302) (0.064) (0.1913) (0.677) (0.1712) 
Constant 11.929*** 7.216 *** 11.028*** 11.669*** 5.8005*** 
  
10.926*** 
 (0.1585) (0.643) (0.1434) (0.351) (1.2424) (0.3218) 
       
Indirect effect of 
family background 0.0155*** 0.0135*** 
                                      (0.0022)                                     (0.005) 
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Direct effect of 
family background  0.0075***                                          -0.004 
                                        (0.0036)    (0.0088) 
Total effect of 
family background 0.0230***                                           0.0095 
                                        (0.0041) (0.0098) 
       
R-Squared 0.08 0.08 0.32 0.06 0.06 0.25 
Observations 1271 1271 1271 401 401 401 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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As regards the decomposed effects of family background, there is a significant 
positive indirect effect of family background on earnings for both rural and urban 
individuals, although the effects are slightly larger for urban individuals compared 
with rural individuals. The results shows interestingly that in urban areas, education 
does not mediate the relationship between family background and earnings. Instead, 
family background given the individual’s education has direct effects on labour market 
success. The direct influence of family background on earnings in urban areas may 
occur through social networks and parents knowledge of the labour market, and could 
be explained by the difficulty associated with finding wage jobs in urban areas. This 
is similar to the argument by Hudson and Sessions (2011) that educated parents may 
have better connections and will therefore be able to assist their children in securing 
good jobs with a higher chance of progression, and higher wages. Pellizzari (2010), 
also argues that, the presence of intermediaries in labour markets makes the wage 
effects of personal contacts and connections higher. There are no significant direct 
effects of family background in rural areas.  
One interpretation of the difference between the direct effects of family 
background on earnings is that, the wage labour market in rural areas might be less 
desirable and easy to gain access into compared with urban labour markets, and so 
individuals in rural areas might require less parental influence to secure wage jobs. 
Rural individuals may therefore only require an appreciable level of education in order 
to find wage jobs. The effects of the control variables are similar to the earlier results 
from table 3.5. Earnings of both men and women increase with age. There is also a 
significant positive effect of being married on earnings for men but not for women.  
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There is however the possibility of internal migration having an effect on 
earnings of individuals. For instance, an individual born or raised in the rural area may 
have relocated to the urban area at some point and this can have an effect not only on 
education, but also on the earnings. This possibility has been considered, but from the 
data only 5 percent of individuals have moved from rural to urban areas at the time of 
the survey. 15.9 percent of individuals have moved from one rural area to another rural 
area. The relatively low proportion of internal migration means that this issue may not 
be relevant for the current study.  
3.7.3 Gender effects of family background and education for urban individuals 
This section examines the effects of education and family background on 
earnings separately for men and women in urban areas. This is not done for rural areas 
because there are no significant direct effects of family background. The decision 
particularly of women to participate in the labour market may be non-random and 
could therefore lead to sample selection. However, the estimation techniques adopted 
in this section do not allow for selectivity (Heckman, 1979) to be taken into account. 
This is because the estimation is conducted jointly using mediation analysis. Even 
when selectivity has been taken into account using Heckman correction, Kingdon and 
Soderbom (2002) find this to be largely insignificant for the case of Ghana.  
The results in table 3.7 show the effects of family background on education 
and earnings among men and women in urban areas. 
 
123 
 
Table 3. 7 Gender effects of family background and education among adult urban children 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Path c 
(TE): log 
of weekly 
earnings 
Path a: 
Education 
Part b and 
c1(DE): 
log of 
weekly 
earnings 
Path c 
(TE): log 
of weekly 
earnings 
Path a: 
Education 
Part b and 
c1(DE): 
log of 
weekly 
earnings 
  Urban men Urban women 
       
Family 
background 0.0217*** 
0.12098*** 0.0081* 
0.02673*** 0.13457*** 0.0051 
 (0.00456) (0.0187) (0.00414) (0.0088) (0.03419) (0.0071) 
Education   0.112***   0.1607*** 
   (0.00707)   (0.0112) 
Age 0.02871*** 0.1206*** 0.0151*** 0.02505*** 0.02944 0.0203*** 
 (0.00417) (0.0171) (0.00380) (0.0076) (0.0297) (0.0059) 
Married 0.2948*** 0.4392 0.245*** 0.2532* 2.16098*** -0.09412 
 (0.0940) (0.3855) (0.0835) (0.1425) (0.5532) (0.1141) 
Constant 11.903*** 6.578*** 11.164***  11.856*** 9.3697*** 10.351*** 
 (0.1747) (0.7164) (0.16194) (0.3532) (1.3718) (0.2957) 
       
Indirect effect of 
family 
background  0.0136*** 0.021623*** 
                                             (0.00227)                                      (0.005696) 
Direct effect  of 
family 
background 0.0081* 0.0051 
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(0.00414)                                               (0.00705) 
Total effect of 
family 
background  0.0217*** 0.02673*** 
                                             (0.00456)                                         (0.00880) 
       
R-Squared 0.09 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.09 0.42 
Observations 943 943 943 328 328 328 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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As with earlier findings from table 3.5, including education of the individual 
reduces the effects of family background on earnings in columns (3) and (6). 
Interestingly, and as seen from earlier results in table 3.6, even after controlling for 
education in the earnings regressions, family background is significant for men’s 
labour market success, although this is insignificant for women. A possible 
interpretation of this is that, due to the over representation of men in wage jobs in 
urban areas, entry into high-paid jobs may be more difficult for them than women. As 
such, men may benefit more from positive family background effects in addition to 
their own level of education. Women on the other hand, despite their labour market 
disadvantages can succeed in the labour market if they have more years of schooling, 
and this is seen by the larger positive effects of education on earnings. This is evident 
in the indirect effects of family background on women’s education, which is seen to 
be almost 1 percentage point higher compared with the effects for men.  
The larger effects of family background on women’s education is in line with 
my earlier finding from chapter 2, where the results indicate that educated urban 
parents have a higher likelihood of enrolling girls in schools. This seems to suggest 
that, women’s education is increasingly becoming important, particularly in urban 
areas. Urban educated parents are willing to invest more in their daughter’s education, 
perhaps, to enable them find high-paid jobs that can allow them to earn as much as 
their male counterparts who face less disadvantages in the labour market. Again, the 
total effects of family background on earnings is larger for women than it is for men, 
despite the insignificant indirect effect for women.  
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3.8 Summary of findings: Effects of family background 
Table 3.8 shows summary of the effects of family background on individual 
earnings. Overall, the results suggest that family background effects, measured as 
parents’ education (and family background measured using an index variable) are 
important for labour market success in Ghana. For the whole sample, there are indirect 
effects of family background on labour market success, with the effects larger for 
women compared with men. This larger effect of 2.3 percent compared with 1.3 
percent for men is mainly through parents’ investment in women’s education. Among 
urban adult children, there is a direct positive effect of family background on earnings, 
an indication that in urban wage employment, education is less able to influence the 
effect of family background, partly because of the nature of the labour market and the 
importance of “connections”. 
Table 3. 8 Summary of family background effects on earnings 
  
Indirect effect 
(via 
education) Direct effect Total effect 
Men  0.013*** 0.0052 0.0184*** 
Women 0.0232*** 0.0028 0.0260*** 
Urban areas 0.0155***  0.0075*** 0.023*** 
Rural areas 0.0135*** -0.004 0.0095 
Urban men 0.0136*** 0.0081* 0.0217*** 
Urban women 0.021623*** 0.0051 0.02673*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
In rural areas, family background only had an indirect effect (through 
education) on earnings, which is plausible. This result is a possible indication that, 
since there are fewer intermediaries in rural wage employment, the direct effect of 
family background on earnings are less relevant. For urban men and women, there are 
indirect effects of family background on earnings with a larger effect for women. 
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Unlike men, there are no direct effects of family background for women in urban areas, 
which can be interpreted as due to the lower concentration of women in wage jobs in 
urban areas.  
 
3.9 Conclusions 
Evidence to date suggests that parental income and family wealth are strong 
predictors of the likely economic status of the next generation. However, most 
previous studies of the relationship between parents’ socio-economic background, 
educational attainment and occupational outcomes have focussed on occupational 
status more generally. There are limited evidence on the linkages between education, 
family background, and labour market success particularly for developing countries. 
The main aim of this study has been to examine these linkages by estimating a 
structural equation model, which allowed me to separate the direct and indirect effects 
of family background on earnings. 
In most part of the analysis, the results indicate that while family background 
transmits advantages directly to children, it appears that most of these transmissions 
are indirect, arising from the fact that family background affects how much parents 
invest in their children’s education, which then determines their success in the labour 
market, based on earnings from wage jobs. In rural areas where labour markets are 
thinner, businesses smaller, and individuals generally more disadvantaged, the results 
indicate a lower indirect effect and no direct effect of family background compared 
with adult children in urban areas. This finding of no direct effect shows that education 
may completely mediate the relationship between the effects of family background and 
earnings in rural areas. A possible interpretation of no direct effect of family 
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background among rural adult children is that, rural parents generally invest less in 
their children’s education because of financial constraints, and are by themselves less 
educated, therefore, the effects of family background on labour market success are 
negligible. More generally, rural parents may not have enough influence in the labour 
market to support their children into high-paid jobs, which are usually found in urban 
areas. As for urban areas where access to wage jobs are more difficult, and where a 
larger proportion of individuals are highly educated compared with rural areas, the 
influence of family background is important for the individual’s labour market success.  
Interestingly, the results indicate that the indirect effects of family background 
are larger for women than men. What this may suggest is that in the face of general 
labour market disadvantages, educated parents, by investing more in their daughter’s 
education can enable them to find better, higher paid jobs and potentially earn as much 
as their male counterparts who face fewer disadvantages in the labour market. While 
looking at the results separately for urban men and women, it was found that even after 
controlling for the individual’s education, family background is significant for men’s 
labour market success but not for women’s. One possible interpretation of this result 
is that, due to over representation of men in wage jobs (which my data shows), entry 
into high-paid jobs may be more difficult for men than women, and so men rather than 
women tend to benefit more from positive family background effects, in addition to 
their own level of education. Women on the other hand, despite their labour market 
disadvantages require less family background support (possibly because fewer women 
tend to have wage jobs), and can succeed in the labour market if they have more years 
of schooling. This could possibly explain the larger indirect effect of family 
background for women.  
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The evidence of nepotism (generally referred to as “whom you know” in 
Ghana) in urban wage jobs is less surprising. Wage jobs are usually the preferred 
option for most individuals mainly because of the higher wages offered compared with 
wages in other sectors. In labour markets with frictions and intermediaries, it is 
plausible that family networks through the level of parent’s education could provide 
an important source of information on job vacancies to adult children. Prospective 
employers and job seekers would learn and know about each other from personal 
sources, as these information may sometimes be more reliable (Granovetter, 2005). 
This partly suggest that word-of-mouth may be key for labour market success in urban 
Ghana. The evidence of a positive impact of family background on earnings is 
consistent with the literature, especially for Southern European countries. For a Ghana 
labour market dominated by intermediaries, my finding is in line with Pellizzari (2010) 
and Hudson and Sessions (2011) that access to good jobs and higher wages are 
associated with those individuals that found jobs through connections and personal 
contacts. This might partly explain why educated parents are willing to support their 
children into well-paid jobs in Ghana. In addition, the finding of direct effect of family 
background on the earnings of men in urban areas is consistent with Raitano and Vona 
(2015b), that parental background exerts a significant influence on sons’ earnings. 
One key implication of the results is that, although family background affects 
individuals early in life by influencing years of schooling, family background can also 
form a strong foundation for future economic success. Most notably, individuals from 
poorer families will be affected by the potential positive effects of family background 
on labour market success, as shown by the findings for individuals in rural areas. As 
such, policies that aim at removing household financial constraints and improving 
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educational attainment can be used to reduce inequality in the Ghana labour market. 
An important consideration is the need for a strong emphasis on educational policies 
aimed not only at providing individuals with basic skills and literacy but also at 
ensuring the necessary level of education to secure higher earnings in the labour 
market. As suggested by Bratsberg et al. (2007), one possible way to offset the effect 
of family background on human capital development and economic success is the 
provision of a good education system that can create a homogenous educational 
qualifications floor for all individuals. For Ghana, achieving this may not be easy and 
may require support from the international community.  
To further mitigate the direct influence of “whom you know” and social 
networks via family background effect in the Ghana labour market, labour standards 
and employers hiring process must be aligned to reflect equal access and opportunity 
for all. Currently, the process of hiring in the formal sector is less standardized, and 
favours individuals who have “connections” or whose parents have good knowledge 
of the labour market and know people in high standings. Where the influence of family 
background and nepotism persist, it is evident that access to wage jobs and higher 
wages in Ghana will be a privilege for only a selected few.  
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Appendix 
Generating composite variable for family background 
The tables below show the process of constructing an index that is able to 
summarize the information provided by the family background variables. The four 
main family background variables are; father’s education, mother’s education, father’s 
occupation, and mother’s occupation (education levels were categorised as; no 
education, basic education, and post-basic education. Occupational status was 
categorised as; agriculture, production/other, sales/services, and professional 
occupations). The polychoric correlation matrix, which shows the correlation among 
the four variables in table A3.1, indicates a positive correlation among all variables, 
with the strongest correlation being the relationship between father’s education and 
mother’s education (72%), and between father’s education and father’s occupation. 
The high correlations between these variables is a possible suggestion of assortative 
mating, where highly educated fathers, and fathers in highly paid jobs are married to 
educated and working mothers. 
Table A3.1. Correlation matrix 
  
Father's 
education 
Mother's 
education 
Father's 
occupation 
Mother's 
occupation 
Father's 
education 1.000    
Mother's 
education 0.724 1.000   
Father's 
occupation 0.691 0.514 1.000  
Mother's 
occupation 0.438 0.468 0.589 1.000 
Table A3.2 also shows principal factor analysis correlation. The eigenvalues 
illustrate the variances of the factors. The percentage of common variance explained 
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by the first factor is almost 100%, and since the eigenvalue of the first factor is more 
than one, based on the Kaiser criterion only one factor can be retained. 
Table A3.2. Factor analysis/correlation: Method-Principal Factors 
Factor  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative  
Factor1 2.287 2.141 1.040 1.040  
Factor2 0.146 0.164 0.066 1.106  
Factor3 -0.018 0.197 -0.008 1.098  
Factor4 -0.215   -0.098 1.000  
LR test: Independent vs. saturated: chi2(6)=8718.86, Prob>chi2=0.000 
The results from the squared multiple correlations in table A3.3 seem large, 
and hence justifying the use of a factor. In table A3.4, the KMO measuring sampling 
accuracy has an overall value of 0.69, and suggests that these variables have enough 
common factors to warrant an EFA (Kaiser, 1974).  
Table A3.3. Squared multiple correlation  
Variable SMC 
Father's education 0.6666 
Mother's education 0.5559 
Father's occupation 0.5838 
Mother's occupation 0.3935 
 
Table A3.4. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy 
Variable KMO 
Father's education 0.6457 
Mother's 
education 0.6984 
Father's 
occupation 0.6892 
Mother's 
occupation 0.7287 
Overall  0.6848 
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Table A3.5. Factor loadings and unique variances 
Variable 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 Uniqueness 
Father's 
education 0.8413 -0.1682 0.2639 
Mother's 
education 0.7546 -0.1859 0.396 
Father's 
occupation 0.7862 0.1768 0.3507 
Mother's 
occupation 0.6261 0.228 0.5561 
Table A3.5 shows the weights and correlations between each variable and the 
factor, that is, the factor loadings. All four variables define the first factor considerably 
well, with father’s characteristics explaining an average of 81%, and 69% for mother’s 
characteristics.  The scree plot in figure A3.1 that plots the eigenvalues against the 
factor number indicates that only one factor can be retained. This is seen from the 
flattening of the line after the first factor, indicating that each successive factor is 
accounting for smaller amounts of the total variance. 
Figure A3.1. Scree plot 
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Rotations 
Tables A3.6 to A3.8 below are results from the orthogonal varimax rotation. 
This shows that the percentage of common variance explained by the first factor is 
70%. It can also be seen in table A3.8 that the first factor is mostly defined by fathers 
and mothers education (77% and 72% respectively).  
Table A3.6. Orthogonal factors 
Factor  Variance Difference Proportion Cumulative  
Factor1 1.518 0.603 0.690 0.690  
Factor2 0.915 . 0.416 1.106  
LR test: Independent vs. saturated: chi2(6)=8718.86, 
Prob>chi2=0.000 
 
Table A3.7. Factor rotation matrix 
Factor  Factor1 Factor2 
Factor1 0.801 0.599 
Factor2 -0.599 0.801 
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Table A3.8. Factor loadings: Rotated and Unrotated 
  Rotated Unrotated 
Variable 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 Uniqueness Variable 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 Uniqueness 
Father's 
education 0.7742 0.3697 0.2639 
Father's 
education 0.8413 
-
0.1682 0.2639 
Mother's 
education 0.7155 0.3035 0.396 
Mother's 
education 0.7546 
-
0.1859 0.396 
Father's 
occupation 0.5233 0.6128 0.3507 
Father's 
occupation 0.7862 0.1768 0.3507 
Mother's 
occupation 0.3645 0.5578 0.5561 
Mother's 
occupation 0.6261 0.228 0.5561 
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As shown by the post-estimation results above, one factor is retained and the 
score generated from this is used as an alternative measure of family background. The 
correlation coefficient for both measures of family background with the main variables 
used in the study is seen in table A3.9. For both measures of family background, there 
is a positive correlation with the adult child’s education and earnings. The higher 
coefficient for the index measure is attributed to the fact that this measure accounts 
also for parent’s occupation. This might also explain the larger coefficients in the 
regression results that uses the index as measure of family background.  
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Table A3.9. Correlation among variables 
  
Log of 
weekly 
earnings 
Education Family 
background 
(index) 
Family 
background 
Urban Married Females Age 
Log of weekly 
earnings 1.00        
Education  0.521*** 1.00       
Family 
background 
(index) 0.169*** 0.232*** 1.00      
Family 
background  0.125*** 0.157*** 0.792*** 1.00     
Urban 0.156*** 0.12*** 0.251*** 0.19*** 1.00    
Married  0.131*** 0.089*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.047** 1.00   
Females -0.095*** 0.068*** 0.124*** 0.079*** 0.114*** -0.137*** 1.00  
Age 0.207***  0.145*** -0.23*** -0.26*** -0.002 0.302*** -0.05** 1.00 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A3.10. Effects of family background and education by gender 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Path c 
(TE): log 
of weekly 
earnings 
Path a: 
Education 
Part b and 
c1 (DE): 
log of 
weekly 
earnings 
Path c 
(TE): log 
of weekly 
earnings 
Path a: 
Education 
Part b and 
c1 (DE): 
log of 
weekly 
earnings 
  Men Women 
       
Family 
background 0.2399*** 
 
1.6336*** 0.0609 0.43897*** 2.31756*** 0. 0485 
 (0.05023) (0.1978) (0.0466) (0.0942) (0.36055) (0.07633) 
Education   0.10962***   0.16849*** 
   (0.00669)   (0.0108) 
Age 0.0243*** 0.1112*** 0.1209*** 0.02597*** 0.02192 0.0223*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0149) (0.0035) (0.0073) (0.02798) (0.0056) 
Married 0.2888*** 0.48637 0.2355*** 0.22686 
  
1.84552*** -0.08408 
 (0.0886) (0.34877) (0.0799) (0.14215) (0.54403) (0.11062) 
Urban 0.3898*** 0.6028** 0.32374*** 0.45653*** -0.31503 0.50961*** 
 (0.07797) (0.3071) (0.0705) (0.18898) (0.72325) (0.14469) 
Constant 11.416*** 
 
4.1786***  10.958*** 10.7184*** 6.5351*** 
 
9.61736*** 
 (0.1981) (0.7804) (0.18098) (0.40396) (1.54602) (0.31716) 
       
Indirect effect 
(IE) of family 
background  0.17897*** 0.39047*** 
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 (0.0243) (0.065701) 
Direct effect 
(DE) of family 
background  0.0609 0.0485 
 (0.04663) (0.07633) 
Total effect 
(TE) of family 
background 0.2399*** 0.43897*** 
 (0.05023) (0.09421) 
       
R-Squared 0.0907 0.097 0.260 0.119 0.131 0.485 
Observations 1175 1175 1175 348 348 348 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A3.11. Effects of family background and education by location 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Path c (TE): 
log of weekly 
earnings 
Path a: 
Education 
Part b and 
c1 (DE): 
log of 
weekly 
earnings 
Path c 
(TE): log 
of weekly 
earnings 
Path a: 
Education 
Part b and 
c1 (DE): 
log of 
weekly 
earnings 
  Urban Rural 
       
Family 
background 0.33699*** 1.9177*** 0.1050*** 0.11967 1.2768*** -0.0444 
 (0.04728) (0.19333) (0.04285) (0.11045) (0.39477) (0.09962) 
Education   0.1209***   0.129*** 
   (0.0063)   (0.01290) 
Age 0. 02737 *** 0.08544*** 0.0170*** 0.01917*** 0.08999*** 0.0076 
 (0.00369) (0.0151) (0.00326) (0.00735) (0.02626) (0.00664) 
Married 0.23318***  1.0945*** 0.10077 0.3574*** 0.69589 0.26796* 
 (0.08023) (0.32803) (0.0701) (0.17861) (0.63835) (0.1591) 
Females -0.1818*** 0.3547 -0.225*** -0.3264* 0. 9522 -0.449*** 
 (0.07704) (0.3149) (0.06703) (0.19628) (0.70152) (0.17502) 
Constant 11.528   4.761*** 10.952*** 11.767 5.455***  11.07*** 
 (0.19627) (0.80246) (0.17326) (0.40562) (1.44969) (0.36759) 
       
Indirect effect 
of family 
background 0.23199*** 0.16408*** 
 (0.02632) (0.05334) 
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Direct effect 
of family 
background 0.1050*** -0.0444 
 (0.04285) (0.09962) 
Total effect of 
family 
background 0.33699*** 0.11967 
 (0.04728) (0.11045) 
       
R-Squared 0.089 0.104 0.313 0.044 0.054 0.245 
Observations 1146 1146 1146 377 377 377 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A3.12. Gender effects of family background and education by location and gender 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Path c 
(TE): log 
of weekly 
earnings 
Path a: 
Education 
Part b and 
c1 (DE): 
log of 
weekly 
earnings 
Path c  
(TE): log 
of weekly 
earnings 
Path a: 
Education 
Part b and 
c1 (DE): 
log of 
weekly 
earnings 
  Urban men Urban women 
       
Family 
background 0.2858*** 
 
1.7680*** 0.0936* 0.4849*** 2.3783*** 0.11413 
 (0.05385) (0.2215) (0.04996) (0.09783) (0.38759) (0.08197) 
Education   0.1087***  0.1559*** 
   (0.00746)   (0.01174) 
Age 0.0287*** 0.1518*** 0.01617*** 0.02267*** 0.02212 0.0192*** 
 (0.0043) (0.01771) (0.00395) (0.00759) (0.03005) (0.00598) 
Married 0.23164*** 0. 4378 0.18404*** 0. 19947 1.9752*** -0.10844 
 (0.09788) (0.40265) (0.08766) (0.14632) (0.57968) (0.11759) 
Constant 11.5803*** 
 
4.3833*** 11.1038*** 11.2193*** 
 
5.9890*** 10.2858*** 
 (0.22087) (0.90858) (0.20035) (0.42353) (1.67795) (0.34101) 
       
Indirect effect 
of family 
background 0.1922*** 0.37074*** 
 (0.027456) (0.066557) 
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Direct effect of 
family 
background 0.0936* 0.114139 
 (0.04996) (0.081978) 
Total effect of 
family 
background  0.2858*** 0.48487*** 
 (0.05385) (0.09783) 
       
R-Squared 0.087 0.101 0.270 0.096 0.144 0.441 
Observations 855 855 855 291 291 291 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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CHAPTER FOUR: EDUCATION, FAMILY BACKGROUND, AND 
PERFORMANCE OF UNREGISTERED URBAN FIRMS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Across many developing countries, a sizeable share of all economic activities 
take place in the informal sector. The share and contribution of unregistered business 
activities to livelihood in these countries is sizeable and considerable research have 
examined the causes of the size and growth of the informal economy (Maloney, 2004; 
Fajnzylber et al., 2006). Nevertheless, the economic contribution of the informal sector 
and reasons for variability in performance are difficult to quantify.  
In particular, few studies have examined the effects of owner characteristics 
such as education and family background on performance of firms in the informal 
sector in developing countries. An exception is Pasquier-Doumer (2013) who 
examined the role of family background on performance of informal entrepreneurs. 
The limited evidence available shows that, despite the lower productivity of small 
firms compared with larger firms, performance of small firms in the formal sector is 
enhanced by the educational attainment of the owner (Sluis et al., 2005; Van Praag et 
al., 2013). This is consistent with theoretical models of human capital (Becker, 1962) 
which are built around the hypothesis that the knowledge and skills embodied in 
humans directly raises productivity (Jones, 2001) and earnings (Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos, 2002). While it is reasonable to expect that firms with well-educated owners 
should be more efficient (Goedhuys et al., 2008), productivity and profitability in small 
unregistered firms can be determined by a complex set of other influences. These may 
include family background, and other external factors that can make the importance of 
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education for business performance less relevant, especially in firms that employ 
additional labour.  
There is also strong evidence for developed countries of the importance of 
family background on business outcomes (Fairlie and Robb, 2007a; Chlosta et al., 
2012) and intergenerational transmission of self-employment (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 
2000). In particular, growing up in an entrepreneurial family offers the individual the 
opportunity to acquire general and specific business human capital (Fairlie and Robb, 
2007a; Fairlie and Robb, 2007b) which can then be used to improve the performance 
of the business. It also gives the individual a realistic view of business ownership and 
management practices. Previous research show that growing up in a family with self-
employed parents may lead to children becoming self-employed themselves (Dunn 
and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Kim et al., 2006; White et al., 2007). There are plausible 
reasons in Ghana why coming from a family of self-employed parents could increase 
participation in self-employed or entrepreneurial activities. Parents with business 
ownership experience, registered or unregistered, could offer their children exposure 
to running and maintaining a business. These individuals may then be motivated, 
perhaps due to their experience to become entrepreneurs themselves, especially if they 
expect to inherit the family business.  
To exploit these possibilities, this study uses the 2013 World Bank’s Informal 
Firms Survey (IFS) to examine among other factors, the effect of owner’s education 
and family background on the performance of unregistered urban firms in Ghana. This 
study does not consider the case of registered firms because the 2013 World Bank 
survey of registered firms does not have information on the education of the owner. 
The study focuses only on unregistered firms because the private informal sector 
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constitutes about 41.9% of total employment in Ghana (GSS, 2015), making this 
segment of the labour market of greater importance. If education is essential for putting 
specific knowledge to use, and the skills acquired by individuals during formal 
education are necessary for the success of businesses (Lazear, 2004), being an 
educated owner should lead to increased firm performance. However, in an 
environment where government regulations on businesses are tough, and in 
circumstances of poverty, firm owner’s education may not be enough for performance 
of unregistered businesses. The study examines this proposition by including 
education in a production function framework (measured by monthly sales) and in a 
profits equation. In addition to owner’s education, the study addresses the impact of 
family background, measured as parents’ education and parents’ business ownership 
on sales and profitability of the firm, and examine whether growing up in an 
entrepreneurial family gives the individual better management and entrepreneurial 
skills to succeed in business. Lastly, it is assumed that the decision to remain 
unregistered depends on the costs and benefits associated with operating an 
unregistered business. In this context, a discrete choice model based on maximum 
likelihood estimation is used to examine the factors that determine unregistered 
businesses’ intention to register, with a particular focus on the firm owner’s education 
and family background. 
These issues are of particular importance in many developing countries since 
informal firms constitute a large share of employment opportunities and make 
significant contributions to GDP. In Ghana, unregistered businesses are the main 
source of employment and incomes for many urban dwellers who find it difficult to 
access wage jobs. This is largely because of government regulations on doing business 
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in the formal sector, and the associated corruption “nepotism” in formal sector jobs 
(which the results from chapter 3 seems to suggest for urban wage workers). In 
addition, the interest in informal economic activities and unregistered businesses are 
that, unregistered and informal businesses serve as a common entry and starting point 
for the less advantaged to gain access into a challenging urban labour market. 
 4.1.1 Organisation of the chapter 
The remainder of the study is organised as follow. First, a brief background to 
the informal economy in Ghana will be provided followed by a discussion on the 
reasons for the large share of informal economic activities. A discussion on how the 
informal economy is conceptualized is carried out in section 4.2. Section 4.3 provides 
a review of the literature, followed by data description and empirical specifications in 
sections 4.4 and 4.5 respectively. Key findings from the regression results in section 
4.6 are discussed. The last section, section 4.7 concludes. 
 
4.2 Background to the informal economy in Ghana 
Since the early 1970’s research on the informal sector has constituted a 
growing part of the literature in developing countries (Hart, 1973). These small and 
often unregistered firms are of great concern for government policies, and the interest 
in the informal sector in Ghana is mainly because most households derive employment 
(61.5% in urban areas and 23.3% in rural areas, GSS, 2015) and earnings opportunities 
from informal economic activities. Especially for those unable to access the small but 
highly paid formal sector, running informal businesses elevates them from extreme 
poverty and economic hardships.  
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The informal non-agricultural sector in Ghana is predominantly urban (61.5% 
employed in urban areas and 23.3% in rural areas (GSS, 2015), with earnings from 
these activities often higher than earnings from agricultural activities which are mainly 
concentrated in rural areas. However, the risk of poverty in informal activities 
compared with formal sector jobs is high. The informal sector in Ghana, similar to 
other developing countries, sometimes acts as a haven for skill development, 
particularly for those coming from rural areas to urban and bigger towns (including 
the educated) to acquire skills that can enable them to thrive in a more challenging 
urban labour market (Bigsten et al., 2004). These individuals often relocate to urban 
areas due to the lack of wage jobs, and other labour market opportunities in rural areas. 
The concentration of informal economic activities in urban areas can also be associated 
with the limited employment prospects in wage employment which accounted for only 
16.4% of total employment of persons aged 15 to 64 years in 2006 (GSS, 2008).  
While the informal sector may be thought of as a sector dominated by people 
with lower levels of education, Ghana’s informal sector attracts skilled and educated15 
individuals, who for one reason or the other may have lost their jobs in the formal 
sector, are struggling to gain access to formal sector jobs, or are new to self-
employment. The proportion of skilled and unskilled individuals engaging in non-farm 
enterprises (informal) is 69.33% and 30.67% respectively (GSS, 2008). Some of these 
individuals engaging in informal economic activities may have obtained their skills 
while working in the formal sector. They therefore take advantage of the ease of entry 
into informal economic activities to further enhance their skills, while for instance, 
                                                   
15 From the 2013 World Bank Informal firm survey for Ghana, 12.5% of informal 
entrepreneurs have not completed any educational qualification compared with 49.6%, 33.2%, 
and 4.7% that have completed basic, secondary, and university education respectively.  
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waiting to reinter into wage employment. For those that are educated but struggling to 
find jobs in the formal sector, informal economic activity is a transition period for them 
while waiting to find a wage job, e.g. in the public sector, or to be hired by a formal 
private organisation where wages are relatively higher. Bennett and Estrin (2007) refer 
to this stage as a ‘stepping-stone’. Therefore, informal entrepreneurial activities in 
Ghana generally start as a very small unregistered enterprise with fewer or no 
employees. For those who want to go into self-employment, this phase allows them to 
make a choice whether to remain informal or register with the hope of expanding. 
The informal sector in Ghana also makes indirect contributions to national 
output by supplying inputs (at relatively cheaper costs) to larger firms. Because 
informal entrepreneurs tend to be more flexible in terms of payments, and are able to 
build good customer relationships, some formal registered enterprises go into 
‘contract’ with informal entrepreneurs to make products and purchase of raw materials, 
and pay back at a later date or through an alternative payment arrangement. The 
importance of informal firms in this regard agrees with the assertion of Porta and 
Shleifer (2008) that the informal sector could be productive, but their growth may 
sometimes be hindered by government regulations, and business conditions. 
Lastly, entrepreneurial activities, formal or informal run by families (Parker, 
2004) in Ghana. The literature on self-employment find that children from families 
where parents are business owners tend to have a higher probability of being self-
employed themselves (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Hout and Rosen, 2000). There 
are plausible reasons in Ghana why coming from a family of self-employed parents 
could increase participation in self-employed or entrepreneurial activities. Parents with 
business ownership experience, registered or unregistered, could offer their children 
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exposure to running and maintaining a business, as well as informal training on-the-
job. For instance, with businesses that operate in the compounds of the owner’s home 
(and for businesses that operate in business districts, such as the regional capitals), 
children sometimes provide after-school business support services to their parents. 
Through these activities, children may then be motivated, because of their experience, 
to become entrepreneurs themselves especially if they expect to inherit the family 
business.   
The discussion from the above shows how important informal economic 
activities are in Ghana. Through its employment creation and income-generating 
advantages, the informal economy is able to provide a source of livelihood for 
individuals who due to some reasons are unable to gain access into the higher paid 
formal sector. This study will show how family business experience and education are 
related with business success among unregistered firms in five urban areas. 
4.2.1 Accounting for the larger share of unregistered businesses in Ghana  
The percentage of people working in the rural and urban non-farm informal 
sector in sub Saharan Africa is almost 70% (ILO, 2002). In Ghana, the private informal 
sector accounts for about 41.9% of total employment (GSS, 2015). Most of these 
activities take place within households and temporary stalls. In some instances, 
informal businesses operate in open space, either by the roadside or at a desirable 
location where owners believe they can attract customers. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show 
examples of the type and nature of informal economic activities taking place in Ghana.  
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Figure 4. 1 Informal economic activity in Suame Magazine, Ashanti region 
 
Source: District life http://district.life/2015/06/24/celebrating-the-informal-sector/ 
Figure 4.1 shows a shop that deals in ‘spare’ car parts in Suame Magazine, a 
well-known area in Kumasi noted for car repairs and metal works. The business has 
the contact details on display, just like one will expect to find on business units in 
developed countries. As can be seen, this business owner is operating in an open space 
under a tree, which is where you normally find some unregistered businesses 
particularly those operating in the service sector.  These kind of businesses normally 
operate in connection with the sunrise and sunset. Business usually opens around 6am 
and closes around 6pm. Due to the high cost of electricity bills, and because of the 
recent power crisis (Daily Graphic, 2015), these informal businesses try to avoid 
operating at night. A unique feature of some of these informal businesses is that, they 
are sometimes able to supply services and goods to formal businesses at relatively 
lower prices. This enables them to maintain a good customer relationship and as a way 
of increasing their client base. Services are usually the drop-in type and it is based on 
a first-come-first-serve basis, although in some instances “connections” can enable a 
client to receive a fast service.  
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Figure 4.2 also shows a picture of a convenience store in the national capital, 
Accra. The business is located on the roadside and easily accessible by all. Unlike 
figure 4.1 that usually operates until around 6pm each day, convenience stores in 
Ghana are open until late, sometimes midnight, depending on owners’ availability. 
Businesses open as early as 6am, and are operated by family or hired workers who 
normally run shifts. Relative to other informal businesses in the manufacturing sector 
that rely heavily on electricity, convenience shops tend to have alternative sources of 
electricity. Most of these businesses use candles, rechargeable lamps, and lanterns in 
the evenings when there is blackout (commonly referred to as “dumsor” in Ghana). 
Convenience stores such as these are usually individually owned or family-owned, 
with occasional support from owner’s children, normally after-school hours, or with 
additional help from relatives and non-relatives.  
Figure 4. 2 Typical convenience store in Accra 
 
Source: http://volunteering-ghana.blogspot.co.uk/ 
These examples of informal businesses in urban areas show how important the 
informal sector can be for some urban dwellers. Informal businesses provide 
employment opportunities and a source of likelihood for those unable to access the 
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formal sector. The participation of individuals in formal and informal activities is often 
because of stiffer government regulations and the associated costs and benefits of 
working in either registered or unregistered firms. The remainder of this section 
addresses some of the reasons for the rise in unregistered businesses in Ghana.  
One major reason for the size and preference for informal economic activities 
in Ghana is the ease of doing business. Currently, Ghana ranks 114 out of 189 countries 
on the ease of doing business (World Bank, 2016), with a regional average of 128. In 
terms of starting a business, Ghana ranks low at a current position of 102, having 
dropped places from 97th in 2015. There are a number of reasons for the decrease in 
the country’s current performance in registered business start-ups and operations. 
Firstly, given a low GDP per capita of $1,590, potential entrepreneurs are required to 
pay-in a minimum of 2.4% of income per capita before registration. This figure is 
considerably higher considering the extent of poverty and difficulty in assessing credit 
facilities. Based on this, potential entrepreneurs may find it more beneficial to operate 
unregistered businesses. In addition, firms are also required to pay 33.3% of their total 
profits in taxes, which is also too high given that current economic conditions in Ghana 
are unfavourable. Added to these, the total number of procedures required to register 
a business sometimes serve as a deterrent, as in many cases this requires payment of 
fees and other services, in addition to the minimum capital deposit. Currently, it takes 
an average of 14 days to go through formal registration process, compared with 8.3 
days in OECD countries. 
Another explanation for the larger share of unregistered business activities in 
the Ghana labour market is poor labour standards. The World Bank (1995), note for 
instance that in Latin America, the development of the informal sector was because of 
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high labour policies in the formal sector. In Ghana, workers in formal registered firms 
sometimes work strict and longer hours, often without overtime allowance. The poor 
labour standards and working conditions sometimes encourages individuals to go into 
self-employment and unregistered business activities since it offers more flexibility 
(e.g. no strict opening and closing times) and greater independence. Contrary to formal 
businesses, informal businesses are not required to adhere to working hour regulations, 
and they may find it easier to control hired labour.  
Poor macro-economic conditions are also a contributory factor for the larger 
size of urban informal businesses. Looney (2006) and Wallace and Latcheva (2006), 
argue that a higher incidence of informality is associated with countries that experience 
regular economic downturns. During such periods, informal economic activities 
function as a ‘safety net’ for households and individuals, by providing them with 
alternative source of employment opportunities (Loayza and Rigolini, 2011). For 
instance, with the current economic reforms in Ghana, such as the public sector 
employment freeze, many individuals who are unable to find jobs in the highly paid 
public sector have ended up in unregistered business activities in order to earn some 
income. In addition, the recent power crisis in Ghana has led to decreased productivity 
and poor business performance (Daily Graphic, 2015). Businesses have responded to 
this by laying off workers, and those operating at a loss have had to shut down. These 
and other reasons may encourage those struggling to find jobs to start operating 
unregistered businesses.  
Entrepreneurs also generally prefer to start unregistered businesses when there 
are high fixed entry costs to registered businesses. This relates in particular to the 
financial costs of registration and the time it takes to register a business, as well as the 
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poor access to credit facilities (Straub, 2005; De Soto, 2002; Djankov et al., 2002). 
According to World Bank (2016), Ghana moved from 36th to 42nd position in terms of 
access to credit. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (2016) 
report that the most problematic factor for doing business in Ghana is access to finance. 
As I discuss later in subsequent sections, there is evidence to suggest that unregistered 
firms mostly associate the lack of access to credit facilities as a major obstacle to 
registering their businesses.  
For these and similar reasons, Bigsten et al. (2004) suggests that the incentive 
to operate in the formal economy is weak. Enterprises will find no potential benefits 
from running formal businesses. If the associated costs of registering businesses 
outweigh the benefits, then it is plausible that the share of unregistered and informal 
activities will remain relatively large. While serving as a buffer for the formal sector 
(Fields, 1990), the ease of entry and exit in this segment of the labour market makes it 
a natural safety net (Cunningham and Gomez, 2004) for those who are unable to 
participate fully in wage and formal employment. Informal and unregistered economic 
activities may persist and serve as an important alternative source of employment and 
livelihood in Ghana. Table 4.1 shows a comparable statistic of business and 
employment conditions/ regulations for Ghana and other regions.  
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Table 4. 1 Summary of comparable business and employment conditions 
Measure Year Ghana 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
OECD (or 
other) 
Notes and 
Sources 
GDP per capita 2014 $1,5901 $1,6381  $39,223.32  
1 Source: The 
World Bank, 
World 
Development 
Indicators  
2 Source: 
OECD.stat 
 
Wage and 
salaried workers 
(% of total 
employment) 
2010 18.23  26.64 
87.64  
(Western 
Europe 
only) 
3 Source: World 
Development 
Indicators 
4 Key Indicators 
of the Labour 
Market (KILM), 
ILO 
 
Share of 
vulnerable 
employment (% 
of total 
employment) 
 
76.85 
(2010)  
70.96 
(2013) 
7.76 (2013, 
Western 
Europe 
only) 
Note: Vulnerable 
employment is 
unpaid family 
workers and 
own-account 
workers as a 
percentage of 
total employment 
5 Source: World 
Development 
Indicators  
6  Source: KILM, 
ILO 
 
Ease of doing 
business 
20157 114 143 25 
7 Source: World 
Bank, 2016 
Starting a 
business 
20157 102 128 45 
7 Source: World 
Bank, 2016 
Note: Figures 
shown are 
rankings 
Compared with Western Europe, the share of individuals in wage and salaried 
work in Ghana in 2010 was considerably low (87.6% as against 18.2%), and even 
lower than the sub Saharan Africa regional average of 26.6%. Looking at the share of 
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people in vulnerable employment, 76.8% (in 2010) of workers were in unpaid family 
work and own account jobs, compared with only 7.7% for Western Europe in 2013. 
These figures show undoubtedly how deprived some individuals in Ghana are, and 
how informal economic activities through its employment creation potential, is able to 
elevate people from poverty and give them a source of livelihood. 
4.2.1.1 Other reasons for the size of the informal economy 
Theories on the informal sector (Azuma and Grossman, 2008; Marcouiller and 
Young, 1995; Loayza, 1996) assume that, despite the benefits of better access to, for 
instance, credit facilities, operating a formal business or firm imposes burdens on firms 
through high taxes, compliance with regulations, and high labour standards. The 
decision to register one’s business may therefore depend partly on the trade-off 
between the benefits and costs associated with becoming formal or remaining 
informal. The empirical literature relates the size of the informal economy to a host of 
factors including; tax rates, entry costs, institutional quality, and labour standards.  
Ulyssea (2010) study the regulation of entry and the informal sector for Brazil. 
The author notes that, although an effective way of reducing the size of the informal 
sector is by increasing the enforcement of labour regulations, Ulyssea (2010), found 
that enforcement of labour regulations potentially increased unemployment. This 
finding implies that formalising economic activities can have adverse effects on 
economic welfare, due to corresponding job losses and high unemployment rates. An 
interesting and more plausible finding was that, lowering the costs of entry into the 
formal sector improved employment composition. The author therefore suggests that 
a better approach to reduce the size of the informal economy, and improve economic 
welfare in countries of high informality is instead to reduce the costs associated with 
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registering or operating formally, rather than imposing penalties on businesses that are 
already struggling to raise sufficient funds to register or stay in business.  
Similar to Ulyssea (2010), Auriol and Warlters (2005), also argue that a key 
reason why micro and small businesses prefer to remain informal in developing 
countries is due to the large fixed costs associated with operating formally. However, 
the authors also note that high costs are sometimes part of government’s deliberate 
attempt to raise tax revenue. By increasing entry cost by 1%, the authors found the 
informal sector to increase by 14% in developing countries. Similar to Ulyssea (2005), 
Auriol and Warlters (2005) suggest that in order for governments to increase the tax 
base, a policy of reducing costs of entry into the formal sector would be more 
appropriate. 
In a related study on determinants of the informal sector, Friedman et al. (2000) 
do not find evidence in support of the fact that higher taxes induces informal economic 
activities. What the authors found interestingly however, is that, informal activities 
were associated with countries that have weaker legal environment, higher levels of 
corruption, and countries with higher levels of bureaucracy. Thus, countries with lower 
regulations on businesses have lower informal economic activity rates. The findings 
from this study suggests that when faced with tougher government regulations and 
market inefficiencies, such as corruption, those operating in the informal economy will 
be compelled to hide their activities from government officials in order to avoid paying 
the high costs associated with operating formal enterprises.  
These findings are partly in line for the case of Ghana, and many other 
developing countries, where due to government regulations and ineffective 
163 
 
institutions, entrepreneurs prefer instead to operate informally, regardless of the 
disadvantages. 
4.2.2 Informal employment: Regional estimates in developing economies 
In most regions of the world, informal economic activities serve as the main 
source of livelihood and income. This arises partly because of government regulations 
on businesses and macroeconomic conditions, as well as labour standards. Regional 
estimates across developing economies show that non-agricultural informal 
employment comprises of over half of total employment. Apart from South Asia that 
had a total informal sector employment rate of 82%, from 2004 to 2012, as shown in 
table 4.2, SSA had the largest share of informal employment as a percent of non-
agricultural employment. 66 percent of men and women were operating in the informal 
economy from 2004 to 2012. Urban China had the lowest share of workers in informal 
employment during this period. Across most regions, a larger proportion of informal 
workers were women. For example, in SSA, the share of women in informal 
employment was 74% compared with 61% for men. The only region where the 
proportion of women in informal employment was lower than men is the Middle East 
and North Africa.   
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Table 4. 2 Informal employment as percentage of non-agricultural employment: 
2004-2010 
Region 
Women 
(%) 
Men 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
South Asia 83 82 82 
SSA 74 61 66 
Latin America and the Caribbean 54 48 51 
Urban China* 36 30 33 
East and Southeast Asia (excluding 
China) 64 65 65 
Middle east and North Africa 35 47 45 
* China based on six cities: Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, Wuhan, and Xi-an 
Source: Based on Vanek et al. (2014: 11, Table 1)   
 
Even in terms of wage and self-employment, the regional estimates indicate 
that SSA had the lowest share of workers in informal wage employment. Across all 
regions however, the rate of workers in informal wage employment was below 50%. 
In SSA, 67% of informal workers were self-employed. It is interesting also to note 
that, a larger proportion of men were in informal wage employment, compared with 
women who were disproportionately in informal self-employment. This is a possible 
indication that women may prefer to sort into occupations that allows them flexibility 
and time to manage household production, whereas men are simply interested in 
salaried jobs. Table 4.3 shows a breakdown of the share of men and women in informal 
wage and self-employment. 
Table 4. 3 Informal wage and self-employment as percentage of non-agricultural 
informal employment 
Panel a. Informal wage employment    
Region 
Women 
(%) 
Men 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
South Asia 42 49 47 
Sub Saharan Africa 24 42 33 
Latin America and the Caribbean 49 48 48 
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Urban China* 52 47 49 
East and Southeast Asia (excluding China) 39 56 49 
Panel b. Informal self-employment 
South Asia 58 51 53 
Sub Saharan Africa 76 58 67 
Latin America and the Caribbean 51 52 52 
Urban China* 48 53 51 
East and Southeast Asia (excluding China) 61 44 51 
* China based on six cities: Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, Wuhan, and Xi-an 
Source: Based on Vanek et al. (2014: 11, Table 4)   
 
4.2.3 Conceptualizing the informal economy  
Since its inception in the early 1970’s by Hart (1973), the concept of the 
informal economy has received considerable attention among researchers and policy 
makers, although no consensus has been reached regarding its conceptualisation. The 
literature on the informal economy continues to remain vague with some authors 
associating it with illegal activities (Maloney, 2004; Schneider and Enste, 2000). One 
of the dominant notions of informal economic activities is that it offers a solution to 
poverty and unemployment in regions where there is high incidence of informality. 
Divergent views have led to the categorization of the informal economy according to 
three main schools of thought; the structuralist, dualist and the legalist schools. This 
section provides an overview of these schools of thought. It also includes an alternative 
view, the voluntarist school. 
4.2.3.1 Dualist Approach 
The dualistic school of thought stems from the work of Lewis (1954), Harris 
and Todaro (1970), and Hart (1973). This school of thought views the informal 
economy as an inferior segment of the labour market with no direct link to the formal 
economy. Bacchetta et al. (2009) argue that the informal sector is a residual that arises 
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mainly from the transformation process in a developing economy. According to the 
dualist view, the informal economy exists, in part because, the formal sector (often 
regarded as the sector that provides ‘good jobs’ and higher wages) is not able to offer 
employment opportunities to all individuals. The formal sector therefore offers 
employment opportunities for those with higher education, since these individuals tend 
to be more productive, compared with informal workers who are often assumed to 
have lesser education and are less productive (Porta and Shleifer, 2008). 
4.2.3.2 Structuralist Approach 
This school of thought views the informal economy as comprising of small 
firms and unregistered workers subordinated to large capitalist firms (Castells, 1989, 
Chen, 2012). It emphasises interdependence between formal and the informal sectors, 
with firms in the informal economy supplying cheap labour and inputs to larger firms, 
thus improving the competitiveness of larger firms. Growth according to the 
structuralist view has minimum impact on eliminating informal production because of 
the interdependence from large formal firms (Castells, 1989). As such, the structuralist 
school of thought views the informal economy as a productive part of the economy 
because of the direct linkage with larger firms and ability to supply inputs at lower 
costs. 
4.2.3.3 Legalist Approach 
Contrary to the dualist and structuralist views, the legalist school of thought 
views the informal economy as a sector characterised by micro-entrepreneurs who 
operate informal enterprises in order to avoid the large costs associated with running 
formal establishments (de Soto, 2000). This school of thought clearly articulates some 
of the reasons associated with firms’ decision to remain informal in many developing 
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countries. For this reason, workers in the informal economy are considered a hindrance 
to economic development. By operating micro and small enterprises, firm owners are 
able to avoid detection by government officials, and according to Farrell (2004), the 
cost advantage in terms of tax avoidance and government regulation usually tend to 
outweigh the small scale and productivity of informal businesses. This may therefore 
encourage them to remain informal.  
4.2.3.4 Voluntarist school 
This school of thought views the informal economy as made up of firms that 
deliberately engage in informal activities in order to avoid government regulations and 
taxes (Maloney, 2004). The voluntarists are similar to the legalists but unlike the 
legalist, the voluntarists do not necessarily blame the cost associated with registering 
to operate formally for their decision not to register. This school of thought therefore 
suggest that, business owners in the informal economy may choose to register their 
businesses willingly, bearing in mind that the benefits from not registering may 
outweigh the costs of registering. 
These different perspectives suggest that informal entrepreneurs sometimes 
choose, or volunteer to work in the informal economy. As per Chen (2012), informal 
and unregistered business activities grow during periods of economic downturn, and 
as in many developing countries such as Ghana, the surge in the number of people 
engaging in informal economic activities may be attributed to government regulations 
on businesses, macroeconomic conditions, and in part, a result of market 
inefficiencies.  
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4.3 Previous research: Education, family background, and entrepreneurship 
Since the work of Mincer (1974) two main factors; education and experience, 
have been found to have positive impact on individual earnings (Psacharopoulos, 
1993). As the model applies more to wage employees, it centres on measurable returns 
such as income, but education may also benefit the entrepreneurs’ performance in 
other ways, such as, the growth of the enterprise, firm productivity, and profitability 
of the enterprise. Human capital theory suggests that knowledge acquired from 
education provide individuals with greater abilities that could affect firm performance 
by making entrepreneurs more productive and efficient. Educational attainment should 
therefore affect the performance of enterprises, measured by, for example, the growth 
of the enterprise, productivity, and profitability.  
In addition, because individuals aim to maximize their economic benefits given 
their level of human capital, highly educated individuals may in effect choose not to 
become entrepreneurs, simply because, being self-employed could potentially lead to 
reduced income compared with being in wage employment. On the other hand, 
entrepreneurs that have invested more in human capital will be willing to stay in 
business and grow their enterprises to achieve higher profits, compared with those that 
have invested less in their human capital (Cassar, 2006). However, this decision can 
be influenced by a host of factors, such as the nature of the business environment, 
access to credit facilities, and government regulations.  
Although economic theory suggests that education enhances earnings and 
productivity, in circumstances of poverty, running a successful business in urban 
Ghana could depend less on education. The poor macroeconomic conditions and 
unfavourable business environment could make it less lucrative and difficult for 
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businesses to survive. Educated and well-connected individuals may instead seek jobs 
in the highly paid formal sector, or through their connections and support of parents, 
be able to access credit facilities that can help them to grow their businesses. This 
means that those with limited opportunities are left to operate informal businesses. The 
level of corruption (currently Ghana ranks 56 out of 168 countries according to 
Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International, (2016)) implies further that 
individuals with less “connections” and limited access to, for instance credit facilities 
will operate in the informal economy. What might therefore be an engine of business 
success among unregistered firms is the experience and exposure to business skills 
acquired because of growing up in a family with parental business ownership. Family 
background through parents’ business ownership may therefore be a vital factor.  
The remainder of the section discusses evidence from the literature on 
education and firm performance. Most of the available evidence are related to 
developed countries and the formal sector (manufacturing firms), with very few studies 
examining this for developing countries.  
4.3.1 Education, entrepreneurship and firm performance 
It is often argued that firm owners and employees in Micro and Small 
Enterprises (MSEs) in less developed countries have fewer years of education than 
their developed country counterparts, mainly because well-educated individuals tend 
to place themselves in larger firms where they receive higher wages (Nichter and 
Goldmark, 2009; Sluis et al., 2005). In a study on seven West African countries, 
Pasquier-Doumer (2013) examine intergenerational transmission of self-employment, 
and find interestingly that the effect of owner’s education on sales is negative and 
insignificant. The author however does not provide any reason for this negative effect. 
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Although not addressing the informal sector, Alvarez and Crespi (2003) examined the 
differences in technical efficiency among Chilean MSE manufacturing firms. 
Interestingly, the authors also find that highly educated firm owner’s do not induce 
higher efficiency of the firm. They attempt to explain this negative relationship by 
assuming that control activities are the result of knowledge, effort and time monitoring 
of the workers. They suggest that due to higher opportunity costs of monitoring, highly 
educated firm owners focus less efforts in monitoring activities.  
On the other hand, there are compelling evidence of the importance of 
education for firm performance for developed countries (Parker and Praag; 2006, 
Bosma et al., 2004). Other studies by Sluis et al. (2005) and Van Praag et al. (2013), 
show how schooling raises firm performance. Davidsson and Honig (2003), find that 
human capital, in the form of education is important for nascent entrepreneurs in 
Sweden. The authors also found that, as businesses moved away from start-up phase, 
the effect of education became less important. For instance, the authors found no 
significant effect of education of the owner on making sales or on business 
profitability. Possible explanations given by the authors, although speculative are that, 
as the entrepreneur move from start-up to exploitation, they may be confronted with 
other activities that require different forms of human capital, possibly experience, and 
not necessarily education, similar to the reason given by Alvarez and Crespi (2003). 
The authors further suggest that success of businesses may be facilitated by education 
in addition to the effects of family and individual connections, a reason that is 
plausible, and might be more applicable in labour markets with intermediaries. In 
developing countries, there are also evidence of positive effects of owner’s education 
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on firm productivity, but mainly in the formal sector and among manufacturing firms 
(Aggrey et al., 2010; Goedhuys et al., 2008). 
In a similarly related literature on informal entrepreneurship and education, 
Jiménez et al. (2015) find that tertiary education leads to an increase in formal 
entrepreneurship, whereas for informal entrepreneurship, tertiary education reduces 
the rate of informal entrepreneurship. A suggested reason according to the authors is 
that, entrepreneurs with higher educational attainments may be more aware of some of 
the negative implications of engaging in informal activities, such as detection by 
government authorities leading to fines, reduced access to credit facilities, and limited 
scope for expansion.   
This evidence show that the effects of education on enterprise performance are 
mixed. The effects may vary by, for instance, economic conditions (developed vs 
developing countries) and type of employment sector (formal vs informal). Typically, 
individuals that are more educated will be in wage employment rather than self-
employment, which tend to have lower and uncertain incomes. Educated owners could 
therefore underperform when operating informal businesses, due to the perceived 
negative consequences of operating informal and unregistered businesses. The study 
pursues this possibility and adds to the dearth of evidence for developing countries by 
examining the effects of owner’s education on performance of unregistered businesses, 
and on the intention to register.  
4.3.2 Family background and entrepreneurship  
The literature on self-employment shows that children of business owners have 
a higher likelihood of becoming self-employed themselves compared with children 
from non-business ownership backgrounds (Fairlie and Robb, 2007a; Dunn and Holtz-
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Eakin, 2000; Hout and Rosen, 2000; Chlosta et al., 2012; Colombier and Masclet, 
2008). Some explanations for the intergenerational transmission are that, the human 
capital acquired through informal learning and apprenticeship-type training provides 
an opportunity correlated with business success (Colombier and Masclet, 2008; Lentz 
and Laband, 1990). Key business skills necessary for firm performance can also be 
obtained through exposure to, and experience in an entrepreneurial environment, a 
suggestion that individuals from families that own a business might have an advantage 
(Kim et al., 2006). For instance, Fairlie and Robb (2007a) find that previous experience 
in a family-owned business improves the outcomes of small businesses. They also find 
business outcomes to improve for those with previous experience in businesses that 
deal in similar goods. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) find that the probability of being 
self-employed are higher among those whose fathers were involved in self-employed 
activities. This suggests, according to Fairlie and Robb (2007a), that this relationship 
might occur due to the ability of self-employed parents to transmit business skills to 
their offspring, rather than simply based on the similarities in the desire to be self-
employed.  
Another explanation of the intergenerational correlation is that self-employed 
parents are able to provide moral and financial support to potential entrepreneurs 
(Steier and Greenwood, 2000) than individuals from families with no business 
ownership. Wealthy families may act as a source of funding where for instance, capital 
needs are modest (Parker, 2004), and where it is difficult to raise large amounts of 
money to start a business (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006), a reason that can be associated 
with Ghana and other developing countries. Evidence also show that family members 
in self-employment are able to transfer resources in the form of credit facilities, and 
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knowledge to other members of the family (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000). Particularly 
in Ghana where access to finance is limited for businesses (Global Competitiveness 
Index, 2016), extended family members usually help raise funds for potential 
entrepreneurs to start businesses, often with the hope that these businesses will become 
successful and serve as a means of employment for other family members in the future. 
In addition, family members can avail themselves for use as additional input in the 
business process, either as paid or unpaid labour, a practice common among many 
developing countries, where access to paid jobs are restricted.  
Despite Hout and Rosen (2000) finding that the employment status of fathers 
are a major determinant of children’s likelihood of becoming self-employed, the 
authors also find interestingly that, men who were raised in households with neither 
parents were less likely to become self-employed, compared with men that grew up in 
households with both parents. This finding suggest that the presence of both parents 
could be important for children’s employment outcomes. Parents could therefore serve 
as role models (Bosma et al., 2012), and could provide children with business 
management skills. Chlosta et al. (2012), find evidence in support of this, that in 
households where parents usually serve as role models for their offspring, these 
individuals are often associated with a higher likelihood of becoming self-employed.  
Although evidence support intergenerational mobility of business ownership, 
there is limited empirical evidence on the effect of family business background on 
business outcomes. Among the very few studies for developed countries, Fairlie and 
Robb (2007a) found that family business background is important for firm profits in 
the US (although they also find a negative insignificant effect on sales). The authors 
however note that, the main effect of family background was through the informal 
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learning that occurred when individuals worked in a family business, rather than 
simply as a result of having self-employed parents (Lentz and Laband, 1990). In a 
similarly related literature on nascent entrepreneurship, Davidsson and Honig (2003), 
showed that individuals having parents in business increased the odds of nascent 
entrepreneurship. However, the authors found that as the business progressed, the 
effect of having parents in business became less important. Other forms of social 
capital, such as individual contacts via friends/neighbours and membership in business 
networks were found to be more important for obtaining sales and making profits.  
For developing countries, there are not many studies that specifically address 
the impact of family background on informal business outcomes. An exception is 
Pasquier-Doumer (2013) who addresses the impact of parental self-employment status 
(only fathers’) on business outcomes (measured by value added and sales) for seven 
West African countries. The author finds in contrast to developed countries that, those 
with self-employed fathers do not significantly affect the performance of firms. 
Pasquier-Doumer (2013) argues that, because of the poor access to valuable human, 
physical, and social capital, self-employed fathers are unable to make significant 
effects on their children’s businesses, compared with informal entrepreneurs without 
a self-employed father. A similarly related study by Fafchamps and Minten (2002) for 
Madagascar investigates whether social networks in the form of relatives enhanced 
firm productivity among agricultural traders or not. The authors note that those whose 
relatives were engaged in agricultural activities did not benefit from a positive effect 
on productivity. What the authors found instead was that, higher productivity was 
associated with individuals that had no informal training from relatives. In contrast to 
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these, family socioeconomic background, measured by parent’s occupation was found 
to increase the incomes of informal entrepreneurs in Jamaica (Honig, 1998). 
The review so far shows that evidence on the effects of family background on 
informal business outcomes is scarce and inconclusive for developing countries. In an 
environment where government regulations on business start-ups are tough and costly, 
labour market connections through parents’ business knowledge and social networks, 
and informal learning experience from having parents with business ownership could 
be more valuable for business performance. By assuming that growing up in a family 
where parents owned/own a business could confer on the individual better 
endowments and managerial skills, this chapter examines in addition to education of 
firm owners, whether family background is important for the performance of 
unregistered businesses.  
 
4.4 Data 
The data used are from the 2013 World Bank Informal Enterprise Survey (IFS) 
for Ghana. The survey collected data on non-registered businesses across five urban 
cities in four regions of Ghana: Greater Accra (Accra and Tema), Western (Takoradi), 
and Northern and Ashanti regions (Tamale and Kumasi). Each urban city was divided 
into zones based on regional considerations and the concentration of informal business. 
Overall, 180 zones were identified, and a minimum of four interviews were conducted 
per identified zone. An informal enterprise is defined by the study as a business not 
registered with the Registrar’s General Department. Illegal activities (e.g., prostitution 
or drug trafficking), as well as domestic helpers are excluded from informal activities. 
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The survey has 729 firms across the service and manufacturing sectors. The 
sample is restricted to unregistered firms where the majority owner is also the main 
decision maker. This eliminates some of the possible measurement and reporting errors 
associated with, for example, quoting monetary values such as sales revenue that might 
affect the reliability of the results if the respondent is not the main decision maker. 
There are very few non-decision making owners and therefore their exclusion does not 
lead to sample truncation. This leaves a sub-sample of 707 firms of which 54.1% have 
workers, and the remaining 45.9% having no workers (defined as micro firms). The 
relatively fewer number of informal firm owners who are also not the main  
4.4.1 Summary descriptive  
Table 4.4 shows summary statistics for the variables used in the study. Average 
years of education is 9.2 years for both firms with workers and firms without workers. 
This is equivalent to completing basic education. The average number of workers is 
2.3. 63 percent of all firms are female-owned with the remaining 37% being male-
owned. While there are more female than male owners in the sample, female owners 
are disproportionately represented among smaller, micro firms. One reason for the 
stronger representation of female owners in the sample may be that women may 
engage in self-employment because it offers them flexibility by allowing them to 
balance their need to complement family income with their responsibilities for taking 
care of their children and other family members (Arias and Bendini, 2006). Looking 
at the descriptive by firm size, the average years of education are 9.1 and 9.3 for firms 
with employees and firms without employees (micro firms) respectively. In terms of 
performance, measured as sales and profits, there are higher sales and profits per 
month for firms with workers compared with firms without workers. Specifically, 
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firms with no workers make an average profit of 817.9 Cedis (equivalent to £146.04) 
per month, and 1,115.95 Cedis for firms with workers (equivalent to £199.3).16 
Table A4.1 and A4.2 in the appendix also shows correlation matrix of the main 
variables for firms without workers and firms with workers. There is a significant 
positive correlation between owner’s education and firm performance for firms with 
no workers. There is no significant correlation between education and performance for 
firms with workers. From the correlation matrix, there is also a positive correlation 
between education and parents’ education for both firms with workers and firms 
without workers. There is a positive correlation between education and parents with 
business ownership. For female owners in both firms with workers and firms without 
workers, there is a negative correlation with firm performance. 
Table 4. 4 Summary statistics of variables 
  
Firms with 
no workers 
Firms with 
workers 
  
   Mean  Mean T-value 
Log of monthly sales 6.28 6.77 -5.11 
Log of monthly profit  5.82 6.16 -2.63 
Average monthly sales 
(in Cedis) 1096.11 1752.11 
-2.9 
Average monthly profits 
(in Cedis) 817.85 1115.95 
-1.4 
Number of workers  3.41  
Hours operated per week 62.61 60.55 1.03 
Education of owner 
(years) 
9.06 9.27 -0.65 
Experience in the sector 
(years) 
8.18 10.99 -4.22 
Age of owner 38.45 40.63 -2.41 
Own funds 85.76% 85.38% 0.14 
Electricity 49.82% 63.44% -3.39 
Cell phones 70.86% 82.90% -3.68 
                                                   
16 Conversion rate used is from the Bank of Ghana interbank FX rate (£1=GHS5.6)  
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Parents: no business 
ownership 
54.36% 53.37% 0.25 
Parents: post basic 
education 
29.06% 21.59% 2.05 
Female owner 68.87% 57.39% 3.03 
Inclined to register 40.41% 59.57% -4.83 
Source: Author’s own calculation from IFS 2013 
Figure 4.3 shows that most firm owners have completed primary education, 
with only 4.65% having completed university. 12.56 percent of firm owners have no 
education. It also shows that a high proportion of firm owners have completed 
secondary education (33.18%). Male-managed firms tend to have a high post-primary 
education completion rate than female-managed firms. 41.91 percent of male firm 
owners have competed secondary education compared with 27.97% of female-
managed firms. Firm owners with post-basic education have less experience in sector 
of operation (8.7 years compared with 10.3 years) than those with no post-basic 
education. This could possibly be because more educated firm owners are in informal 
activities while waiting to find jobs in the formal and public sector, a phenomenon that 
Bennett and Estrin (2007) refer to as a ‘stepping-stone’. 
Figure 4. 3 Education level of firm owners 
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average of 1,812.6 Cedis a month. Owners with no education have an average of 1,564 
Cedis a month. Looking at this by firm size, owners with no education in firms that 
have workers have higher sales per month compared with those with a university 
qualification, as well as those with basic and secondary education. For firms with no 
workers however, informal entrepreneurs with an educational qualification have 
higher average sales per month compared with those without any educational 
attainment. In terms of profit, firms with no workers whose owners have an 
educational attainment are associated with higher profits. This is in contrast to firms 
with workers, where owners with no education are associated with higher profits. 
These of course can be traced to the fact that in firms with workers, owners without 
education have lower costs compared with owners with university education, whose 
costs are noted to be almost 200 Cedis higher. Table A4.3 in the appendix shows a 
summary of performance of firms by firm owner’s level of education.  
Since family business experience acts as a channel of informal training, it is 
plausible to examine performance based on whether owners with family business 
experience have higher performance than those without family business experience. 
For both sales and profit that owners whose parents have business ownership tend to 
perform better. For instance, in firms with no workers, owners with no family business 
experience have an average monthly sale of 963.5 Cedis compared with 1249.4 Cedis 
for those with family business experience. Looking at this for firms with workers, 
owners with family business experience have average monthly sales of 2149.4 Cedis 
compared with 1359.9 Cedis for owners with no family business ownership. These are 
similar when compared with profits. Owners with family business experience have 
higher profits per month compared with owners with no family business experience. 
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This seems to suggest that, informal learning experience through parents’ business 
ownership may be an important source of success for informal entrepreneurs in the 
five urban cities of Ghana, as my earlier discussion of the literature suggests. Table 
4.5 shows performance of firms based on parents’ business ownership. 
Table 4. 5 Performance by parents’ business ownership 
Panel a. Monthly sales 
 
Parents have 
no business 
ownership (in 
Cedis) 
Parents have 
business 
ownership (in 
Cedis) 
Firms with 
no workers 963.47 1249.44 
Firms with 
workers 1359.86 2149.38 
Panel b. Monthly profits 
Firms with 
no workers 676.00 979.40 
Firms with 
workers 755.58 1418.70 
Moving away from education and family background, an important feature of 
businesses in developing countries is the use of cell phones, and reliance on electricity 
in the production process. Since most companies do not have internet access or 
landline telephones, cell phones are particularly useful for placing orders, and 
communicating with customers. As regards electricity, securing access to the national 
grid can be a tedious exercise; it takes on average 79 days to secure access (World 
Bank, 2016). 77.9% and 59.3% of firms in the sample use cell phones and electricity 
respectively. I find that the use of cell phones and electricity increases with the level 
of education. For instance, 55.6% (86.7%) and 31.4% (88.9%) of firm owners with no 
education (with university education) reported using cell phones and electricity 
respectively, whereas 86.7% and 88.9% of firm owners with university education 
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reported using cell phones and electricity respectively. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 shows a 
detailed breakdown of education level of firm owners and use of cell phones and 
electricity. 
Figure 4. 4 Education of owner and use of cell phones 
 
Figure 4. 5 Education of owner and use of electricity 
 
The reason for remaining unregistered is usually associated with the costs and 
benefits of registering businesses, which I discuss in the next section. Where the costs 
associated with registering outweighs the benefits, firm owners will prefer to remain 
informal. However, the motivation and inclination to register a business could be 
related to owners’ level of education. Table 4.6 shows that the intention to register 
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increases with the level of education. 35.1% of owners with no education reported that 
they were willing to register their business, compared with 63.4% of those that have 
completed secondary education. This is similar to Amin (2011) that more educated 
individuals show a greater willingness to register in Latin America’s informal 
economy. There is also a positive correlation between firm owner’s intention to 
register and firm performance. There are positive correlations between these variables 
as seen in the correlation coefficients in appendix A4.1 and A4.2.  
Table 4. 6 Education of owners and intention to register 
  Intention to register 
Level of education No Yes T-value 
None 64.94 35.06 3.00 
Primary 56.39 43.61 3.55 
Secondary 36.59 63.41 -4.31 
University 29.63 70.37 -2.05 
 
4.4.1.1 Obstacles to registering and doing business 
As discussed in section 4.2.1, the reasons associated with operating informal 
businesses in Ghana is partly due to government regulations and business conditions. 
These are examined further by looking at the descriptive on some of the obstacles to 
registering and doing business. Figure 4.6 shows the perceived obstacles to registering 
businesses. In general, when firm owners were asked whether they would like to 
register their business, 51.2% indicated they would be willing to register. Despite 
almost half of firms’ willingness to register, these firms face obstacles that potentially 
affect their ability to register. For instance, time, fees, and paper work associated with 
the registration process were among some of the reasons firms gave in support of their 
decision to remain informal. 42.57 percent of firms also indicate that payment of taxes 
was one of the main obstacle to registering their businesses with the Registrar General. 
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18.95% and 18.67% are of the opinion that inspections and meetings with government 
officials, and bribes paid out to officials when businesses are registered were some of 
the obstacles to registering businesses. In addition, 33.8% of firms were of the view 
that there were no benefits from registering their businesses.  
 Despite the obstacles to registering, firm owners believed that, there were 
some associated benefits from registering. In figure 4.7 51.06% of firm owners were 
of the view that registering will give them better access to finance and loans. 37.06 
percent of firm owners also believed that by registering their businesses, they were 
more likely to have better access to raw materials, infrastructure and government 
services. For both firms with workers and firms without workers, limited access to 
finance or loans, and problems associated with electricity supply were the two biggest 
obstacles faced by firms.  
Figure 4. 6 Obstacles to registering business 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Due to times, fees, and paper work
Due to taxes
Due to inspections and meetings with
officials
Due to bribes
No benefit from registration
Don't know No Yes
184 
 
Figure 4. 7 Benefits from registering business 
 
Examining the obstacles faced by businesses based on firm size, both firms with 
workers and firms without workers indicate that the biggest obstacle is the limited 
access to finance or loans. This is followed by the limited access to land and 
infrastructure. Table 4.7 shows summary of the biggest obstacles faced by firms. 
Table 4. 7 Biggest obstacle faced by the business 
  
Firms with no 
workers 
Firms 
with 
workers 
Limited access to 
finance or loans 
39.63 34.47 
Limited access to 
land 
16.1 12.11 
Corruption 0.62 0.53 
Crime 0.62 3.16 
Problems with 
electricity supply 
26.01 33.42 
Problems with 
water supply 
8.05 10.26 
Limited access to 
technology 
0.93 2.37 
Inadequately 
educated workforce 
(including owner) 
1.24 0.26 
Don't know 6.81 3.42 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Better Access to finance and loans
Better access to raw materials,
infrastructure, and government services
Less bribes to pay
Ability to issue receipts to attract
customers
Don't know No Yes
185 
 
4.4.2 Variables used in the analysis 
Performance is measured in two ways; sales from the previous month in Cedis, 
and total profit per month in Cedis. Profit is calculated as the value of sales per month 
less costs (costs of electricity, transportation, raw materials, and the total amount paid 
to workers). An advantage of using total profit as an additional measure of 
performance is that it facilitates a comparison of the returns to education. Most 
previous research for paid employees calculate these using earnings as the dependent 
variable, and profits can be interpreted as residual income for the unregistered firm 
owner. 
Education is measured in years of completed schooling for the firm owner with 
a maximum of 16 indicating completion of a university education. Education is also 
included as a categorical variable in the regressions presented in the appendix in order 
to identify the true effects of the returns to various educational qualification 
attainments. In addition to formal education, experience of the firm owner in sector of 
operation as an additional measure of human capital in the regressions. Family 
background is measured as parents’ education and parents’ employment status as 
reported by respondents. Parents’ education is defined by whether parents have post-
basic education or no post-basic education.17 Similarly, parents’ employment is 
defined by whether or not parents own/owned a business. Having a parent with 
business ownership may increase the opportunities available to the individual to 
accumulate human capital (through informal education on the job, and experience) 
which then becomes valuable to the individual through its effects on performance. 
                                                   
17 The education data does not specifically indicate the level of father’s and mother’s education 
separately, hence the term parents’ education 
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A series of control variables that in the wider labour economics literature are 
known to affect income are included in the regressions. These include a dummy 
variable to control for gender, and the number of hours that the business operates per 
week. Other variables capture firm specific characteristics and include the number of 
workers used in the business, and intermediate inputs defined by the source of funds, 
use of cell phones, and use of electricity. I use these imperfect measures of physical 
capital because of the difficulty in obtaining direct measures of physical capital. 
Geographic location is also included to account for regional variations in firms’ 
activities and the business environment. Table 4.8 shows a summary definition of the 
variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Table 4. 8 Summary definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Log of monthly sales Log of monthly sales (Cedis) 
Log of monthly profit Log of monthly profits (Cedis) 
Intention to register 
Whether firm owner would like to register the business 
in the future 
Education (in years) Highest level of formal education completed by owner  
Experience (in years) Experience of owner in the sector 
Own funds 1 if firm uses internal source of funds, 0 if otherwise 
Use electricity 1 if firm uses electricity for the business, 0 if otherwise 
Workers Number of workers  
City City of the business. Reference group: Accra 
Use cell phones 1 if firm uses cell phones, 0 if otherwise 
Parents: No business 
ownership Parents do not own a business 
Parents: Post-basic 
education Parents have Post-basic education 
Hours per week Number of hours business is operated per week 
Female owner If the owner is female 
Age (in years) Age of the owner 
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4.5 Empirical specifications 
4.5.1 Unregistered firm’s production function: Sales per month 
Firstly, the study estimates the firm’s production function (measured by 
monthly sales) in which inputs include human and physical capital, and labour. Human 
capital is measured by the years of completed schooling and experience of the 
enterprise owner. An additional variable included in the production function 
framework is family background measured by parents’ education and parents’ 
business ownership. Family background is assumed to be a potential source of 
informal learning for firm owners which could then improve performance of firms. 
The augmented production (measured as sales per month) function I estimate is:  
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖 +  𝛼2𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 +  𝛼3𝐹𝐵𝑖 +  𝛼4𝐾𝑖 + 𝛼5𝐿𝑖 +  𝛼6𝑋𝑖 +  𝛼7𝑅 +
 𝜀𝑖          (10) 
where 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 is the log of monthly sales for each firm; 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶 and 𝐸𝑋𝑃 are the years 
of education and experience of the owner in the sector respectively. 𝐹𝐵 is family 
background measured as parents’ level of education and business ownership. 𝐾 is a 
vector of capital inputs capturing whether the firm uses electricity or not, outside 
sources for funds, and use of cell phones; 𝐿 is the number of workers; 𝑋 is a vector of 
firm and owner characteristics; 𝑅 and 𝜀 are regional dummies and a random error term 
respectively. All regressions are estimated separately for firms without workers and 
firms with workers. 
4.5.2 The profits equation 
Secondly, I estimate a profit equation of the form; 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖 +  β2𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 + β3𝐹𝐵𝑖 +  β4𝐾𝑖 + β5𝐿𝑖 +  𝛽6𝑋𝑖 +
 𝛽7𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖         (11) 
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where 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 is log of total profit per month. All regressions are estimated for 
firms without workers and firms with workers. 
In considering the effect of owner’s education on profits and sales, there are at 
least two possible sources of bias when OLS is used to estimate the relationship. 
Firstly, as in standard earnings regressions, the schooling decision is likely to be 
endogenous because individuals are likely to base their schooling decision in part on 
the future expected returns. Secondly, there may be unobserved individual 
characteristics such as ability that may affect schooling and subsequently business 
performance. The omission of these variables is likely to bias the OLS estimates. 
However, the survey data do not include a good instrument for education, therefore, 
making it impossible for me to use an instrumental variable technique in this study. In 
particular, the only candidate instrumental variable, family background is associated 
with mixed results when used as instrumental variable (see for instance Ashenfelter 
and Zimmerman, 1997), and is one of my variables of interest. More pertinently, 
family background can affect both owner’s education and business outcomes. 
While disaggregating into two groups - informal entrepreneurs with workers 
and informal entrepreneurs without workers, it is possible that better performing firms 
will have certain characteristics that lead to a relatively larger firm size. To try to 
address this issue, I experimented by using the experience of the informal entrepreneur 
as an exclusion restriction. This was in part because it was insignificant in the sales 
regression, and also because more experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to have 
larger firm size compared with entrepreneurs with less experience. However, the 
correction term is insignificant in the outcome equation although it is significant in the 
selection equation.  As such, it was considered preferable to include experience as an 
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additional regressor because of the expected indirect effect on performance outcomes, 
and OLS is used. 
4.5.3 Intention to register: Predicting registration 
Lastly, the study examines possible factors that impact on the likelihood of 
registering using a binary outcome model of the form;  
Pr (𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖 = 1) = γ1𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖 + γ2𝐹𝐵𝑖 + 𝛾3𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖 +  𝛾4𝑋𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖 (12) 
where the outcome variable, 𝑅𝐸𝐺 is the firm owner’s intention to register, and is 
captured by a variable that takes the value of 1 when the firm owner indicates that they 
intend to register the business, and 0 otherwise. A major limitation of the dependent 
variable is that it does not necessarily imply that the firm owners will register even if 
they intend to do so - it is only a measure of intention. Nevertheless, the responses 
should accurately reflect the intention of the firm owners since they have no particular 
incentive to lie, knowing that a possible benefit of registering is gain access to finance. 
The consistency of this measure are examined by comparing individual owner’s 
intentions with responses to questions on the main obstacles to business development 
and the expected benefits from registration. The responses to these questions are in 
line with stated intentions to register or not in the future.18  
 
4.6 Results and discussion 
4.6.1 Effects of education and family background on firm sales 
Table 4.9 presents results from the OLS regression estimates that uses log of 
firm’s monthly sales as measure of firm productivity. It is important to look at sales 
figures and not only rely on profits, as these may be more accurate. Sales figures are 
                                                   
18 Examples of biggest obstacles are limited access to finance or loans and problems with 
electricity supply. Full details of obstacles to business can be seen in section 4.4. 
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also easy to track by firm managers compared with profits that require careful 
calculations. All regressions are estimated separately for firms without workers and 
firms with workers. This is to allow for the possibility of economies of scale generating 
a sales gap which arise between firms with and without employees, in part because 
firms may adopt similar if not the same production techniques and production function. 
In addition, due to differences in the stock of knowledge available to unregistered 
business owners, and motivations, unregistered firms may use different combinations 
of inputs, leading to possible differences in the relationship between inputs and sales. 
In particular, the relationship between education of the owner and firm type could 
affect how additional labour and other inputs are used (Baptista et al., 2013).  
Table 4. 9 Regression results: Effects of education and family background on firm 
sales 
  (1) (2) (3) 
DV: Log of monthly sales All firms 
Firms 
with no 
workers 
Firms 
with 
workers 
        
Education  0.0231 0.0761*** -0.0257 
 (0.0187) (0.0211) (0.0251) 
Parents: Post-basic 
education -0.205 -0.136 -0.192 
 (0.130) (0.159) (0.214) 
Parents: No business 
ownership -0.306*** -0.276** -0.248* 
 (0.101) (0.139) (0.138) 
Experience in business 
sector 0.0108 0.0157 0.00347 
 (0.00706) (0.00963) (0.00960) 
Own funds -0.369** -0.574*** -0.218 
 (0.149) (0.207) (0.204) 
Use electricity -0.275** -0.268* -0.281* 
 (0.113) (0.149) (0.162) 
Use cell phone 0.511*** 0.521*** 0.278 
 (0.127) (0.159) (0.198) 
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Age of owner 0.00424 0.00529 -0.000834 
 (0.00512) (0.00612) (0.00731) 
Female Owner -0.229* 0.0873 -0.409** 
 (0.133) (0.174) (0.188) 
Hours of operation per 
week 0.00176 -0.000608 0.00448 
 (0.00227) (0.00306) (0.00317) 
Number of workers   0.120*** 
   (0.0292) 
Constant 6.448*** 5.696*** 7.073*** 
 (0.372) (0.476) (0.527) 
    
Observations 450 214 236 
R-squared 0.137 0.203 0.201 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: All regressions include city dummies 
   
In column (1) of table 4.9, there are no significant effects of education on firm 
sales, although positive. The insignificant effect of owner’s education for all firms may 
be driven by the insignificant effect of education on sales of firms with workers. 
Family background variables, measured by parents’ education and parents’ business 
ownership show a negative effect on sales. The strong negative significant effect of 
owners whose parents have no business ownership suggests that family business 
experience can transmit skills (Kim et al., 2006) to individuals that can make their own 
businesses successful. There is also a significant negative effect on sales for firms 
relying on their own source of funds and firms that use electricity. Regarding the effect 
of cell phones, this increases sales by 36.9% for all firms. While the gender dummy 
has a negative effect on sales, this effect is only significant at 10%, and may be driven 
by the positive effect on sales for firms with no workers. All other variables are 
insignificant. 
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Columns (2) and (3) shows estimates of the sales regression for firms without 
workers and firms with workers. In column (2), there is a positive effect of owner’s 
education on sales in firms without workers. A possible interpretation of the significant 
positive effect of education for firms with no workers is that, the smallest firm owners 
may be relying more on their own ability, reflecting their acquired years of schooling 
to succeed, rather than relying on inputs from others. There are no significant effects 
of owner’s experience on firm sales for both type of firms. The insignificant effect of 
owner’s education among firms with employees in column (3) is contrary to 
expectations based on assumptions that educated firm owners would have better 
managerial skills and ability, and that this would be associated with larger firm size. If 
education is an indicator of managerial ability, then education should be linked to firm 
size. As Lucas (1978) infers, better managed firms would be larger and have the 
resources and incentives to employ better management19 to further enhance firm 
performance. However, the insignificant effect of education among firms with workers 
is admittedly difficult to explain. Alvarez and Crespi (2003) find similar results for 
manufacturing firms in Chile, but the authors assume that the insignificance of 
education could be because highly educated owners sometimes fail to pay attention to 
monitoring performance of the business, because other activities such as, identifying 
and exploiting opportunities distract them. Educated firm owners may therefore be 
relying more on the skills of hired workers to improve firm performance rather than 
their own education and skill set. Thus, educated entrepreneurs hire workers to 
leverage their skills (Baptista et al., 2013). The insignificant effect of owner’s 
                                                   
19 For instance, Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) find that better management practices 
(measured across 18 different categories including attracting and retaining human capital) 
leads to improved firm performance. They also find that apart from a strong correlation of 
education with management quality and that management quality increases with firm size.  
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education is also consistent with Pasquier-Doumer (2013) who found an insignificant 
effect of owner’s education on firm sales and value added, although the author 
provided no interpretation of the insignificant effect. The implication of the 
insignificant effect of education is that in circumstances of poverty, running a 
successful business depends more upon other factors such as family connections, 
rather than formal education, which is plausible. In regressions that use a categorical 
variable as measure of education (reported in appendix A4.4), the results show that for 
firms without workers sales increases with educational attainment. For instance, 
owners with basic education qualification compared with owners with no education 
are associated with 65% increase in monthly sales. As for those firms with workers, 
although insignificant, each level of educational attainment is associated with a 
decrease in sales compared with owners with no educational qualification. 
For firms with workers, there is a strong positive effect of the number of 
workers on sales. This is expected as the number of workers proxies for firm size. 
However, the education of the owner could be working indirectly on sales through the 
number of workers employed, since the education of the firm owner and the number 
of workers employed is positively related. There is evidence of this in a separate 
regression reported in table 4.10, that education of the owner increases the number of 
workers, although this is significant at the 10% level. Looking further into this, results 
show that mainly owners with university education drive the positive effect of 
education on the number of workers. This suggest to me that, at higher levels of 
education, owners may have better managerial skills compared with owners with no 
education.  
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The intercept terms in table 4.9 also show that sales revenue is higher for firms with 
workers than the smallest firms without workers. 
Table 4. 10 Effects of owner’s education on firm size 
  (1) (2) 
DV: Number of workers Firms with workers 
    
Education 0.0726*  
 (0.0380)  
Basic education  0.312 
  (0.390) 
Secondary education  0.406 
  (0.395) 
University education  2.320* 
  (1.251) 
Own funds -0.557 -0.460 
 (0.459) (0.468) 
Hours of operation per 
week -0.00908 -0.00847 
 (0.00856) (0.00831) 
Experience in business 
sector 0.0541** 0.0504* 
 (0.0271) (0.0277) 
Female owner -0.486 -0.436 
 (0.314) (0.301) 
Constant 3.383*** 3.540*** 
 (0.612) (0.653) 
   
Observations 330 330 
R-squared 0.075 0.093 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Regarding the effects of family background, sales are lower for firms whose 
owner’s parents have no business ownership, as expected, whereas the effect of 
parents’ education on sales is negative and insignificant. This is seen in columns (2) 
and (3). The power of parental business ownership to raise sales is consistent with 
family business background acting as a channel for the transmission of business 
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knowledge and skills to future entrepreneurs (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Fairlie and 
Robb, 2007a), and in contrast to the insignificant effect of father’s self-employment 
status on the sales of firms found by Pasquier-Doumer (2013). A possible inference 
from this is that, unregistered firms whose owners have parents involved in self-
employed activities benefit from an advantage of informal learning and business 
management experience that translates to increased firm sales compared with firms 
whose owners have parents without business ownership.  
Firms without workers that rely on their own sources for funds have 57.4% 
lower sales. The size of this effect is substantial, but this should come as no surprise 
since 85% of the firms in the sample finance the business using their own funds. 
Nevertheless, the result is worrying since when owners face financial constraints the 
economic benefits (associated with higher employment and improved standards of 
living) from realising new opportunities e.g. by entering new markets (Parker and 
Praag, 2006), may not be realised. There are no significant effects on sales of reliance 
on own funds among firms with workers. 
The results also show that the use of cell phones leads to 52.1% higher sales 
for micro firms. In Ghana, the use of cell phones for bank transactions and payments 
has become more widespread not only for personal reasons but also among businesses. 
Because of the limited access to internet, businesses use cell phones to place orders 
from suppliers and to keep contact with customers. On the other hand, another 
apparently important input into production, electricity, has a significant negative effect 
on sales of firms with and without workers. The costs involved in the use of electricity, 
which includes monthly payment of bills, and the power crisis that hit the country at 
the end of 2012 could help explain this negative effect. As well as the power crisis 
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having an effect on growth prospects (Financial Times, 2015; Reuters, 2015), the 
power crisis has also made businesses less productive (Daily Graphic, 2015) and costly 
to run. For instance, the Centre for Policy Analysis (CEPA, 2007) claims that the 
power crisis of 2007 resulted in increased business costs. Lastly, I find that among 
businesses that employ workers, female owners are associated with lower sales 
revenue.  
4.6.2 Effects of education and family background on firm profits 
Table 4.11 shows the estimation results for the effect of education and family 
background on firm profits from specification (14). There are a number of reasons for 
examining firm profitability in addition to sales revenue. First, profits rather than sales 
are the measure of most importance to firm owners when deciding, for instance, 
whether to register or remain unregistered. Second, since a large share of the firm’s 
profits becomes income for the owner, profit may be more relevant when considering 
for instance, how to elevate people from poverty. 
Table 4. 11 Regression results: Effects of education and family background on 
firm profits 
  (1) (2) (3) 
DV: Log of monthly profits All firms 
Firms 
with no 
workers 
Firms 
with 
workers 
        
Education  0.0506** 0.107*** -0.00728 
 (0.0240) (0.0282) (0.0321) 
Parents: Post-basic 
education -0.255 -0.249 -0.172 
 (0.174) (0.222) (0.278) 
Parents: No business 
ownership -0.436*** -0.341* -0.431** 
 (0.135) (0.194) (0.186) 
Experience in business 
sector 0.00763 0.0169 -0.00151 
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 (0.00954) (0.0144) (0.0125) 
Own funds -0.504*** -0.623** -0.401* 
 (0.191) (0.284) (0.239) 
Use electricity -0.397*** -0.370* -0.391* 
 (0.148) (0.201) (0.221) 
Use cell phone 0.526*** 0.607*** 0.263 
 (0.156) (0.203) (0.244) 
Age of owner 0.00752 0.00762 0.00216 
 (0.00651) (0.00788) (0.00957) 
Female Owner -0.0570 0.158 -0.152 
 (0.168) (0.245) (0.232) 
Hours of operation per week 0.00345 -0.000441 0.00784* 
 (0.00305) (0.00411) (0.00426) 
Number of workers   0.148*** 
   (0.0343) 
Constant 5.694*** 5.085*** 6.095*** 
 (0.488) (0.680) (0.665) 
    
Observations 380 179 201 
R-squared 0.146 0.204 0.209 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: All regressions include city dummies 
The results in table 4.11 shows the effects of owner’s education and family 
background on profits. The results are generally similar to the sales regressions. 
However, in contrast to the sales regressions, owner’s education in column (1) 
increases profits. The results also show that, education of the owner increases profits 
by 10.7% (in line with the results for sales revenue) for firms without workers. For the 
smallest firms without workers, owner’s education appears to have the potential to 
improve the owner’s ability to perform generic entrepreneurial tasks such as 
identifying and exploiting opportunities, and being able to allocate resources 
efficiently and this impact positively on profits as well as sales. As in the sales 
regression, there is no significant effect of education on profits for firms with workers. 
In a separate regression reported in the appendix (A4.5), the results show that for firms 
with workers, the negative effect of education is driven by owners with primary and 
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secondary education qualifications. Owners with university education although 
insignificant, have a positive effect on firm profits. 
Regarding the effects of family background, the results are similar to the sales 
regression. Owners whose parents have no business ownership are associated with 
lower profits. The effects are larger for firms with workers. Lack of such experience 
reduces profits by 34.1% and 43.1% for firms with workers and firms without workers 
respectively. This appears to confirm that owners whose parents owned/own a business 
are given an early introduction to entrepreneurship, which pay off in their own 
businesses, not just in sales revenue but also in profit. Of course, there is also the 
possibility that owners with entrepreneurial parents may help their children through 
the labour market connections they have made. Similar to the sales regression, there is 
a negative insignificant effect of parents’ education on profits for firms with workers. 
The number of workers has a positive influence (increasing profits by 14.8%) and 
experience of the owner in the business is negative. However, in contrast to the sales 
regression, while the gender dummy variable takes a negative sign, female owners do 
not appear to impact significantly on profitability. Hours of business operation in 
contrast to the sales regression has a positive effect on profits for firms with workers 
although only at the 10% level. There are no significant effects of owner’s age on firm 
profits in all three regressions. 
Overall, this evidence suggest that owner’s education is important but only for 
the smallest unregistered firms without workers. The finding of the importance of 
family business experience in this chapter echoes the results on the importance of 
family background for urban wage workers in Chapter 3. In an economy characterised 
by high transaction costs, poor institutions and tougher government business 
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regulations, it is plausible to conclude that, family background effect through exposure 
to parents’ business ownership experience could be a viable factor for performance of 
unregistered urban firms.  
4.6.3 Intention to register: Effects of education and family background 
Firms will generally weigh up the benefits and costs associated with remaining 
unregistered when deciding whether to register. While there may be potential benefits 
of registering due to an increase in sales and profitability, it is important to understand 
how owner’s education, firm size, and other individual and firm characteristics affects 
the intention to register. Firm and owner characteristics are important in the decision 
to register, not only through their effect on future firm success (material benefits). 
Owner characteristics may affect decision-making through how they influence 
perceptions of the moral and psychic benefits (World Bank, 2009). Owner 
characteristics can also affect how credit constraints bind, which is particularly 
important in Ghana given the high financial costs associated with registering to operate 
formally.  
The owner characteristics included in the estimation are education, experience, 
gender, age, and family background. Experienced and older firm owners should in 
particular have better knowledge of the business environment and therefore in a better 
position to decide between registering and remaining unregistered. Among firm 
characteristics, firm size is included, as this is likely to affect both the costs and 
benefits of not registering. Firms without workers may choose to remain relatively 
small in order to reduce chances of detection by tax authorities, while firms with 
employees that have higher profits will be more inclined to register even if only to 
have better access to credit facilities. In any case, it is increasingly difficult to remain 
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undetected by the authorities as firm size increases and so registration may become a 
legal imperative. Profits are also included as a determinant of the intention to register, 
simply because businesses that are more profitable can pay the taxes and start-up fees, 
which was found earlier to be one of the obstacles to registration.  
The major drawback from this estimation is that responses are only predictions 
that do not confirm that firm owners actually registered. There is however, ample 
evidence from the descriptive support in section 4.4 that firms with an interest to 
register have more educated owners, an indication that partially allows me to draw 
conclusions about the accuracy of these responses. Table 4.12 shows the results from 
estimating the logit regression modelling intention to register. Appendix 4.6 shows 
results that measures education using a categorical variable. Results from these are 
similar to the ones presented in this section. 
Table 4. 12 Logit estimates of the intention to register: Average marginal effects 
DV: Intention to register All firms 
Firms 
with no 
workers 
Firms 
with 
workers 
        
Education 0.0234*** 0.0339*** 0.0130 
 (0.00673) (0.0111) (0.00919) 
Log of monthly profit 0.0289 0.00494 0.0320 
 (0.0177) (0.0229) (0.0268) 
Parents: No business 
ownership 0.0249 0.131* -0.0742 
 (0.0469) (0.0698) (0.0624) 
Parents: Post-basic 
education 0.0846 0.104 0.0782 
 (0.0595) (0.0805) (0.0902) 
Experience in business 
sector 0.00209 0.00830* -0.000241 
 (0.00322) (0.00435) (0.00436) 
Age of owner -0.00128 -0.000480 -0.00455 
 (0.00228) (0.00375) (0.00326) 
Female Owner -0.00001 -0.0122 0.0348 
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 (0.0488) (0.0674) (0.0703) 
Business sector: Services -0.00251 0.0992 -0.0736 
 (0.0485) (0.0699) (0.0648) 
Own funds -0.114 -0.0617 -0.168* 
 (0.0730) (0.0978) (0.0927) 
Not married 0.0344 0.0259 0.0256 
 (0.0570) (0.0807) (0.0838) 
Firm size: Firms with 
employees 0.159***   
 (0.0459)   
Number of workers   0.0341** 
   (0.0171) 
Log pseudolikelihood -217.97 -99.67 -106.02 
R-squared 0.19 0.24 0.22 
Observations 389 191 198 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: All regressions include city dummies 
In column (1), there is a strong positive effect of education on the intention to 
register for all firms (but not firms with employees in column (3)). Each extra level of 
education increases the intention to register by 2.3 percentage points. In the regressions 
in appendix A4.6 that uses a categorical variable for education, the results show that 
the effects of education on intention to register are significant at secondary and 
university education levels, with no significant effects for owners with primary 
education. This suggests that education may have the potential to promote greater 
awareness of the benefits of formality. This interpretation is in line with Babbitt et al. 
(2015) who find that education increases formalization in Indonesia because it gives 
informal entrepreneurs security to operate their businesses. The results also show that 
it is owner’s whose parents have no business ownership that are more likely to register 
rather than parents’ education in firms with no workers. This effect is only significant 
at 10% level. A possible explanation to this is that since these firm owners do not 
benefit from parents’ business ownership advantage, intending to register may be a 
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viable option for them to grow their business. While it is expected that profitable firms 
will be able to pay taxes, fees and other costs associated with registration, all three 
specifications show that profits although positive do not have any significant effect on 
intention to register.  
Experienced owners are more likely to register in firms without workers 
although this is only significant at the 10% level. This suggest that experienced owners 
in the smallest firms may have accrued enough capital to register and grow their 
business. In direct contrast, age of the owner decreases the likelihood of registration 
but this is insignificant. Business sector and marital status of the owner are 
insignificant. The value of the dummy variable recording whether or not the firm has 
employees in columns (1) and the variable recording the number of workers in column 
(3) are both positively significant. These results indicate that larger firms with workers 
have a higher chance of registering and among firms with workers, employing more 
workers raises owner’s intention to register. This may be in part because firms with 
workers are easier to detect and are therefore subject to more inspections by 
government officials. Interestingly, gender is insignificant, suggesting that women in 
general are no more likely to prefer operating in the informal sector even if it provides 
greater flexibility in terms of working hours, thus allowing them to fulfil their 
household responsibilities.  
The result that education of the owner is only significant for firms without 
employees is in line with the earlier results for firm sales and profits. One interpretation 
may be that since, in firms with no workers, owner’s education is linked to both sales 
and profits, more successful firms without workers that view registration as a 
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necessary step in firm growth have more educated owners who are willing to benefit 
from other advantages associated with registration. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 As with many other developing countries, Ghana is characterised by a 
historically large informal sector and low human capital investment. The formal sector 
has a greater proportion of workers with higher levels of education and relatively 
higher wages compared with the informal sector where incomes are lower. Despite the 
importance of education on labour market returns, studies have tended to ignore the 
potentially positive role education may have in the informal sector. One explanation 
for this neglect is that education is assumed to make little contribution to improving 
productivity and profitability in informal economic activities, largely because these 
activities are traditionally manual and low skilled. However, the private informal 
sector in Ghana is important and this study has examined the determinants of 
performance among unregistered i.e. informal urban firms with particular focus on the 
role of the owner’s education and their family background measured as parents’ 
education and parents’ business experience.  
One of the main findings is that despite education being an important 
determinant of productivity, measured here by sales revenue and profitability, the 
importance is only relevant for the smallest unregistered firms without workers. A 
possible interpretation is that, for firms without workers, owner’s education is directly 
important because owners have to rely on their own ability and skills in the daily 
operation of the business. In contrast, in firms with workers, the education of owners 
is less directly important, a result admittedly difficult to explain. Regarding the 
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positive effect of education for firms without workers, these indicate that, analogous 
to the labour market returns to schooling for wage employees, there are positive effects 
of owner’s education on productivity and profits in the informal sector. In other words, 
education is important for the smallest firms without workers, even in areas where 
wage work opportunities are limited. For the finding on the insignificance of owner’s 
education in determining business performance, other studies of small businesses in 
poor developing countries (Pasquier-Doumer, 2013) have also made such a finding. 
Although difficult to explain, the implication is that in circumstances of poverty, and 
in a challenging urban environment, running a successful business depends more upon 
family connections and experience, than formal education, which is plausible. The 
finding of the importance of parents’ business ownership in this chapter echoes the 
results on the importance of parental influence for individuals in urban wage 
employment in Chapter 3. 
The finding that parental business ownership assists business performance in 
informal firms in Ghana is in line with the literature and consistent with 
intergenerational transmission of skills. Parents’ business ownership effect on firm 
sales and profit finding suggests that whatever the environment, be it developed or less 
developed, formal or informal, mentoring of an individual in business management by 
his/her parent is important. An early introduction to entrepreneurship from working in 
a family business or simply seeing how a family business is operated is enough for 
individuals to learn basic business skills.  
The study also examined whether owner’s education and family background 
have any significant effect on the registration of a business given their earlier 
importance for performance in firms without workers. The results indicate a positive 
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effect of owner’s education on the intention to register among firms without workers. 
This suggests that educated owners in the smallest unregistered firms without workers 
might be in a better position to grow their business, since formalizing could be 
considered a necessary part of this process. 
 The findings from this analysis have important policy implications for Ghana. 
Formal education and informal education through learning and ‘apprenticeship-type’ 
training from family businesses that provides an opportunity correlated with business 
success can potentially enhance the process of poverty alleviation by improving the 
skill set of micro unregistered firm owners. A key consideration will be to formalise 
these informal learning processes by encouraging apprenticeship training at the 
national level for individuals with entrepreneurial prospects, and those unable to 
continue higher education because of poverty. This can help reduce the growing 
unemployment rate in urban areas, and could potentially lead to an increase in private 
sector activities to complement the high demand for public sector jobs, as well as an 
improvement in the skill content of the labour force.   
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Appendix 
Table A4.1. Correlation among main variables: Firms without workers 
  
Log of 
monthly 
sales 
Log of 
monthly 
profits 
Education Experience Parents 
no 
business 
ownership 
Parents 
Post-
basic 
education 
Female 
owner 
Intention 
to 
register 
Log of monthly 
sales 1.00        
Log of monthly 
profits 
 
0.892*** 1.00       
Education 
 
0.191*** 
 
0.173*** 1.00      
Experience 0.091 0.058 0.006 1.00     
Parents no 
business 
ownership -0.132** -0.110 -0.11* 0.1096* 1.00    
Parents Post-basic 
education -0.0001 0.008 0.312*** 0.0294 -0.143** 1.00   
Female owner -0.087 -0.013 -0.206*** -0.160*** 0.051 -0.018 1.00  
Intention to 
register 0.117* 0.065 0.217*** 0.0791 0.062 0.175*** -0.096 1.00 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A4.2. Correlation among main variables: Firms with workers  
  
Log of 
monthly 
sales 
Log of 
monthly 
profits 
Education Experience Parents 
no 
business 
ownership 
Parents 
Post-
basic 
education 
Female 
owner 
Intention 
to 
register 
Number 
of 
workers 
Log of monthly 
sales 1.00         
Log of monthly 
profits 0.866*** 1.00        
Education 0.041 0.0498 1.00       
Experience 0.091 0.056 -0.081 1.00      
Parents no 
business 
ownership -0.158*** -0.186*** -0.097* 0.085 1.00     
Parents Post-basic 
education -0.112* -0.093 0.1895*** -0.036 -0.056 1.00    
Female owner  -0.154*** 0.002 -0.322*** -0.042 0.021 0.007 1.00   
Intention to 
register  0.222***   0.176*** 0.153*** 0.016 -0.077 0.098* -0.155*** 1.00  
Number of 
workers 0.198*** 0.125** 0.102* 0.214*** -0.045 0.101* -0.107** 0.153*** 1.00 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A4.3 Firm performance by level of owner’s education 
  
Firms with no 
workers 
Firms with 
workers 
Panel a. Monthly sales (in Cedis) 
No education 659.58 2421.97 
Primary education 1192.44 1513.92 
Secondary education 1040.59 1817.55 
University education 1636.67 1925.71 
Panel b. Monthly costs (in Cedis) 
No education 286.89 653.24 
Primary education 300.08 655.37 
Secondary education 303.11 669.66 
University education 203.78 867.00 
Panel c. Monthly profit (in Cedis) 
No education 396.09 2021.67 
Primary education 924.82 897.19 
Secondary education 746.32 1157.00 
University education 1285.00 843.14 
 
Table A4.4. Effects of owner’s education and family background on firm sales 
  (1) (2) (3) 
DV: Log of monthly sales All firms 
Firms 
with no 
workers 
Firms 
with 
workers 
        
Basic education 0.0770 0.653*** -0.364 
 (0.210) (0.228) (0.279) 
Secondary education 0.196 0.867*** -0.374 
 (0.236) (0.258) (0.321) 
University education 0.607 1.429** -0.216 
 (0.376) (0.585) (0.473) 
Parents: Post-basic 
education -0.238* -0.154 -0.223 
 (0.132) (0.165) (0.217) 
Parents: No business 
ownership -0.287*** -0.266* -0.229* 
 (0.102) (0.140) (0.138) 
Experience in business 
sector 0.0114 0.0166* 0.00362 
 (0.00707) (0.00994) (0.00963) 
Own funds -0.352** -0.571*** -0.198 
 (0.149) (0.209) (0.201) 
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Use electricity -0.282** -0.271* -0.295* 
 (0.113) (0.150) (0.164) 
Use cell phone 0.521*** 0.518*** 0.300 
 (0.127) (0.161) (0.201) 
Age of owner 0.00286 0.00482 -0.00250 
 (0.00527) (0.00632) (0.00766) 
Female Owner -0.219 0.0927 -0.401** 
 (0.133) (0.175) (0.190) 
Hours of operation per 
week 0.00186 -0.000542 0.00456 
 (0.00225) (0.00308) (0.00319) 
Number of workers   0.114*** 
   (0.0312) 
Constant 6.556*** 5.727*** 7.203*** 
 (0.387) (0.489) (0.561) 
    
Observations 450 214 236 
R-squared 0.141 0.205 0.205 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: All regressions include city dummies 
Ref group for education: no education 
Table A4.5. Effects of owner’s education and family background on firm profits 
  (1) (2) (3) 
DV: Log of monthly profits All firms 
Firms 
with no 
workers 
Firms 
with 
workers 
        
Basic education 0.257 0.807** -0.247 
 (0.283) (0.319) (0.378) 
Secondary education 0.494 1.255*** -0.219 
 (0.307) (0.345) (0.409) 
University education 1.149** 1.851** 0.259 
 (0.449) (0.798) (0.532) 
Parents: Post-basic 
education -0.317* -0.304 -0.225 
 (0.174) (0.228) (0.280) 
Parents: No business 
ownership -0.408*** -0.323 -0.407** 
 (0.136) (0.195) (0.185) 
Experience in business 
sector 0.00865 0.0181 -0.00141 
 (0.00951) (0.0150) (0.0126) 
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Own funds -0.479** -0.638** -0.358 
 (0.192) (0.290) (0.233) 
Use electricity -0.409*** -0.392* -0.398* 
 (0.147) (0.202) (0.221) 
Use cell phone 0.542*** 0.620*** 0.297 
 (0.157) (0.205) (0.247) 
Age of owner 0.00535 0.00704 -0.000416 
 (0.00676) (0.00823) (0.00998) 
Female Owner -0.0422 0.162 -0.144 
 (0.168) (0.245) (0.233) 
Hours of operation per week 0.00364 -0.000407 0.00811* 
 (0.00303) (0.00415) (0.00427) 
Number of workers   0.136*** 
   (0.0371) 
Constant 5.859*** 5.207*** 6.279*** 
 (0.509) (0.691) (0.711) 
    
Observations 380 179 201 
R-squared 0.153 0.207 0.215 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: All regressions include city dummies 
Ref group for education: no education 
Table A4.6. Logit estimates of the intention to register: Average marginal effects 
  (1) (2) (3) 
DV: Intention to register All firms 
Firms 
with no 
workers 
Firms 
with 
workers 
        
Basic education 0.0990 0.136 0.0405 
 (0.0753) (0.0923) (0.111) 
Secondary education 0.280*** 0.375*** 0.164 
 (0.0803) (0.102) (0.121) 
University education 0.396*** 0.572*** 0.221 
 (0.129) (0.147) (0.188) 
Log of monthly profit 0.0283 0.00346 0.0326 
 (0.0172) (0.0226) (0.0267) 
Parents: No business 
ownership 0.0301 0.140** -0.0710 
 (0.0466) (0.0675) (0.0620) 
Parents: Post-basic 
education 0.0471 0.0542 0.0539 
 (0.0610) (0.0806) (0.0913) 
218 
 
Experience in business 
sector 0.00281 0.00961** 0.000318 
 (0.00313) (0.00414) (0.00431) 
Age of owner -0.00195 -0.000935 -0.00513 
 (0.00229) (0.00352) (0.00333) 
Female Owner 0.00278 -0.0122 0.0448 
 (0.0497) (0.0698) (0.0707) 
Business sector: Services -0.00480 0.0981 -0.0784 
 (0.0493) (0.0701) (0.0651) 
Own funds -0.114 -0.0794 -0.161* 
 (0.0735) (0.0971) (0.0974) 
Not married 0.0359 0.0247 0.0271 
 (0.0571) (0.0805) (0.0837) 
Firm size: Firms with 
employees 0.161***   
 (0.0457)   
Number of workers   0.0336* 
   (0.0177) 
    
Log pseudolikelihood -215.12 -97.53 -105.15 
R-squared 0.20 0.25 0.22 
Observations 389 191 198 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 5.1 Summary of studies and findings 
This thesis first set out to examine the effects of family background (educated 
parents, and household’s lack of access to basic amenities) on school enrolment of 
biological and non-biological children in rural and urban areas. The thesis also 
examined how family background (again parents’ education) enhances both education 
and then earnings of individuals in wage employment. Lastly, the thesis examined the 
importance of an informal entrepreneur’s education and family background for his/her 
firm’s performance among unregistered urban businesses. This section provides a 
summary of the main findings from these three inquiries. Table 5.1 shows summary 
results on the effects of education and family background. 
5.1.1 Conclusions on chapter 2: Gender differences in education among 
biological and non-biological children: educated parents and household poverty 
In the first empirical study, household data on parents and children from the 
2006 GLSS was used to determine how educated parents and household resources 
(measured as access to basic amenities) were related to children’s schooling enrolment 
probability in rural and urban areas. Family background, as measured by parental 
education, proved to be strongest in rural areas. In particular, the study found the 
effects of educated fathers to be more important than educated mothers for both boys’ 
and girls’ schooling enrolment. Educated mothers only helped boys, perhaps 
indicating more “traditional” values among women, who emphasise sons’ education, 
given that, sons traditionally support their parents in old age. In urban areas, the effects 
of educated parents were weaker, which is plausible given the weaker influence of 
traditional family ties. Here, if anything, parental education – particularly of the 
220 
 
mother – helped girls’ education (rather than boys), again indicating the weakening of 
traditional pro-son ties. Interestingly, however, for non-biological urban children, the 
(step) mother’s education is seen to be actually adverse, suggesting that these children 
fulfil a servant-type role to facilitate the educated mother’s market work. 
These results on the effects of both educated mothers and fathers on biological 
and non-biological boys’ schooling enrolment in rural areas, thus, indicate that rural 
parents may still have a preference for boys’ education, simply because boys’ 
compared with girls are more likely to provide future financial support ‘pensions’ to 
parents in old age. Urban educated parents on the other hand, are less traditional and 
may have access to, for instance, pensions and savings. They therefore do not expect 
financial support from children especially boys, in old age, promoting more investment 
by parents in their daughter’s schooling in urban areas.  
The access to basic amenities variables, for its part, showed that poor access to 
water and light strongly reduced both boys’ and girls’ school enrolment probability, as 
expected, although the effects were again generally stronger for girls. The larger effect 
on girls can be related to the fact that in Ghana’s rural areas it is the girls rather than 
the boys who traditionally spend more time collecting firewood and fetching water. 
The general findings from this chapter are that girls schooling enrolment are 
better in urban areas possibly because the expectations of old-age care through 
financial support from children may be less relevant for educated urban parents. Boys’ 
schooling enrolment, on the other hand, are important in rural areas because rural 
parents are more traditional and may rely on boys to provide old-age financial support. 
These are in line with the literature (Li and Lavely, 2002; Hannum, 1998; Parish and 
Willis, 1993; Brown and Park, 2002) that because boys, compared with girls are more 
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likely to provide future financial support to parents in old age, parents are more willing 
to invest in their education. The finding also that children’s school enrolment 
probability reduces in households with limited access to basic amenities is supported 
by evidence from the literature (Lloyd et al., 2008; Hannum, 1998) that the enrolment 
gap between boys and girls is exacerbated when households face financial constraints. 
The results from further examination on the effect of household lack of access to basic 
amenities using the number of hours spent on household activities (from table 2.5) is 
also consistent with Amin et al. (2006) for Bangladesh that an increase in time spent 
on household work reduces girls’ education.  
Table 5. 1 Summary of findings on the effects of education and family background 
Panel a. Effects of family background on education (schooling enrolment) 
 Biological children Foster children 
 Rural  Rural 
 Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Father educated 0.0515** 0.124*** 0.143** 0.229*** 
Mother educated 0.0882** 0.032 0.0768 0.017 
 Urban Urban 
 Boys Girls All 
Father educated 0.015 0.0648*** 0.151**  
Mother educated 0.021 0.0485** -0.115**   
Panel b. Effects of family background (parents education) on earnings 
 
Indirect effect 
(via 
education) 
Direct effect Total effect 
  
Men  0.013*** 0.0052 0.0184***  
Women 0.0232*** 0.0028 0.0260***  
Urban areas 0.0155***  0.0075*** 0.023***  
Rural areas 0.0135*** -0.004 -0.0095  
Urban men 0.0136*** 0.0081* 0.0217***  
Urban women 0.0216*** 0.0051 0.0267***   
Panel c. Effects of education and family background on informal business 
performance 
 Firms with no workers Firms with workers 
 Sales Profits Sales Profits 
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Owner's education 0.0761*** 0.107*** -0.0257 -0.0073 
Parents: Post-basic 
education -0.136 -0.249 -0.192 -0.172 
Parents: No business 
ownership -0.276** -0.341* -0.248* -0.431** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Sources: Panel a: Table 2.5 and table 2.8; Panel b: Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7; Panel c: Tables 4.9 and 4.11 
5.1.2 Conclusions on chapter 3: Direct and indirect effects of family 
background on earnings  
In the second empirical study, individual data from the 2006 GLSS was used 
to examine the linkages between family background, education, and earnings of adults 
aged 25 to 60 years in wage employment. A simultaneous equation model was 
estimated to determine the effect of family background on earnings both with and 
without a control for the individual’s education. If family background determines 
education, but not earnings given education, the implication is that connections and 
nepotism are not important in the Ghana labour market.  
In fact, the study found some evidence of direct effects of family background 
on earnings given education for adults in urban areas, and in particular men. However, 
in rural areas there were no evidence of such direct effects. This finding makes sense, 
because in rural areas labour markets are thinner and businesses smaller, so there is 
less room for connections and nepotism to have an effect. In addition, rural parents, 
due to their lower levels of education may not have enough influence in the labour 
market to support their children into wage jobs. In urban areas where labour market 
activities are more vibrant and challenging, with relatively higher unemployment rates 
(6.3% in urban areas, 8.9% in Accra, compared with 1.6% for rural areas, (GSS, 
2008)), access to wage jobs may be more difficult. Family background (parents’ 
education) through parents’ “connections” could therefore be a viable option to gain 
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quicker access into wage jobs. For men, due to the larger proportion in wage jobs 
(which the descriptive statistics from chapter 3 suggests), entry into high-paid jobs 
may be more difficult compared with women. As a result, men rather than women are 
more likely to benefit from positive family background effects, in addition to their own 
level of education. 
This evidence of nepotism in urban wage jobs is less surprising. In a labour 
market where notices of job vacancies are difficult to access, personal referrals and 
contacts become a feasible option for employers. Despite Ghana having an adult 
literacy rate of 71.5% in 2010, mean years of schooling (7.5 years) falls below the 
expected years of schooling of 11.5 (HDR, 2015), equivalent to completion of senior 
secondary school. With the relatively lower mean years of schooling, it is plausible 
that family background and other networking effects may complement success in the 
labour market. At the moment, the process of hiring in the formal sector is less 
standardised, and tend to favour individuals who have “connections”, what is 
commonly referred to as “whom you know”, or individuals whose parents have good 
knowledge of the labour market, and know people of higher standings in society. Some 
employers also still rely on word-of-mouth referral in the hiring process, which again 
goes to suggest that children of wealthy parents (educated parents) may benefit more 
from this advantage. Where the influence of family background and nepotism persist, 
then it is possible that access to wage jobs will remain a privilege of a fortunate few. 
Bratsberg et al. (2007), however, suggest that one possible way to reduce the 
positive effect of family background on human development and economic success in 
the labour market is the provision of a system of education that is able to create a 
homogenous educational qualifications floor for all individuals.  
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The evidence of nepotism in urban wage jobs is consistent with the literature. 
For instance, Pellizzari (2010) argue that in labour markets with intermediaries, the 
effects on wages of finding jobs through personal contacts is generally higher, which 
is similar for the case of Ghana. In support of the effect of family background on 
earnings, Hudson and Sessions (2011) argue that the positive effect arises because 
educated parents are well-connected than less educated parents, and as such they are 
able to secure good jobs for their children. My finding is also in line with Raitano and 
Vona (2015), who find for Italy that parental background exerts a significant influence 
on the earnings of sons. 
5.1.3 Conclusions on chapter 4: Education, family background, and 
performance of unregistered urban firms 
The final empirical study examined the effect of the firm owner’s level of 
education and family background on business performance (sales and profits) among 
informal (unregistered) firms in five urban areas using data from the 2013 World Bank 
Ghana Informal Firm Survey. By considering the informal economy that is more 
disadvantaged due for instance, to government regulations on business start-ups, the 
study indirectly considered the heterogeneous self-employment group that was not 
covered in the second empirical study on formal wage work (which are best, in the 
Ghana context). Disaggregating by firm size, the study found owner’s education to be 
important for only unregistered businesses without workers. For businesses with 
workers, there was no finding of a significant effect of education, a result that was 
admittedly difficult to explain, although other studies of small businesses in poor 
developing countries (Pasquier-Doumer, 2013) have also made such a finding. In 
general, for owners of informal businesses, parental education was unimportant. What 
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was important for all business owners, however, was having parents who operated or 
still operate a business. A possible interpretation is that, in circumstances of poverty, 
running a successful business depends more upon family connections and experience, 
rather than formal education, which is plausible. In fact, my finding that firm owners 
with family business experience have higher sales and profits is exactly in line with 
the literature. The implication of this finding is that whatever the environment, be it 
developed or less developed, formal or informal, mentoring of an individual in 
business management by his/her parents is important. Firm owners with an 
introduction to business management through working in family businesses at an early 
age have higher chances of performing better in their own businesses.  
The results also showed a positive effect of owner’s education on the intention 
to formally register for firms with no workers. The implication here is that the educated 
self-employed who may be preparing to take on workers, are more likely to take the 
formal route when growing their business. The finding that profits are not important 
in firm owners’ intention to register suggest that it may not necessarily be the costs 
associated with registering a business that is the issue. There are likely to be other 
unidentified obstacles. More research is therefore needed to address this issue.  
The finding of parental business ownership to raise sales and profits in both 
businesses with and without workers is consistent with the literature that family 
business background act as a channel for the transmission of business knowledge and 
skills to future entrepreneurs (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Fairlie and Robb, 2007; 
Kim et al., 2006). Unregistered urban business owners will therefore benefit from 
advantages of informal learning and business management experience from their 
parents, which could then translate to increased sales and profit. With the importance 
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of the informal sector in Ghana by way of generating employment opportunities and 
incomes for individuals, it is plausible that formalising some of these informal learning 
activities can be important for performance and skill development of unregistered 
business owners. For instance, encouraging apprenticeship training at the national 
level for individuals with entrepreneurial prospects could be an initial step towards 
improving the human capital level of those unable to enter into the formal wage sector. 
This would help reduce the unemployment rate (in the formal sector), and could 
potentially lead to an increase in private sector activities which can then complement 
the high demand for public sector wage jobs.  
Throughout this thesis, two consistent messages have emerged; firstly, that 
family background, in the form of educated parents is important for child development. 
Family background directly enhances the schooling enrolment chances of children, 
both biological and non-biological, and facilitates higher earnings for adults in wage 
jobs through its direct and indirect effects. However, the parental education component 
of family background is less important as regards the performance of unregistered 
urban businesses, whereas having parents with experience in running businesses is the 
vital factor. Secondly, that education plays a key role in economic success by 
mediating the positive effects of family background on individual earnings, and 
enhances performance of the smallest informal businesses without workers.  
 
5.2 Implications of findings and future research 
In Ghana, there are still some areas where school enrolment is low, especially 
in rural areas, partly because of financial constraints faced by such households. For 
example, the rate of educational attainment at secondary and tertiary levels is generally 
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low as found from the descriptive statistics in chapter 3. Compared with lower levels 
of education, secondary and post-secondary education should ideally have a much 
larger impact on children’s outcomes, such as long-term earnings. An area for further 
research will be for me to use a longitudinal study (with support and funding from 
international development and donor organisations) to track the education and 
enrolment of individuals at the secondary and post-secondary levels, and their 
employment outcomes. To establish causal effects, intervention programmes such as 
cash transfers can be implemented and evaluated to determine whether the availability 
of finance can significantly increase educational attainment of children from 
households that face financial constraints. It is also important to examine the 
relationship between educational outcomes and labour market outcomes (e.g. in terms 
of earnings) of such individuals. 
As regards parents’ possible reliance on children, especially boys, in rural areas 
for old-age financial support ‘pensions’, an important consideration for future research 
is to investigate whether providing poorer parents with a non-voluntary pension system 
can increase school enrolment and educational attainment of children, particularly 
those in rural areas. Currently in Ghana, only 7.6% of adults who are above the 
statutory pensionable age receive an old-age pension20 (HDR, 2015). Compared with 
Brazil and South Africa where non-voluntary pensions have been introduced and noted 
to have a significant impact on poverty reduction (HelpAge International and IDPM, 
2003), the rate of adults above the statutory pensionable age in receipt of an old-age 
pension in the two countries are 86.3 and 92.6% respectively (HDR, 2015). With 
evidence for South Africa and Brazil that introduction of a non-voluntary pensions 
                                                   
20 This is expressed as a percentage of the eligible population. 
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systems led to a reduction in poverty, there is however no evidence to show that 
introduction and provision of a non-contributory pension systems could lead to an 
improvement in school enrolment and educational attainment of children in 
rural/poorer households. If the reasons for low or non enrolment in rural areas is as a 
result of poverty, then this can be a first step towards addressing the issue. But of 
course, such an investigation can only be possible after the introduction of a non-
voluntary pensions systems in Ghana. An intital approach to address this issue will be 
to implement an intervention programme similar to PROGRESA (Levy, 2007), for a 
sample of regions, that identifies poorer households as recipients of “pensions”. Where 
the programme proves successful, then this can be implemented to cover the entire 
country. There might, of course, be concerns regarding administering this system, 
especially given the lower tax bases in Ghana. However, Willmore (2007) find that in 
some developing countries, basic social pensions account for only a small percent of 
GDP. This means that an introduction of this system could be possible for Ghana. 
An investigation of the impact of time-use on women’s non-agriculture wage 
work is also on my list of future research considerations. According to the Ghana Time 
Use Survey 2009 (GSS, 2012), 59% of women compared with only 12% of men were 
involved in activities such as fetching water for use by the household each week. 
Similarly, 71% of adult women compared with 15% of adult men collected firewood 
for use as fuel at home. Women were also likely to engage in other unpaid time-use 
activities such as taking care of the elderly. When individuals, mainly women devote 
time to both wage work and non-wage work, then, it is important to know how the 
associated trade-offs and constraints impact on their non-agricultural wage work 
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participation, especially in Ghana and other sub-Saharan African countries where 
many households have limited access to basic amenities.  
Lastly, an important consideration for future work on enterprises in Ghana is 
to extend the current study to registered firms. An interesting area of investigation is 
to examine the skill component of workers (based on their level of education) and 
whether or not educated workers complement the skills of the firm owner, as well as 
examining their importance for firm performance. If entrepreneurs that are more 
skilled are able to run larger firms because of their managerial ability, which is due in 
part to their level of education, they can perhaps also attract highly educated workers. 
This complementarity could be associated with higher productivity in large firms and 
higher wages for workers (as a reward for the higher productivity and compensation 
for their human capital investments).  
In conclusion, this thesis has highlighted the complementary roles of education 
and parental influence on schooling and labour market success in Ghana. The 
constraints of poverty measured by household access to basic amenities have also been 
highlighted, as have differences in the situations faced by those living in rural and 
urban parts of Ghana. Overall, the evidence from this study suggests that there is plenty 
of scope for policy interventions to improve future opportunities for Ghana’s children 
and those involved in labour market activities.  
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